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FOREWORD BY WILLIAM LACY SWING
The impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on human mobility are complex and often long-lasting. People may 
migrate, for instance, because of environmental 
degradation as such, or because environmental 
degradation has led to the loss of their livelihood. 
In some cases, people have no choice but to move. 
In other situations, people choose to move. Then 
again, some who wish to move may not have the 
means to do so. The State of Environmental Mi-
gration shows the complexity of migration in the 
context of environmental degradation and cli-
mate change and calls attention to environmental 
migrants by offering insights on climate-related 
events of the year 2011, their migratory impacts, 
and the policies and programmes that were devel-
oped in response.
The working relationship between the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) and the 
Institute for Sustainable Development and Inter-
national Relations (IDDRI) and, via IDDRI, Paris 
School of International Affairs at Sciences Po, is 
based on a shared vision that well-managed mi-
gration can be an effective climate change adapta-
tion strategy, an innovative response that empow-
ers migrants and strengthens communities. This 
new edition of The State of Environmental Migra-
tion marks the second consecutive year that these 
organisations have worked together to present an 
overview of current issues in the field of climate 
change and migration. The volume brings to light 
recent research conducted by students on the 
topic of migration, the environment and climate 
change. Their views should therefore not be seen 
as expressions of IOM’s or IDDRI’s policy positions 
but as the outcomes of their independent research 
activities.
The studies in this publication offer both fresh 
analysis and novel solutions on migration in the 
context of natural disasters. They cover a wide 
variety of situations, including, for instance, pro-
posed infrastructure and public works projects to 
enhance resilience to flooding in Bangkok, Thai-
land; an examination of the efficacy of circular 
migration policies enacted in response to flooding 
in Colombia; and an analysis of policy responses 
to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. These 
articles offer concrete assessments of current 
shortcomings in policies related to disaster risk 
reduction and steps that can be taken to enhance 
preparedness and response capacity. Other papers 
examine potential approaches to mitigating slow-
onset climate change in countries such as Spain 
and Mexico, highlighting the severe humanitarian 
consequences resulting from a type of climatic dis-
aster that is too often overlooked. While each pa-
per addresses a specific situation, they all empha-
size how migration policy can be used as a tool to 
manage the pressing needs of vulnerable commu-
nities to adapt to disparate environmental hazards. 
As the threat of climate and environmental 
change continues to present challenges to com-
munities and policy makers alike, IOM trusts that 
the second edition of The State of Environmental 
Migration will be a useful resource for both policy 
makers and the general public. ❚
Director General, 
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
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Major forces of change, including climate change, are already at play in natural and human environments across the world. 
Environmental degradation has measurable im-
pacts on migration and presents humanity with 
unprecedented challenges. The diversity of these 
challenges argues for a new strategic approach to-
wards policy development. Failing to incorporate 
migration within the policy discourse could seri-
ously undermine potential alternative livelihood 
strategies. 
Incorporating the voices of tomorrow within the 
current policy discourse is an important step in de-
veloping strong future leadership needed to tackle 
these difficult challenges. So with this new edition 
of The State of Environmental Migration, it is my 
pleasure to present our yearly qualitative assess-
ment of the changing dynamics of environmental 
migration based on a collection of student research 
papers and case studies documenting some of the 
most significant situations that took place in 2011. 
It is thanks to this new generation’s expertise, ded-
ication and contributions that we have ensured a 
broad, global perspective on how to confront and 
overcome these current challenges and events.
I am particularly grateful to IOM’s strong com-
mitment to making The State of Environmental Mi-
gration an annual publication. The collaborative 
partnership between IOM and IDDRI present an 
excellent opportunity to raise public awareness of 
the complex nature of environmental migration, 
facilitate policy discourse, and share knowledge 
and insights concerning the links between migra-
tion and climate change. I am also most grateful 
to Sciences Po’s School of International and Public 
Affairs (PSIA) for supporting this important initia-
tive and for contributing to the success of this edi-
tion of The State of Environmental Migration, and 
look forward to those that will follow in the forth-
coming years. ❚
FOREWORD BY LAURENCE TUBIANA
Director, 
Institute for Sustainable Development  
and International Relations (IDDRI)
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INTRODUCTION
François Gemenne, Pauline Brücker and Dina Ionesco
While scientific research on environmental migra-
tion has considerably expended over recent years, 
The State of Environmental Migration once again 
gathers and documents major cases of environ-
mentally-induced migration and displacement 
that happened during the year 2011. It is meant 
to feed scholar studies and eventually political 
discussions. The existence itself of this volume 
underscores the importance of the subject, but also 
the complexity of the phenomenon. As we stressed 
last year in the 2010 edition of The State of Envi-
ronmental Migration, diversity and universality 
are common features of environmental migration: 
be they labeled migrants or refugees, affected by 
human-made or natural events, all those migrating 
or being displaced seek protection, livelihood and 
opportunities for a safer future. 
Environmental migration, 
in its forced and voluntary 
forms, is a reality
Unsurprisingly, the plight of environmental and 
natural disasters, at a time of profound economical 
and migration crises, affected both the North and 
the South. The losses in 2011—about the double of 
the 2010 toll—were the highest ever recorded, at 
US$ 380 billion1. This includes the US$ 210 billion2 
resulting from the earthquake that hit Japan on 
March 11, 2011, a disaster that became the costliest 
in history. Though the number of fatalities from 
these disasters was lower than feared, the human 
toll was no less significant, with major popula-
tion displacements occurring in Thailand, Bang-
ladesh, and of course Japan, where a staggering 
number of 350,000 people—and rising—are still 
displaced at the time of writing. According to the 
1. According to the annual 2011 statistics released by the 
NatCat Service of re-insurance company Munich Re.
2. This amount excludes the cost of the nuclear accident 
that followed. 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), 
14.9 million people were internally displaced in 
2011 throughout the world due to natural disasters, 
mostly related to weather events such as floods 
and storms. 89% of the displacement occurred in 
Asia.3 The IDMC Report also shows that China had 
the highest number of people newly displaced, 
with a total of 4.5 million people displaced by ten 
events, including floods, storms and earthquakes 
throughout the year.
Millions of people were also displaced by slow-
onset degradations of their environment. Although 
being given less publicity in the media, slow-onset 
events threaten millions of households throughout 
the world, and often result in complex emergen-
cies where environmental crisis feed existing insta-
bility and political tensions. The drought that af-
fected the Horn of Africa was labeled by the UN as 
the ‘worst humanitarian disaster’. Millions of peo-
ple were driven away from their homes, both inter-
nally and regionally. The refugee camp of Daadab, 
in Eastern Kenya, close to the Somalia border, al-
ready the largest camp in the world, was continu-
ously fuelled by people fleeing the drought and 
the famine, mingling with those fleeing conflicts. 
Eastern Africa was not the sole region affected by 
droughts, and this report also documents other 
crises from Mexico to Morocco.
If droughts and desertification are currently the 
major drivers of slow-onset environmental crises, 
floods and erosion associated with sea-level rise 
are growing threats, as global warming intensifies 
year after year. 2011 was a record year for green-
house gas emissions: according to the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), 34.83 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide were emitted, a 3.2% jump over the 
previous year. 
3. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) and 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Global estimates 
2011: People displaced by natural hazard-induced disas-
ters (June 2012)
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We can thus expect that human mobility will 
remain and increasingly become a consequence 
and a response to climate change impacts on live-
lihoods. According the Gallup World Poll (2011)4, 
more than one in ten adults worldwide say they 
expect to move because of the environment.
Policy responses: managing 
migration in the context 
of climate change and 
environmental degradation
Significant policy developments have occurred 
while the scientific recognition of the phenomena 
was growing. In late 2010, at the Cancun Climate 
Change Conference5, delegates agreed that poli-
cies and projects on migration associated with 
climate change would be able to receive funding 
as a form of adaptation to climate change through 
the Green Climate Fund for instance. This signaled 
a radical shift in the way environmental migration 
was perceived: it was no longer necessarily consid-
ered as a failure to adapt, but could also become 
a way for people to adapt to a changing environ-
ment. This is a point that we had highlighted in 
last year’s SEM report, and which is again empha-
sized in different cases featured in this report.
This shift of perspective was reinforced with the 
publication of the 2011 Foresight report6, a major 
research effort conducted by the UK Government. 
The report also advocated that migration could be 
an effective adaptation strategy for populations 
confronted with environmental changes, but also 
highlighted the plight of the ‘trapped populations’, 
that is, populations that find themselves unable to 
move when confronted to environmental changes. 
Indeed, as our report shows—in the cases of Ja-
pan or Thailand, for example—the most vulner-
able populations are often unable to escape the 
degradations of their environment because they 
lack access to resources, transport, networks and 
information. 
In 2011, the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCC) followed up on the 
4. Gallup World Poll: the Many Faces of Global Migration 
(based on research in more than 150 countries), IOM and 
Gallup, 2011.
5. UNFCCC, Cancun Agreements 2010, paragraph 14f: 
“Measures to enhance understanding, coordination 
and cooperation with regard to climate change induced 
displacement, migration and planned relocation, where 
appropriate, at the national, regional and international 
levels”.
6. Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change 
(2011), Final Project report, The Government Office for 
Science, London.
Cancun Agreements, with the “Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action”.  This roadmap will serve 
the drawing up process of a legal framework for 
climate action by 2015, to be implemented by 2020. 
Yet, if the thematic of migration is anchored in the 
climate change text since the COP in Cancun, no 
more advances on migration-related issues were 
specifically made in Durban. Nevertheless, pro-
gresses were achieved on programmes such as 
National Adaptation Plans and Loss and Damage, 
which are related to and impact issues of forced 
migration, planned relocation, displacement and 
migration as an adaptation strategy.
Amongst the most noteworthy policy develop-
ments in 2011 was the Dhaka Ministerial Declara-
tion of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, following a 
major ministerial meeting held in Bangladesh. The 
Declaration7 was signed by nineteen of the most 
vulnerable countries to climate change: it empha-
sizes concerns raised by displacement, relocation 
and related security matters, and it recognizes mi-
gration in its voluntary and well-managed forms 
as a “viable adaptation strategy”. Policy awareness 
of the impacts of climate change on human mobili-
ty is definitely growing, as highlights several other 
declarations released in 2011.8 
Moreover, in June 2011, the Norwegian govern-
ment, with the support of the Swiss government 
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR), proposed the Nansen Principles, a set of 
7. Dhaka Declaration: “Aware that climate change induced 
displacement of people is a major concern and their relo-
cation puts enormous pressure on infrastructures and 
service facilities; and furthermore, large-scale displace-
ment has the potential to transform into security con-
cerns; Recognizing that migration is a viable adaptation 
strategy to ensure that populations are not compelled 
to reside in high risk and affected areas, and to manage 
risks during displacement; and furthermore a planned 
strategy in the long-term to offer displaced populations 
with enhanced options for dignified and diversified 
livelihood; (…)In particular, we call for the immediate 
implementation of paragraph 14 (f) of the Cancún Agree-
ments, which recognises that migration is a viable adap-
tation strategy to address human displacement induced 
by climate change, and includes undertaking measures 
to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation 
with regard to climate-induced displacements, migration 
and planned relocation, and in this respect call for the com-
mencement of an international dialogue for an appropri-
ate framework”. The full Declaration can be viewed here: 
http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/
Dhaka.Declaration.pdf
8. Other declarations released in 2011 include the Global 
Migration Group (GMG) Statement, the European Union 
Consultation paper on “Migration and Climate Change” 
(as part of the overall Communication package on the 
European Global Approach to Migration) and the Dhaka 
Declaration of the Colombo Process Member Countries 
mentioning the “possible nexus between environmental 
degradation and climate change on one hand and human 
mobility on the other”.
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guidelines to foster the protection of those forci-
bly displaced because of disasters. A key outcome 
of these principles was reached on 2 October 2012 
with the launch of the Nansen Initiative, an in-
tergovernmental consultative process aimed at 
defining a protection agenda for those displaced 
across borders by disasters. Meanwhile, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) was flagging the issue 
as one of primary importance for the Asia-Pacific 
region and advocating more regional and bilateral 
cooperation, within a development agenda.9 In-
deed, the Asia-Pacific region experiences the high-
est levels of environmental migration, and this 
report documents the significant displacements 
that took place last year in Thailand, China, Bang-
ladesh, and of course Japan. Additional insights in 
migration and climate change related issues were 
provided by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) and partners report10 showing 
how change in climate trends exacerbate existing 
vulnerabilities and may become new drivers for 
conflict or forced migration. IOM for its part has 
long recognized the linkages between the environ-
ment and population movements and has sought 
an active role in instigating action and discourse in 
the international community. 
From the abovementioned examples, we can 
see that policy-makers and international organisa-
tions are indeed coming to grip with the challeng-
es posed by environmental migration. However, 
countries often still lack the capacities needed to 
take action. One major obstacle to policy devel-
opment is that environmental migration calls for 
complex cross sector policy responses. Policy mak-
ers need to tailor activities within the intertwined 
fields of emergency relief, humanitarian respons-
es, long-term development strategies, urban and 
rural planning, human rights, security, disaster 
risk reduction and adaptation to climate change. 
This raises concrete issues about which projects 
can be developed and who should fund them.
Operational solutions: 
supporting and protecting 
environmental migrants
The year 2011 was marked by a large number of 
floods and weather-related events that led to 
important population displacements and called for 
9. IOM-ADB Policy Dialogues on Climate Induced Migra-
tion, Geneva (June 9th 2011) and Bangkok (June 16th-
17th 2011) http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/iom-adb-
policy-dialogues-on-climate-induced-migration/cache/
offonce
10. Livelihood Security Climate Change, Migration and Con-
flict in Sahel, UNEP, IOM, OCHA UNU and CILLS, 2011.
both urgent and long-term operational responses. 
Indeed, natural disasters have immediate and 
lasting effects that necessitate measures to reduce 
the incidence of forced migration. When natural 
disasters hit, the immediate response is humani-
tarian; at the international operational level, the 
“cluster system” aims to strengthen the efficiency 
of humanitarian action11 to directly respond to 
forced migration, in particular due to sudden 
onset events. However, on the long term, solutions 
need to include development, adaptation and 
disasters risk reduction elements – in a nutshell, to 
go beyond short-term policy responses to longer-
term planning, aimed at preventing forced forms 
of migration and facilitating voluntary mobility. 
Once the critical immediate relief stage is over, 
solutions for people affected and displaced are 
diverse and part of the sustainable livelihoods ap-
proach, with activities targeted at building transi-
tional or permanent shelter support, finding suit-
able relocation space, integrating families on tran-
sition or permanent relocation sites, return when 
possible, reparation programmes, Disaster Risk 
Management support and other capacity building 
and preparedness activities. The current edition 
of The State of Environmental Migration shows in 
each case study how the operational responses are 
diverse, but often constrained by the local, nation-
al and regional conditions and capacities.
Noting for instance that droughts are longer, 
more frequent and more intense; knowing that 
droughts drastically reduce livelihood coping ca-
pacity for many communities, it is important to 
acknowledge that migration can be an adaptation 
mechanism. The examples of slow-onset events in 
the current edition show that facilitated migration 
as an adaptation strategy is possible, even though 
it is still a rare option and raises many implementa-
tion questions.
Introducing The State of 
Environmental Migration 2011
In its 2011 edition, The State of Environmental 
Migration particularly focuses on cross-border 
displacement, and the securitization of migra-
tion, cutting across all policy sectors mentioned 
above. The Indian-Bangladeshi, US-Mexican and 
Morocco-Spanish borders stress the difficulties 
that neighbors found, especially if presenting 
different social and/or religious and economic 
status, in pacifically and humanly dealing with the 
migration issue. As this volume presents, in some 
11. CCCM Cluster, Global Camp Coordination and Camp 
management Cluster, Newsletter, Issue 1, October 2011, 
UNHCR and IOM
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cases the lack of protection standards and legal 
status of those displaced aggravates a situation 
where quotas, walls and externalization processes 
of migration control considerably limit possibili-
ties of migration. 
This edition also attracts attention on the di-
versity and complexity of human mobility in the 
context of climate change and environmental deg-
radation. While writing the papers, students were 
often confronted with a number of terminology 
challenges. Should they speak of forced migrants, 
internally-displaced people, environmental mi-
grants, evacuees, relocated populations? Very 
often, situations are not clear cut. Natural disas-
ters can combine for instance with conflict situa-
tions causing large number of displaced families, 
making it difficult to identify one single cause for 
migration. Moreover, the multi-causal nature of 
migration makes it often difficult to isolate the 
environmental factors from other social, political, 
economic or demographic ones. In addition, in 
many cases, it is difficult to say whether migration 
is voluntary or forced, as people often make con-
strained choices. The glossary (pages 130-131) of-
fers some guidance on the terms used throughout 
the report, while some of the chapters still contain 
mixed choices of words, due to the difficulty to de-
scribe complex situations.
We like to think that The State of Environmen-
tal Migration is doing its part in raising aware-
ness about the plight of the people who are on the 
move, year after year, because their environment 
is changing, sometimes brutally. Environmental 
changes are now acknowledged as a major cause 
of migration and displacement across the world, 
and this report aims to document the cases where 
such population movements occur. Though envi-
ronmental migration remains largely perceived as 
an issue affecting only developing countries, our 
report shows a more contrasted reality. Though 
developing countries remain a prime focus of at-
tention, in particular because they tend to be the 
most severely hit by the impacts of climate change, 
our report shows that industrialized countries 
also have to deal with environmental migration. 
Indeed, our report documents situations in some 
of the planet’s poorest countries, such as Bangla-
desh or Somalia, but also in some of richest coun-
tries, such as Japan or the United States. It shows 
situations of desperate plights and dire humani-
tarian crises, but also situations where migration 
was used as a tool by resourceful individuals, as a 
way to deal with an environmental crisis.
This report is the work of the students from the 
graduate course ‘Environment and Migration’ 
taught at the Paris School of International Affairs 
of Sciences Po. They have been supported by a 
team of editors who compiled their reports into 
this edition of The State of Environmental Migra-
tion. The cases presented here are not the result of 
a direct fieldwork, but rather of a careful review 
of secondary sources and interviews with actors 
directly involved on the field. The report does not 
claim to be exhaustive in its coverage of the cases 
of environmental migration in 2011. Many cases are 
indeed not documented in this report—the Washi 
typhoon that brought havoc in the Philippines, for 
example—but an exhaustive coverage of all cases 
would be impossible, as the cases are simply too 
numerous and too diverse, reflecting the wide va-
riety of migration patterns that can be found un-
der the umbrella of ‘environmental migration’. 
This new edition of The State of Environmen-
tal Migration is an attempt to document some of 
the most significant situations that took place in 
2011. Some of them were reported in the media 
when they occurred; others were not. Some will 
be the subject of further academic inquiries; oth-
ers will not. Meanwhile, we found important to 
provide empirical evidence of these situations, so 
that policy debates can be fed with a qualitative, 
yearly assessment of the changing dynamics of 
environmental migration. This is the ambition of 
this edition of The State of Environmental Migra-
tion, and of those that will follow in the forthcom-
ing years. ❚
PART 1 SUDDEN 
DISASTERS
Sudden disasters catalyse enormous media attention and gener-
ally inspire massive response on the part of governmental and non-
governmental actors. They often induce large-scale displacements, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath. But these displacements can 
also occur months after the event and can transform into long-term 
or permanent migration, as the chapter on the Fukushima disaster 
shows. The year 2011 has been the costliest ever for disasters, with 
a total cost amounting to US$ 380 billion, according to re-insurance 
company Munich Re. This sections highlights the human costs of these 
disasters. In 2011, more than 15 million people have been displaced by 
disasters, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. 
Some of the most salient cases of displacement are presented here, 
spanning across the globe from Thailand to Colombia, China and 
Bangladesh. And of course the 11 March catastrophe in Japan, by far 
the disaster that attracted the most attention in 2011.
Photo credits: Tagajo city, situated 12km north east of Sendai city on 20 March 2012. © 2012. Reiko Hasegawa (IDDRI)
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ENVIRONMENT AND MIGRATION:  
THE 2011 FLOODS IN THAILAND
PATRICK PHONGSATHORN
INTRODUCTION
The floods which inundated Thailand from 
August to December 2011 were the worst in living 
memory for most Thais. Originating in the North 
and Northeast of the country, the floods severely 
affected sixty-five of Thailand’s seventy-seven 
provinces. In total, over 13 million people were 
affected, more than 800 were killed, and around 
160,000 were displaced. The World Bank esti-
mates that the floods caused $46 billion worth of 
economic damage, making it one of the top five 
costliest natural disaster events in history (The 
Economist, 2012). Although the initial government 
response to the disaster was faltering, it eventu-
ally got to grips with the situation. The decision, 
however, to divert flood waters to save central 
Bangkok, causing massive damage and displace-
ment in rural and suburban areas, remains contro-
versial. Moreover, with climate change and rapid 
development combining to seemingly exacerbate 
the flooding to which the country is prone, the 
government’s response to the 2011 Floods will be 
of critical importance for the future peace and 
stability of the nation. 
The response of the Thai authorities in this re-
gard may also prove instructive to Thailand’s re-
gional neighbours who face similar and, in some 
cases, more significant threats. According to the 
Asian Development Bank, in 2010-11 alone 42 mil-
lion people in Asia and the Pacific were displaced 
by “extreme environmental events”, and the re-
gion is “the most prone to natural disasters, both 
in terms of absolute numbers and populations 
affected” (Asian Development Bank, 2012) . The 
scale of this challenge requires innovative thinking 
and planning on the part of governments and soci-
eties across Southeast Asia. 
Often only seen as a negative consequence of 
natural disasters, migration should also be viewed 
as part of climate change strategy. This chapter 
will firstly give an account of the 2011 Floods in the 
Kingdom of Thailand, describing the economic, 
political and social impacts the floods have had. 
Map 1. Map of Thailand
Source: CIA World Factbook
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Next, we will look more closely at the impact the 
floods had on populations in terms of environmen-
tal migration and the government’s response to 
the floods. Finally, this chapter will detail the pol-
icy options available to the Thai authorities in the 
wake of the 2011 Floods, and will recommend that 
migration should be harnessed within a strategy 
of national risk diversification and sustainable de-
velopment. Much of this chapter will address the 
2011 Floods as they affected Thailand’s capital city, 
Bangkok. This is not to play down the impact of the 
floods on other parts of the country, but rather to 
draw attention to the specific issues faced by Bang-
kok during the floods, and the challenges it faces 
in the future.  
1. THE 2011 FLOODS AND 
THEIR IMPACTS
The Bangkok Metropolitan Region is situated in 
the delta of the Chao Phraya River basin, an area 
of 159,000 km2, or around 39% of the total area of 
Thailand. The region lies in a central floodplain 
with an average elevation of one to two metres 
above sea level. Typically floods originating in the 
north of the country have inundated this flood-
plain region. These floods have usually taken 
prolonged periods to drain due to Bangkok city 
acting as a “bottleneck” to floodwaters, obstructing 
their natural flow into the Gulf of Thailand (World 
Bank, 2010a). Bangkok has a tropical monsoon 
climate, which produces heavy precipitation 
particularly between May and October. As such, 
Bangkok is no stranger to large-scale flood events. 
Major floods have occurred in 1942, 1978, 1980, 
1983, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2006, and of course most 
recently in 2011. According to a recent World Bank 
report, future flood events in Thailand are set to 
be more frequent, covering a larger area of land 
and therefore affecting more of Bangkok’s citi-
zens (World Bank, 2010a). The evidence from 2011 
certainly suggests this prediction to be accurate.
In the first nine months of 2011 rainfall levels 
were found to be 32% higher than normal (see Fig-
ure 2), as the country felt the effects of three sepa-
rate tropical storms Nock-Ten, Haitang and Nesat 
(Thai Meteorological Department, 2011). Severe 
and violent flooding was first experience in the 
northern regions of Thailand in August, affecting 
infrastructure, crops and households in areas such 
as Chiang Mai, Udon Thani and Nong Khai (Bang-
kok Post, 2011a). By September, the floodwaters 
had quickly spread to 55 of Thailand’s 77 provinces. 
The flooding continued to create havoc, destroy-
ing crops, inundating industrial parks, and forcing 
factories owned by multinational companies, such 
as Honda and Sony, to temporarily shut down (Ten 
Kate and Yuvejwattana, 2011). 
By October the historically- and industrially-
rich region of Ayutthaya had been inundated forc-
ing private residences, hospitals and prisons to 
be evacuated (The Nation, 2011a). Residents of 
Bangkok prepared for the waters by moving be-
longings upstairs, stocking up on vital commodi-
ties or by getting out of the city entirely. By late 
October floodwater had breached the barriers 
of Don Muang International Airport in the north 
of the city, forcing the government’s Flood Re-
lief Operations Centre based there to relocate to 
dryer ground (The Nation, 2011b). The Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority began evacuating neigh-
bourhoods to the north and northwest of the city, 
whilst monitoring those to the east and west. As 
November wore on, up to a fifth of Bangkok be-
came submerged. Communities located near and 
Figure 1. Accumulative Rainfall in Towns and Cities of Northern Thailand, May 1 to October 31, 2011
Source: Thai Meteorological Department, 2011
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beside the canals through which the floodwaters 
surged were severely affected. As the end of the 
year approached it seemed likely that the majority 
of Bangkok city centre would be saved by a mix-
ture of government action and pre-existing flood 
protection measures. All the while, however, many 
suburban and rural areas surrounding the city re-
mained submerged. By the beginning of 2012 most 
of the floodwater had drained off from the streets 
of Bangkok into the Gulf of Thailand. Despite this, 
the economic, political and social impacts of the 
2011 Floods continue to be felt well into 2012.   
1.1. The economic impacts
Thailand’s 2011 Floods had a significant impact on 
the national economy. The Thai economy took a 
sharp dip in the fourth quarter largely due to the 
floods (see Figure 3). Overall, in 2011 the Thai 
economy grew by only 0.1% (Robinson, 2012). 
For an emerging market such as Thailand which 
in recent years has become used to 5-8% annual 
growth rates, this sharp decline represented an 
economic shock. Thailand’s economy is highly 
dependent on exports such as rice, of which it is the 
world’s largest producer, and manufactured goods 
such as cars and electronics. Thailand is also a major 
tourist destination; typically this sector makes up 
6-7% of annual GDP (Bangkok Post, 2008). The 
2011 Floods had a major effect on all sectors of the 
Thai economy, with manufacturing and tourism 
taking the hardest hits (Robinson, 2012). 
The impact of the 2011 Floods was also felt in 
the world economy. J.P. Morgan estimates that 
the floods set global industrial production back 
2.5% (The Economist, 2012). Individual compa-
nies such as Honda, Toshiba and Western Digital 
suffered major losses from flood damage and loss 
of production. Sony, experienced a net loss of $2.1 
billion for the final three months of 2011, blaming, 
among other factors, interrupted production due 
to the floods for their weak performance (BBC 
News, 2012). Coming so soon after the Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami, as well as a string of 
preceding natural disasters, the 2011 Floods com-
pounded what has been an extremely costly year 
in terms of damage caused by natural disasters.    
1.2. The political impacts
As well as the economic costs, the political fallout 
of the 2011 Floods has also been significant. As 
demonstrated by the violence which erupted on 
the streets of Bangkok in 2010, Thailand’s politics 
are currently deeply divided. A poisonous polit-
ical atmosphere infects every issue in Thailand, 
even ones as seemingly technical as flood mitiga-
tion and prevention. During the floods decisions 
on how, when, and whether to protect central 
Bangkok from the waters became highly politicised 
topics. Talk of Bangkok elites having “contempt” 
for the poor and sacrificing less well-off areas of 
the city were rife during the floods (The Nation, 
2011c). Despite the politics surrounding the issue, 
the imperative to save central Bangkok from the 
worst of the flooding was clear. Bangkok is home 
to almost 12 million inhabitants, contains vital 
national infrastructure and produces around 
42% of Thailand’s GDP (World Bank, 2010b). Had 
the whole city been badly flooded it would have 
constituted a national emergency. The long-term 
challenge for the government will be to lessen the 
vulnerability of Bangkok, possibly through the 
relocation of some of the country’s assets away 
from its capital city.  
In the short-term the government will need to 
rebuild and repair damaged infrastructure and 
put in place immediate measures to mitigate the 
effects of future extreme weather events. In this 
regard, Thailand is receiving financial and tech-
nical assistance from its international partners. 
The German and Dutch governments have offered 
valuable technical assistance, and the Japanese 
government has agreed to provide 8 billion yen 
(almost $98 million) to help the reconstruction 
effort and to build new flood defences (Bangkok 
Post, 2012a). Seeing as much of the infrastructure 
affected by the floods also serves Japanese busi-
nesses based in Thailand, this assistance has ad-
vantages for both countries. 
1.3. The social impacts
Thailand’s international partners, as well as 
various UN agencies and NGOs, were vital in 
Figure 2. Evolution of Thailand’s GDP 2009-2011
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responding to the humanitarian crisis caused by 
the flood. In total, over $20 million was donated 
to directly aid the victims of the flood. In addition, 
the Royal Thai Army deployed a total of 56,000 
personnel to aid the flood relief effort (World 
Bank, 2012a). The Thai authorities were also 
assisted by two U.S. Navy helicopters, deployed 
to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the flooding 
(Vaswani, 2011). This international response is 
symbolic of the magnitude of the floods and the 
humanitarian toll this disaster took. 
It is estimated that as many as 1.5 million homes 
and other structures were affected by the floods, 
with around 300,000 homes being damaged in the 
greater Bangkok Metropolitan Region alone (Aon 
Benfield, 2012). Livelihoods were also severely af-
fected. Known as the ‘Rice Bowl of Asia’, rice pro-
duction plays a highly significant role in Thailand’s 
economic, social and political life. It is estimated 
that the floods wiped out as much as 14% of paddy 
fields (Javier and Suwannakij, 2011). This devas-
tation threatened to seriously impact the incomes 
of farmers and the wellbeing of communities de-
pendent on low rice prices. Due to a mixture of lo-
cal resourcefulness and government intervention, 
rice production has not been adversely affected 
(Sinpeng, 2012). It was not only in rural areas, 
however, that the impact of the flood was felt. 
Perhaps the populations taking the hardest hit 
from last year’s floods were impoverished urban 
communities based in and around central Bang-
kok. Such communities are often established 
around Bangkok’s network of canals, in cramped, 
make-shift settlements (see Figure 4). As such 
these settlements are extremely vulnerable to 
flooding. Even before the floods reached Bang-
kok, these communities were suffering from the 
rise in vital commodity prices caused by panic buy-
ing and shortages (Voice of America, 2011). Pro-
duction of certain commodities was also severely 
interrupted by the floods, causing real health 
threats. In particular, bottled water supplies were 
affected when the floods knocked out production 
at all of Thailand’s biggest water suppliers (Fuller, 
2011a). As a result, members of Bangkok’s most 
vulnerable communities were not able to stock up 
on essentials before the floods hit, putting them in 
a bad position to deal with the disaster.
2. THE FLOODS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
In this section we will look more closely at the 
environmental migration caused by this sudden-
onset disaster. The response of the Thai authorities 
to the 2011 Floods will then be discussed.
2.1. Population displacement 
and ‘trapped populations’
The 2011 Floods were one of the most prolonged 
periods of flooding Thailand has ever experi-
enced, causing the highest levels of popula-
tion displacement seen in the country since the 
Second World War (Tansubhapol, 2011). At their 
height the number of internally displaced people 
(IDPs) reached more than 165,000 (World Bank, 
2012a). Due to the relatively slow progression of 
the floodwaters, however, this displacement was 
generally well-ordered and the authorities, as well 
as non-governmental organizations and private 
citizens, were in a good position to come to the 
aid of the majority of the displaced. At the peak 
of the flooding around 2,600 shelters took in over 
165,000 IDPs (World Bank, 2012a). 
Initially, as the floods affected the rural north 
and northeast of the country, communities were 
displaced either towards local disaster shelters, to 
regional cities, or towards Bangkok, depending on 
their social and financial capacity to relocate. In 
late October when the flood waters reached Bang-
kok, the government declared an emergency five-
day holiday and urged residents living in flooded 
or flood-prone areas to evacuate to safer locations. 
Major disaster shelters were established within 
Bangkok in sports stadiums, university campuses, 
Vulnerable Migrant Communities in Bangkok: 
Living on the Edge
Since the latter half of the twentieth century Thailand has enjoyed rapid 
economic development, increasing urbanization and migration towards 
the capital. There are approximately 3.5 million international migrants in 
Thailand, the majority of whom originate from the surrounding countries of 
Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos (IOM, 2011). Thailand also experiences high 
levels of internal migration, amounting to approximately 1.2 million people 
annually (IOM, 2011). These migrant communities often live in informal 
settlements in urban and peri-urban settings which are exposed to variety 
of vulnerabilities. Firstly, they are often made up of poor quality housing, 
precariously balanced on the edge of canals (see Figure 4). Such proximity 
to canals and the poor quality of housing creates a multitude of health, 
environmental and disaster-related dangers. Secondly, due to the informal 
and often illegal nature of these settlements they lack the infrastructural 
and social support afforded to other communities, negatively impacting 
their ability to cope with floods and other natural disasters. Thirdly, again 
owning to their often illegal nature, these settlements are periodically tar-
geted by the authorities for relocation (Davivongs et.al., 2012).The precari-
ous legal and environmental existence of migrant communities in Bangkok 
discourages them from investing in improvements to the quality of their 
homes and neighbourhoods, increases their social marginalization, and 
exposes them to a lack support and capital necessary to cope with the 
impact of floods and other natural disasters.  
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and airport terminals. Many residents preferred, 
however, to flee the city entirely, with large num-
bers heading towards the southern beach towns of 
Hua Hin, Pattaya and Phuket, and others towards 
safer cities in the country (Konglang, 2011). Air-
ports, bus terminals and train stations all became 
packed to capacity and those wishing to leave by 
road faced traffic jams of between six to ten hours 
(Tansubhapol, 2011). 
Some of Bangkok’s residents did not have the 
capacity to leave the city and became trapped in 
their residences with little access to daily necessi-
ties for the duration of the floods. According to the 
government, this trapped population amounted to 
as many as 800,000 individuals in Bangkok alone 
(Tansubhapol, 2011). As the floods continued this 
trapped population became increasingly isolated, 
and without access to electricity, clean water or 
easy access to food, this population became sus-
ceptible to a variety of health risks including skin 
infections, dysentery, malaria, dengue fever, acci-
dental drowning and electrocution (Bland, 2011).  
The inability or unwillingness of certain sectors 
of Bangkok’s society to move away from flooded or 
flood-prone areas stemmed from their pre-existing 
vulnerabilities in society. Sectors with particularly 
high-levels of marginalization and vulnerabil-
ity include migrant communities (see Box 1). The 
floods significantly impacted locations and indus-
tries with high migrant concentrations, including 
industrial parks in Ayutthaya, Pathum Thani and 
Nakorn Pathom provinces where many migrants 
are employed. The inundation of these locations 
put many migrant workers, temporarily or per-
manently, out of work. The already vulnerable 
position of migrants was, therefore, further weak-
ened by the 2011 floods. Lacking employment, 
many migrant workers decided to return to their 
countries of origin. Between September and No-
vember 2011 around 100,000 migrants from My-
anmar returned to Myanmar through the Mae Sot 
border pass (Bangkok Post, 2011b). 
2.2. Response of the 
thai authorities
During the floods the authorities took a variety 
of steps to manage the disaster, provide aid to 
victims, and communicate information on the situ-
ation to effected communities and the nation as a 
whole. Initially, the actions of the authorities came 
across as confused and uncoordinated, displaying 
a lack of preparedness and an unwillingness to 
cooperate during a time of national catastrophe. 
Miscommunication was rife and the newly-elected 
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra seemed more 
willing to delegate and “skirt around tough deci-
sions” than get to grips with the situation (Pong-
sudhirak, 2011). Moreover, political infighting 
between the government and the opposition-led 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration led to 
contradictory reports, public confusion, and a 
failure to take advantage of the international assis-
tance offered to Thailand (Alertnet, 2011). 
The response of the authorities was supposed 
to be coordinated through the Flood Relief Op-
erations Command (FROC), an ad-hoc body cre-
ated by the government. Until the Prime Minister 
personally took charge of this body, however, its 
efforts were significantly hampered by infighting 
Photo credits : © IOM 2007 - MTH0249 (Photo: Thierry Falise)
A view of the Mae La refugee camp in Thailand. 
STUDY 06/20111 8 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2011 
and a lack of coordination with other agencies. 
The direct involvement of Prime Minister Yingluck 
appeared necessary as it became increasingly clear 
that some officials were not obeying her instruc-
tions. As well as taking direct control of flood man-
agement efforts, the Prime Minister also declared 
that the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act 
would be thoroughly enforced, a law which in-
cludes punishments for disobedient officials (Full-
er, 2011b). With the chain of command clarified 
disaster management efforts seemed to improve. 
Political questions still persist, however, over the 
response of the authorities, especially their deci-
sion to safe-guard central Bangkok, while keeping 
surrounding communities inundated. 
Anger was particularly directed at the use of 2.5 
tonne sandbags, employed to protect central Bang-
kok (Alertnet, 2011). While offering protection 
from inundation to some, these sandbags trapped 
flood waters in neighbourhoods particularly in 
the north of the capital for weeks destroying 
homes and livelihoods and enflaming communal 
tensions. For the fledgling government of Prime 
Minister Yingluck, elected on a largely populist 
agenda, the decision to appear to sacrifice poorer 
neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Bangkok for 
the privileged city centre has made many question 
the governments’ loyalties. 
There was also a controversy over the treat-
ment of migrants and discriminatory distribution 
of assistance. During the floods many migrants 
avoided evacuating to disaster shelters for fear of 
arrest and deportation. Those who decided to seek 
shelter in their countries of origin faced extortion 
at the hands of border officials and opportunistic 
gangs (Petty, 2011). There have also been reports 
of discrimination against migrants in the deliv-
ery of flood assistance, and activists have claimed 
that the Thai authorities failed to help migrants 
trapped in houses and factories (Win, 2011).  
Since the end of the crisis period the govern-
ment has embarked on a major programme of 
recovery and reconstruction the estimated cost 
of which is THB 1.5 trillion, approximately $50 bil-
lion, over five years (World Bank, 2012a). A recent 
World Bank report, written in collaboration with 
the Thai Ministry of Finance, has presented an 
initial policy framework which may provide a clue 
as to the direction of recovery and reconstruction 
(World Bank, 2012a). 
The first policies presented are directed towards 
providing financial and infrastructural support 
to affected populations, with a particular focus 
on poorer and more vulnerable groups. The sec-
ond branch of this policy framework looks at in-
vesting in a more climate resilient Thailand. The 
report proposes strengthening flood and water 
management mechanisms, hazard mapping, early 
warning systems, and upgraded infrastructure as 
a means to this end. Thirdly, the report highlights 
the need to take advantage of the opportunities 
the reconstruction period present to rethink de-
velopment priorities, review land use practices, 
improve economic planning and environmental 
management, all with a view to reduce vulner-
ability to hazards and ease social conflicts (World 
Bank, 2012a). 
3. POLICY OPTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section we will review some of the policy 
options available pursuant to creating a more 
climate resilient Thailand. Firstly we will explore 
the development and migration challenges faced 
by Bangkok in relation to urban flooding. Secondly 
we will detail the policy options, of both a struc-
tural and non-structural nature, open to the Thai 
government in the wake of the 2011 Floods. Finally 
this section will make a case for integrating migra-
tion and migrants into the policy response.
3.1. Migration and urban 
flooding in Bangkok
Over the past thirty years rapid urbanisation has 
created greater urban sprawl throughout the 
entire Bangkok Metropolitan Region, creating one 
of Southeast Asia’s largest mega-urban regions. As 
such, this region attracts migrants not only from 
rural areas of Thailand, but also from all around 
Southeast Asia. To provide employment for 
these newcomers developers have built commer-
cial centres and industrial zones all around the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region. Bangkok and its 
vicinity has thusly become a highly dynamic urban 
region accounting for nearly one half of all indus-
trial production in Thailand (World Bank, 2010a). 
But it has also caused a variety of new environ-
mental hazards, and has enhanced existing ones. 
One such hazard is urban flooding.  
The Bangkok Metropolitan Region, owing to its 
nature as a fertile floodplain, was originally set-
tled as a site for agriculture. As such, irrigation 
systems, constructed to facilitate farming and 
transportation, have been present in this region for 
centuries. Since the onset of rapid urbanization, 
however, many of the canals that make up these 
systems have been filled in or have been allowed 
to fill up with silt and debris through neglect. This 
has meant that agricultural areas surrounding ur-
banized zones have suffered from the disruption 
to irrigation system and have become untenable, 
making possible the continued outward sprawl 
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of urbanisation (Naivinit et.al., 2008). This con-
tinued urbanisation has further altered land use, 
changing water flows and expanding imperme-
able surfaces, thereby enhancing the flood hazard 
(World Bank, 2012b). 
The challenge to Bangkok has not only been the 
extent of urbanisation, but also the form that some 
of this urbanisation has taken. The phenomenon 
of seasonal migration poses a particular challenge 
for urban planners in Bangkok. This variety of mi-
gration has long been practiced by rural house-
holds as a response to “land pressure, economic 
crisis and/or opportunity, and the seasonal nature 
of rice cultivation in Thailand” (IOM, 2011: p. 14). 
Insufficient resources have, however, been dedi-
cated to this additional population, resulting in 
urban poverty, unsafe and unsanitary living con-
ditions, and a particularly weak level of resilience 
to floods and other natural disasters within these 
communities. 
As climates become more uncertain and extreme 
weather events more frequent, the need to build 
ecologically sound and well planned urban regions 
has become a priority for countries everywhere. 
Uncertain climates will also provide incentives 
and, in some cases, imperatives for populations 
to migrate. The ways in which Thailand faces the 
twin challenges of continued development and 
increased migration will determine the resilience 
of the nation to future floods and other natural 
disasters. 
3.2. Policy options: 
structural measures
Structural measures in flood risk management are 
changes induced in physical environments engi-
neered to manage the risk of flooding. Such meas-
ures typically include ‘hard-engineered’ solutions, 
such as dams and irrigation channels, but may also 
include ‘complimentary or alternative’ measures 
such as wetland creation (World Bank, 2012b). 
Although these measures are taken to modify 
the natural environment, they also have a social 
impact. A particular theme of heavily-engineered 
responses is that they tend to transfer flood risks 
from one location to another (World Bank, 2012b).
One structural measure already touted as a possi-
ble solution to Bangkok’s urban flooding problems 
is the dredging of canals. By dredging and clearing 
the debris from canals the authorities hope to im-
prove the capacity of these canals to carry flood-
waters safely out of the city. Currently, dredging 
projects are being carried out in 18 districts in the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region, with a further 12 
having been targeted for such projects (Dredging 
Today, 2012). These projects will hopefully also 
improve the environmental condition of Bangkok’s 
canals, and improve the lives of those living close 
to them, as well as reducing the risk of flooding 
within these areas. 
Another structural measure being adopted by 
the Thai authorities is the creation of water re-
tention areas, covering a total of 4,800 km2 of 
farmland. Districts in eight provinces, including 
in Ayutthaya Province, have been particularly 
targeted for the creation of water retention areas 
intended to absorb the bulk of floodwaters before 
they reach highly-populated areas. The creation of 
new floodplains is not entirely popular however, 
and petitions have already been lodged at the Ad-
ministrative Court by farmers whose land has been 
targeted by this scheme (Bangkok Post, 2012b). 
Figure 3. Site-Specific’s Amphibious House Project 
Source: http://asitespecificexperiment.wordpress.com/2011/05/12/
amphibious-house/
A perhaps more popular government programme 
would be one that seeks to improve the quality and 
resilience of housing, as part of a ‘build-back bet-
ter’ campaign. In earlier eras Thai buildings were 
built with floods in mind, in that they were built 
high off the ground on long stilts. In conceiving of 
modern buildings that would be able to cope better 
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with flooding events, Thai architecture firm Site-
Specific have come up with an innovative solution 
that harnesses elements of traditional Thai archi-
tecture to mitigate the effects of flood disasters. 
They have developed the concept of ‘Amphibious 
Houses’ designed with a prefabricated steel flota-
tion systems which sits in a trench underneath the 
house. In times of flooding the trench will fill with 
water, activating the flotation system and giving 
the house buoyancy (see Figure 5). Site-Specific 
has recently been given $90,000 by the National 
Housing Agency to see if their ‘Amphibious Hous-
ing’ project could become a reality (Tang, 2012). 
If this concept proves to be practical it may well 
become part of a wider programme to build-back 
better after the floods.
3.3. Policy options: non-
structural measures
Non-structural measures in flood risk manage-
ment are non-physical measures taken especially 
to enhance capacities to cope and respond to flood 
events (World Bank, 2012b). This category of flood 
response typically involves issues of governance, 
planning and awareness. The success of non-struc-
tural measures requires community engagement 
and clear communication. If these measures are 
successful they can reportedly provide “multiple 
benefits, over and above their flood management 
role” (World Bank, 2012b: p. 288). 
During the 2011 floods the response of the au-
thorities to the unfolding disaster often seemed 
confused and contradictory. Government mis-
communication created unnecessary panic and 
hampered disaster management efforts. Jerry Ve-
lasquez, a Senior Regional Coordinator with the 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, has stated that the problems of 
disaster response were due to the fact that there 
are “about eight institutions centrally that deal 
with water in Thailand” ( Global Ecology Network, 
2011). Having a more streamlined system of disas-
ter management with a clear chain of command 
would have multiple benefits. It would help to im-
prove the coherence of the government’s response, 
enable increased national preparedness, and im-
prove the clarity of government communication. 
Another non-structural measure that could be 
promoted in Thailand is the greater uptake of 
property insurance schemes. This measure could 
aid land use governance and enhance community 
resilience. Currently the level of household insur-
ance coverage in Thailand is low. Increasing cover-
age, in conjunction with improved urban planning, 
could improve community resilience by providing 
funds for repairs and improvements in the wake of 
future floods or other natural disasters. Moreover, 
through financial disincentives insurance schemes 
could be used to discourage inappropriate or dan-
gerous land use (World Bank, 2012b). Thailand as 
well as other emerging nations may become in-
creasingly important markets for insurance com-
panies in the future.       
Improved disaster response and resilience re-
quires a combination of both structural and non-
structural measures. The Thai government should 
also take this opportunity to rethink the develop-
ment policy of the nation and try to address the 
unbalanced nature of economic development in 
Thailand. One way to re-balance development 
would be to encourage the migration of people 
and industries to locations elsewhere in the coun-
try other than the Bangkok Metropolitan Region.
3.4. Policy recommendation: 
integrating migration into 
the disaster response
As pointed out by The Economist, “a growing share 
of the world’s population and economic activity is 
being concentrated in disaster-prone places” (The 
Economist, 2012). As one of Southeast Asia’s most 
dynamic mega-urban regions, which is also at 
continued risk of disastrous flooding, the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region is an example of this trend. 
Rapid development and urbanisation have aggra-
vated environmental hazards and endangered 
the lives and livelihoods of more people. More-
over, the unbalanced development of Bangkok 
in comparison to the rest of Thailand has placed 
many economic assets at unnecessary risk. This 
was exemplified by the massive economic damage 
caused by last year’s floods. Encouraging the 
migration of people and industries away from the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region could form part of a 
strategy of national risk diversification, and could 
help spread the benefits of development more 
evenly across the nation.
 As part of a build-back better policy agenda the 
government should also look to develop national 
infrastructure links, such as airports and highways, 
Migration towards Disaster Zones
As well as prompting population movements away from disaster zones, sud-
den-onset disasters can also pre-empt movements towards the affected areas. 
In the case of the 2004 Asian Tsunami migrant workers from rural areas and 
surrounding countries arrived in Thailand to take up reconstruction jobs (IOM, 
2007). Such employment will also be available in the wake of the 2011 Floods. 
As such, immigration policies may need to be modified to adjust to an increas-
ing need for migrant labour.
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in locations other than the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region. This would encourage the movement of 
industries to underdeveloped regions, would less-
en the strain on Bangkok’s infrastructure, and may 
well help to improve the environmental and eco-
logical health of Bangkok and its surroundings by 
decreasing the pollution levels. While employing 
such a strategy, however, the authorities should 
be cautious not to simply re-locate the problems 
faced by Bangkok to other locations. Any policy 
agenda aimed at building a more climate resilient 
Thailand should look towards achieving a more 
environmentally sustainable development model 
as part of a campaign to build-back better.
Finally, attention should also be given to the 
plight of migrant communities in the wake of the 
2011 Floods. They are some of the most marginal-
ized and vulnerable communities in Thai society, 
whose lives and livelihoods have been severely af-
fected by the floods. In the labour-intensive pub-
lic works programmes soon to be initiated by the 
government, priority employment should be given 
to vulnerable and marginalized sectors of soci-
ety, such as migrant communities (World Bank, 
2012a). Migrant communities should also be more 
productively engaged by the authorities in order to 
improve their resilience to floods and other natu-
ral disasters and to integrate them further into 
society. After the 2011 Floods Thailand should not 
only aim to be a more climate resilient society but 
also a more just and inclusive one as well.
CONCLUSION
Thailand has seen a strong economic recovery in 
the wake of the floods, experiencing a 0.3% GDP 
increase in the first three months of 2012 (Yuve-
jwattana and Munoz, 2012). The nation should 
therefore take this opportunity to start investing 
in a more climate resilient Thailand. With this 
aim in mind the government of Thailand should 
encourage the re-balancing of the Thai economy, 
towards underdeveloped upcountry locations 
and away from the over-burdened central plains 
area. Such a strategy would help to mitigate the 
risks associated with climate change, and may also 
help to ease tensions between urbanites and rural 
communities. 
Finally, special attention should be given to mi-
grant communities in the recovery process. These 
communities were perhaps some of the hardest hit 
during the floods, and some of the least able to re-
spond to such an impact. Yet in the recovery period 
their labour will be crucial. Such employment will 
hopefully mean that migrant communities will 
not be so vulnerable in the future and will become 
more valued sectors of Thai society. ❚
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TEMPORARY AND CIRCULAR LABOR MIGRATION 
BETWEEN SPAIN AND COLOMBIA
TATIANA RINKE
INTRODUCTION
Due to recent climatic events in Colombia, which 
were very probably triggered by the global 
climate change, many houses and livelihoods 
were destroyed and many people were forced 
to migrate. Indeed, since the late 1970’s, impor-
tant pattern changes in the climatic event El 
Niño-Southern Oscillation (EN-SO) have been 
observed. This climatic event is composed of El 
Niño and its counterpart La Niña. It manifests 
itself in a temperature variation of the ocean’s 
surface. The main reason for this is thought to 
likely be the global climate change induced by the 
emissions of greenhouse gases by mankind, even 
if the possibility of a random fluctuation has not 
yet been totally discarded (IPCC, 2007). When 
the coupled atmosphere-ocean event EN-SO 
appears, this happens in two phases. Typically, 
the first one to occur is El Niño, which warms the 
surface of the ocean by a few degrees. Generally, 
this climatic event happens more or less every 
five years and has important consequences on 
most of the continents. In the United States of 
America, for example, the winters are drier and 
warmer in north-western, north-midwestern and 
north-mideastern regions during “El Niño-years”. 
Tropical cyclones are also influenced and the rain-
fall pattern is greatly disturbed. In opposition to 
El Niño, La Niña is a climatic occurrence during 
which the average surface temperature of the 
equatorial Eastern Central Pacific Ocean lies a few 
degrees lower than usual. Once again, the climate 
of various regions is affected by this. In Colombia, 
specifically, the rainy seasons tend to last longer 
during “La Niña-years”. This climatic phenom-
enon is provoked by strong winds which have been 
created along the coasts of South America due to 
a pressure difference between the eastern and the 
western Pacific Ocean triggered by the unusual 
temperature of the ocean surface.  
This climatic disturbance of the usual rainfall 
pattern forced many people to migrate, as they 
could not carry on their usual agricultural 
activities. Many find themselves in situations 
where their vulnerability to both poverty and 
climatic events increases dramatically. In an 
attempt to increase the resilience of the people 
affected by the climatic consequences of La Niña 
in Colombia on the long run, a labour migration 
programme has been implemented between 
Spain and Colombian by the International 
Organization of Migration (IOM) in cooperation 
with Fundació Pagesos Solidaris (FAS), a 
Spanish agricultural union. The project, named 
“Temporary and Circular Labour Migration 
Project” (TCLM), facilitates temporary migration 
to Spain in order to work in the agricultural 
sector for a limited time. This project is being 
funded under the AENEAS programme of the 
European Union. It has been quite successful 
in trying to create a triple win situation for all 
involved parties: the receiving state, the sending 
communities and the migrants themselves. 
Temporary circular migration has proven quite 
successful in various cases and this chapter 
will assess its implementation in the bilateral 
agreement between Colombia and Spain.
1. COLOMBIAN FLOODS 2010-2011
1.1. Course of events
Colombia was affected by very serious floods in 
2010 and 2011. La Niña, combined with Hurri-
cane Tomas, triggered an unusually heavy rainy 
season. Such important rainfalls, which started 
in June 2010, had not been registered in Colombia 
for 40 years. According to the Office for Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) from 
the United Nations, more than 3 million people 
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(3.9 million according to the OCHA)1 got affected 
by the floods and ensuing landslides between 
April 2010 and April 2011 (OCHA, 04/27/2011). 
Between September 2011 and beginning of 
December 2011 alone, 145 people died (OCHA, 
12/15/2011). However, the rain did not stop and 
after almost 11 months of continuous rainfalls, 
floods and landslides were still affecting large 
parts of Colombian in June 2011. After only a few 
months of rest for the land and the people, the 
rain started again in September 2011, as it was 
time for the usual start of the rain season. Even 
if the rainfalls were not as heavy as the former 
year, the registered intensity of this rainy season 
was still seven times stronger than it normally 
would have been during an average year. 
Concretely, this can be translated into damages 
amounting to several billion dollar. Alone for 
the year 2011, estimations amount to more than 
5 billion dollar. In 2011, the Central Emergency 
Response Fund (CERF) from the OCHA “coordi-
nated the mobilization of $6.6 million in CERF 
allocations and $1.6 million in ERF resources to 
help 211,000 people”2. In 2010 the Colombian 
government made a credit request of 150 million 
dollar to the World Bank which was granted 
(World Bank, 2010).
According to a report issued by the Panamerican 
Health Organization on November 29th, 2010, the 
2010 floods and the ensuing landslides affected 
people in 28 of the 32 Colombian provinces. The most 
affected areas as identified by national catastrophe 
answer groups are the following: Bolívar, 
Magdalena, Córdoba, Sucre, Chocó, Nariño, Cauca, 
Norte de Santander and Arauca. The people that 
were most affected were internally displaced people 
(IDP) that were displaced as a result of the violent 
conflict between the Colombian government and 
peasant guerrilla groups such as Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).
As precipitation was five to six times heavier 
than during a normal rainy season, the logical 
consequence was that the rivers flooded over as 
they could not carry all the rain water anymore. 
As it had been raining with such intensity and 
for such an extended period of time, the soil 
was totally saturated and unable to drain the 
overflowing water from the rivers. Consequently, 
the natural drainage of the flood waters was 
compromised, accentuating the instability of 
lands and resulting in numerous landslides in 
areas that were normally not prone to such 
problems.
1. http://www.unocha.org/annualreport/2011/col 
(07/10/2012)
2.  Ibid.
Heavy rainfall continued to affect Colombia 
until April 2011. The rain finally stopped after 
almost 11 months, which is not without reminding 
of the 5-year-long rainfall occurring in the 
Nobel-prize winning novel “One Hundred Years 
of Solitude” by the Colombian author Gabriel 
Márquez. Therefore, the affected areas had only 
a few months to recover before the rainy season 
started again in September. This means that it 
rained during what normally is the dry season 
in Colombia and that this extended rain season 
almost merged with the next rain season. Once 
again, important human and material losses were 
registered. A state of emergency was declared 
for the whole country and $178 million was 
made available by the Colombian government. 
However, the damages were estimated to more 
than $5 billion (UPI, 2011).
1.2. Governmental response
In an attempt to rapidly identify the needs of the 
affected population, the Hydrology, Meterology 
and Environmental Studies Institute (IDEAM), 
the Geographic Institute Agustín Codazzi (IGAC) 
as well as the National Statistics Department 
(DANE) issued a common report on August, 30th, 
2011 aiming to identify the affected areas and 
people and the most appropriate response to the 
devastation. The government hoped to use the 
report to allocate aid funds in the most efficient 
way possible. This report3 defined areas that are 
at risk and high-risk of flooding under normal 
conditions: around 9.2% of the Colombian terri-
tory has been deemed to be periodically flooded, 
representing 10,508,251 ha.. It also states that 
during the floods of 2010 and 2011, 20,718,175 
ha. were affected nationwide, which represents 
an area twice as large. This takes into account 
cultivated land, exploited forests and land used 
to feed cattle. In total, 2,510,858 families were 
affected by the floods and the landslides.
The common report issued by IDEAM, IGAC 
and DANE highlights the first needs of the 
affected people, especially in terms of health, 
water, emergency medical assistance, hygiene, 
protection, food aid, education and lodging. To 
prevent epidemics, such as cholera, it is especially 
critical to distribute water filters and to educate the 
population on how to use them. This may prevent 
epidemics such as cholera. The health issue is 
identified as the most pressing one to tackle. This is 
why the Organización Panamericana de la Salud/
Organisation mondiale de la santé (OPS/OMS) 
3. IGAC & IDEAM & DANE (2011), “Reporte Final de Áreas 
Afectadas por Inundaciones 2010-2011”
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Colombia has decided which actions must 
be prioritized. This includes intensifying the 
surveillance of epidemics and their development, 
better quality of and access to drinking water and 
strengthened action on waste management, food 
manipulation, hygienic infrastructure of housing 
and disposal of solid excrements.
The damage done to the infrastructure, housing, 
and agricultural land throughout the floods forced 
many people to leave their homes and migrate. In 
an attempt to mitigate the impact of unplanned 
migration from Colombians to both national 
and international destinations, the European 
Commission, in cooperation with IOM Colombia 
and PagoSolidarios implemented a temporary 
and circular migration project between Colombia 
and Spain. The Temporary and Circular Labour 
Migration Project (TCLM) is an innovative and 
unique project funded by the European Commission 
and implemented in Spain and Colombia with the 
help of the IOM Colombia. The project started in 
December 2006 and finished in December 2008. 
According to the IOM 1,519 Colombian workers 
took advantage of this project through the IOM 
until 20074. In one of his background paper5, the 
Global Forum on Migration and Development in 
Athens 2009 states that “8,115 Colombians have 
benefited from the programme under TCLM”. 
They were selected by the IOM in Colombia. Most 
of them are people that have been affected by 
recurring natural disasters, such as the eruption 
of the Galeras volcano or the 2010-2011 floods. 
These people receive assistance to go to Spain to 
work in seasonal agricultural for a maximum time 
of nine months. When their visa expires, they 
must return to Colombia. They may be re-eligible 
to return to Spain if they successfully comply with 
all conditions set by the programme. The main 
reason to link the TCLM project to environmental 
migration is that those who lost lost all their means 
of subsistence to the floods and landslides may 
earn some money in Spain in order to reconstruct 
their lives in Colombia as well as acquire new skills 
that they may use to contribute to the country’s 
development. At the same time, this alleviates the 
pressure on the soil from Colombian territories 
that are trying to recover from the 2010 and 2011 
floods. The resilience of the people sent to Spain 
is increased and they are less dependant on the 
4. http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/facilitating-migra-
tion/pid/2017 (07/10/2012)
5. Global Forum on Migration and Development (2009), 
“Background Paper; Roundtable 2: Migrant integration, 
reintegration and circulation for development; Session 
2.2 Reintegration and circular migration – effective for 
development?”
climate to survive and sustain a certain standard 
of living. This may help to avoid unplanned forced 
migration which can cause additional damage to 
both the concerned populations and the territories 
of destination. The following section will deal 
thoroughly with this project, its objectives and 
achievements as well as its advantages and flaws.
2. TEMPORARY CIRCULAR 
LABOR MIGRATION PROJECT
Catalonia is the Spanish province with the highest 
rate of migration workers: more than 21% of the 
migrants living in Spain are living in Catalonia 
(IOM, 2009). This can be explained by the fact 
that agriculture is the province’s most important 
economic sector and that many low skilled workers 
are needed. Skilled migrants and Spanish citizens 
tend to be rather reluctant to take on those jobs. 
Consequently, in 2006, 74,1% of those employed 
in the agricultural sector were foreigners (IOM, 
2009). The main agricultural union of Catalonia, 
Unió de Pagesos de Catalunya (UP), has long been 
able to recognize the potential of this occurrence 
and has decided to put it to use for the common 
good. It started by helping to recruit potential 
workers and to facilitate their stay. In 2001, it 
was decided that an official and well-constructed 
project needed to be implemented in order to 
further develop this recruiting process. This is 
why the UP founded Fundació Pagesos Solidaris 
(FAS), a foundation aiming to support the devel-
opment of rural communities from different 
countries on different levels: social, economic 
and humanitarian. To achieve those goals, UP 
promotes cooperation between rural communi-
ties from different perspectives by, for example, 
providing support and assistance to the environ-
mental migrants from Colombia who are coming 
to Spain. Pagesos Solidaris’ approach is based on 
co-development, a philosophy elaborated by Sami 
Naïr in his 2007 Report on the outcome and tenden-
cies of the co-developement policy related to migra-
tion flows. Co-development is “a proposal for inte-
grating immigration and development in a way 
that migration fluxes will benefit both the country 
of origin and the country of destination. This is 
a consensual relationship between two countries 
that will allow migration to the country of destina-
tion not to imply an equivalent loss in the country 
of origin” (Magri, 2009). In order to implement 
this co-development the FAS divided its work in 
two parts: recruiting the migrants in their country 
of origin and further supporting them in various 
ways once they arrive in Spain. The temporary and 
circular migration system is seen by some as a way 
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to achieve co-development (De Moor, 2010). IOM 
is working in cooperation with FAS on this project 
which is funded by the European Commission in 
the framework of the AENEAS programme, which 
supports temporary circular migration.
2.1. Project implementation
The IOM Colombia is taking care of the selection of 
workers in Colombia. As the work in Spain is either 
fruit-picking and/or conditioning those fruits, the 
project targets low skilled workers for seasonal 
agriculture work. This enables many people to 
apply for the migration program. As many people 
have been affected by the 2010 and 2011 floods 
in Colombia and have seen their whole means of 
subsistence disappear in torrents of water, this is 
particularly attractive for affected farmers and 
internally displaced Colombians. The IOM is basing 
its selection criteria on how big their involvement 
in their home community is. As a concrete example 
on how the selection process works, we can look at 
Usaquén, a community located in the Bogotá prov-
ince. The selection committee located there tends 
to favour people already involved in small produc-
tive businesses. This way, the administrative and 
financial skills as well as the agricultural tech-
niques they learn in Spain can directly be applied to 
their business upon their return, augmenting their 
productivity and stimulating the local economy. 
The higher the involvement of the individuals in 
their community of origin, the more likely they 
will return to Colombia after the expiration of 
their work permit and visa. It would completely 
“undermine the credibility and the benefits for 
the entire community” (Magri, 2009) if a large 
amount of selected migrants decided to overstay 
their welcome and thus harm the ones applying 
later. Secondly, the probability that remittances 
will be invested in projects which benefit the whole 
community is higher. Lastly, the whole commu-
nity may also benefit from the skills the migrants 
learned overseas if they decide to put those skills to 
use for the public good once back home. The skills 
migrants may learn abroad are the following: 1,519 
people were trained by the IOM in basic technical 
skills, 1,021 in financial skills and 322 in leadership 
and local development6. 
Remittances remain the private property of 
the migrants. Therefore, nobody can force the 
migrants to spend their money to fund community 
projects instead of using remittances for  personal 
purposes. However, a study by the Alma Mater 
University has shown that even if for the first two 
6. http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/facilitating-migra-
tion/pid/2017 (07/10/2012)
or three years remittances are mainly used to pay 
off private debts or improve the living conditions 
the migrants might be willing to channel their 
money toward productive projects in subsequent 
years that benefit not only the migrant and the 
migrant’s family but also the whole community 
(Magri, 2009). Thus, the selection process is 
really important to the success or failure of the 
whole project. The project only makes sense if the 
migrant comes back as initially planned and puts 
to good use skills learned overseas. 
Globally, the opportunity to engage in the TCLM 
is perceived as a community project rather than 
a personal project by the local people (Magri, 
2009). Migrants often feel peer pressure from the 
communities of origin, as their participation to 
the programme impacts on the sustainability of 
the project. Also, in IOM interviews with migrants 
(IOM & European Union, 2010) it appears that they 
feel some kind of commitment to the community, 
to those which were not given the opportunity 
to go abroad. This fact increases the probability 
they will use their remittances to fund community 
projects (Magri, 2009).
Travel arrangements that need to be made 
such as visa, purchase of the flight ticket, etc. 
are taken care of by the TCLM project. Once the 
migrants arrive in Europe, the project continues 
to support them by finding a place to stay and 
providing them with further information about 
issues such as the Spanish health care system. The 
project also provides general assistance in case any 
problems should arise. Before the departure to 
Europe, activities and workshops are organized to 
inform the migrants about the living and working 
conditions in Spain. This exercise explains the 
social and cultural context and provides a general 
view on how their life will be in Spain. This 
is done so that  migrants are able to integrate 
themselves in the best possible and efficient way. 
The consequences of failing to comply with the 
expiration date of their visa as well as the benefits 
that they receive are again clearly explained and 
stressed to reduce the risk of migrants deciding to 
stay in Europe. 
The goal of the project is to enable Colombian 
workers to gain knowledge and experience as 
well as specific skills so that they may establish 
a business when coming home and produce 
economic gain for themselves, their family and the 
whole community (IOM, 2010). The ultimate goal 
is the increased resilience of Colombian farmers 
and IDPs toward changing climatic conditions (De 
Moor, 2010). By enabling migrants to develop more 
diversified livelihoods, they lessen the probability 
that they will one day be forced to move due to 
slow-onset climate change or severe climatic event.
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2.2. Evaluation of the project
2.2.1. A triple-win situation?
The TCLM project in the Colombian flood case is 
being used as an adaptation strategy to climate 
change. According to many official reports, among 
them the Mauritius Workshop on circular migra-
tion (2008), there is a triple-win situation. But 
some critics, such as Piyasiri Wickramasekara 
of the Global Union Research Network (GURN), 
imply that benefits may have been exaggerated 
(Wickramasekara, 2011). He recognizes some bene-
fits of circular labour migration but challenges the 
idea of a triple-win situation on the grounds that 
the foundations of the argument are weak. Wick-
ramasekara questions the assumed preference 
of migrants for circular migration as well as the 
benefits for employers and especially the benefits 
for the communities of origin. Further criticism of 
temporary circular migration is the lack of legal 
protection for migrants. In an attempt to address 
this issue, the TCLM project informs migrants 
about their rights and duties before and during 
their involvement in the project through work-
shops and activities. The more informed migrants 
are, the more probable they will make the most 
appropriate decisions (IOM, 2008). The next big 
issue is the risk of circumvention of the authorized 
stay by migrants. In an attempt to counter the fact 
that some migrants might want to stay in Spain 
after their visa expired, the migrants participating 
in the scheme have to present themselves at the 
Spanish embassy in their country of origin within 
one month of the expiration date of their visa. 
Failure to do so would result in them being disad-
vantaged if they ever wish to re-enter the circular 
migration program. Also, migrants who comply 
with the set rules for at least two years are regis-
tered on a special database and are given priority 
whenever they apply again for the same migration 
program or even a permanent worker visa. This 
mechanism aims at increasing the attractiveness 
for those migrants to play by the rules.
Despite those issues, according to the philosophy 
of co-development, the temporary and circulatory 
migration system is trying to create a triple win 
situation for migrants, their communities and 
country of origin and the receiving state. The 
benefit for each actor will be analysed in the 
following sections.
2.2.1.1. Migrants
The benefit for the migrant is quite clear. By 
moving to a country with higher wages, migrants 
increase their income and are able to send remit-
tances to their family. This in turn improves their 
living conditions if they can, for example, build 
a house, buy indispensable tools or open a small 
business. The skills they learned abroad7 may 
eventually enable them to open, create or expand 
some kind of small business in their community of 
origin. This will promote the local economy as well 
as increase the resilience of the migrants and their 
family to any environmental change. In Usaquén, 
the IOM noted that, on average, each migrant came 
back home with savings which can range between 
€350-2,300. The resilience of the environmental 
migrants is also an important point. By going 
abroad, migrants diversify their income through 
the money earned abroad but also through the 
possibility to apply their new skills in ther activi-
ties. They are able to better face environmental 
degradation and ensuing loss of subsistence 
means. Consequently, they become less dependent 
on their environment and can adapt more easily 
to changing environmental conditions, be it slow-
onset change or more sudden events.
2.2.1.2. Community of origin
The benefits for the community have been 
partially explained in the above section. Migrants 
strengthen their sense of commitment to the 
people who stayed in their community of origin, as 
they feel they were privileged by being chosen for 
the project (Magri, 2009). They invest their money 
gained abroad in projects which will ultimately 
benefit the whole community. Also, their newly-
gained skills, which could be called ‘brain gain’ 
in opposition to ‘brain drain’, and experience will 
help them set up economic activities that promote 
the local economy, thus prompting development. 
In the specific case of Colombia, migration also 
enables the territories affected by the floods and 
landslides to recover, which takes some time. 
Replanting the land right away may be unpro-
ductive, as precious minerals have been washed 
out, leaving the land infertile. If the people from 
the affected areas do not use the land for a few 
months or even years, this will allow it to recover 
more quickly and more thoroughly. Upon their 
return, not all migrants will pick up their agricul-
tural activities again, as they will have gained new 
skills that they might prefer to apply, for example 
by opening a new business.
2.2.1.3. Receiving country
The benefit for the receiving country, in the 
case of Spain, is that it is provided with workers 
to fill a gap in the agricultural labour market. 
As mentioned above, the jobs in the agricul-
tural sector that the Colombian environmental 
7. See Section 2.1. Project implementation for the kind of 
skills migrants learn abroad
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migrants are taking are seldom taken up by avail-
able domestic workforce. Therefore, it is wrong 
to assume that these migrants are working at the 
expense of someone else: they are only filling a 
void. The Spanish legislation, as seen above, is 
very clear on this point: the employer has to make 
sure that no other worker residing in Spain wants 
to take up the job.
2.2.2. Implementation in other countries
Implementing a similar project in other countries 
is possible and could yield many benefits. Circular 
labour migration can support development, 
relieve demographic and unemployment pressure 
in developing countries as well as fill gaps in the 
workforce in developed economies if there is a real 
need for labour and a legislative framework guar-
anteeing rights for migrants. As stressed previ-
ously, the legislative framework has to be adequate 
to allow migrants to easily adapt to the changing 
employment situation. Spain’s legislation allows 
a quick worker quota adjustment to the changing 
economic and labour conditions.
To implement a similar project in other receiving 
states, Rush (2005) points out that some conditions 
need to be fulfilled. In his publication, six essential 
points can be identified. Castle (2006) summarises 
them as follows:
 m “The strict enforcement of immigration and 
employment laws, especially against employers 
who illegally employ migrants and/or violate 
minimum wage and employment regulations.
 m The regulation of the cost at which migrants are 
made available to employers through, for exam-
ple, the charging of monthly work permit fees 
for each migrant employed.
 m The implementation of effective labour market 
tests, i.e. , of mechanisms that create incentives 
for employers to recruit migrant workers only 
after all reasonable efforts have been made to 
recruit local workers.
 m The regulation or at least the monitoring of the 
migrant recruiting industry with an eye to con-
trolling migrants’ costs of migration.
 m The protection of migrants’ rights by making 
work permits portable within certain sectors or 
occupations after a certain period of time.
 m Mixed incentive-enforcement measures to facili-
tate the return home of migrants whose tempo-
rary work permits have expired.”8
Spain has implemented most of these measures 
through its laws and regulation. The TCLM 
program in Spain is considered overall a great 
8. S. Castle. 2006. “Guestworkers in Europe: A 
Resurrection?” (pp.747-748).
success both for the Colombian migrants and the 
Spanish agriculture sector according to the IOM 
but other find it quite hard to measure exactly its 
impacts, as only few people have been involved 
(Mc Loughlin & Münz, 2011). States that wish 
to implement a similar project should take into 
account the previous points.
Some limitations to the application of a 
temporary and circular migration project between 
two countries do exist. The most obvious one is 
that the communities of origin where this project 
is implemented should not be permanently 
uninhabitable. Therefore, the implementation of 
such a project is best suited for cases like Colombia, 
where the land needs some time to rest but 
offers to the returning migrants the possibility to 
continue living on and from it. It is also quite clear 
that the amount of people who can take advantage 
of this project is rather limited. As the economies 
from developed states need only a limited number 
of low skilled workers from third countries, the 
number of people who can enrol in this project is 
also limited.
3. POLICIES AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK ON TEMPORARY AND 
CIRCULAR LABOR MIGRATION
The Global Forum on Migration and Development, 
which took place in 2008, issued the following 
statement: “Temporary labour migration can 
work to everyone’s advantage if it is legal, protec-
tive and linked to real labour needs. […] In the 
absence of a functional multilateral system, bilat-
eral arrangements have been found to operate 
effectively in certain countries. […] Joint arrange-
ments between origin and destination countries, 
particularly for lower-skilled migrants, can help 
enforce the laws to protect temporary migrants 
and enhance their contribution to their families 
and home communities” (GFMD, 2008). The UN 
Secretary General’s Report on International Migra-
tion and Development highlighted this already in 
2006: “[...] there is potential for these programmes 
to result in beneficial synergies for migrants, coun-
tries of origin and countries of destination” (UN, 
2006). Other international organizations such 
as the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, the Global Commission for International 
Migration and the World Bank have also issued 
positive statements on this topic (IOM, 2008). It 
can therefore be said that a number of relevant 
worldwide organizations agree on the advantages 
of a temporary and circulatory migration system 
which would fill the labour gap in a national 
economy while contributing to the development of 
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an other one. This system of cooperation between 
countries has not yet been fully exploited.
3.1. Spain
The Spanish position regarding temporary and 
circular migration is quite advanced compared to 
those of other member states from the European 
Union. The Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inte-
gración (Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Inte-
gration) which has been elaborated by the Spanish 
Ministry of Work and Social Affairs in 2007-2010 
highlights this. This plan aims at using migration 
as a tool of co-development between the country 
of origin of the migrant and the migrant itself 
(De Moor, 2010). Spain was able to recognize the 
importance of cooperation between local govern-
ments and the benefits it can generate both in the 
country of origin and the country of destination if 
the remittances are channelled in the most effec-
tive way.
Spain’s policy on migration has historically 
been favourable to temporary migration. The 
Organic Law N° 4/2000: Article 39; Implementing 
Regulation: Articles 77-80 (De Moor, 2010) allows 
workers from countries outside of the European 
Union to live and work in Spanish territory. Some 
conditions need to be fulfilled for the law to be 
applicable and migrants cannot stay more than 
nine months in Spain within the same year (12 
consecutive months). Also, employers must make 
it certain that no worker already legally residing in 
Spain can take over the job (IOM, 2009) and that 
the position is indeed needed within the Spanish 
economy. Quotas are being determined by the 
Spanish state regarding the number of migrants 
already in its territory and the provisional need 
for low skilled workers each year and may vary 
depending on the economic situation of the 
country. These quotas are first proposed to the 
countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral 
agreement aimed at facilitating access for 
citizens of those countries to the Spanish labour 
market. Up until now, Spain has signed bilateral 
agreements on migration with Colombia, Ecuador, 
Morocco, Nigeria, the Dominican Republic, 
Poland, and Romania. The bilateral agreement 
between Spain and Colombia was signed in 2001. 
The configuration of the Spanish economy makes 
it essential for Spain to import workers from 
third-countries at periodic moments of the year. 
Indeed, a lot of low skilled workers are needed 
to help in the harvest of agricultural products. 
Workers already legally residing in Spain often 
do not want to take over these jobs. The workers 
from third countries are therefore only recruited 
for some sectors of the economy, as defined by the 
Royal Decree (2393/2004) (De Moor, 2010), to 
counter the shortage of willing workers. However, 
as the harvests only takes place a few months a 
year, they would become unemployed as soon 
as the harvesting season is over and instead of 
supporting the Spanish economy, stress it. This 
is why Spain favours temporary and, above all, 
circular migration. The greater flexibility of the 
Spanish legislation in regard to changing the work 
place also works in favour of seasonal migration, 
as it allows the migrants to move on as soon as one 
harvest is over and seek an other work place. 
3.2. Europe
On the European level, the European Commission 
is  favourable to a harmonization of the different 
national legal frameworks regarding the imple-
mentation of a project similar to TCLM. This can 
clearly be seen by the elaboration in 2005 of a 
Policy Plan on Legal Migration (European Commis-
sion, 2005). This plan aimed at fighting irregular 
migration by allowing greater integration of the 
selected migrants and thus trying to make illegal 
migration less attractive. This Policy Plan was 
however not able to convince the member states 
and the five legislative instruments it contained 
did not have the expected impact. The 2005 Policy 
Plan was followed by the European Pact on Immi-
gration and Asylum adopted by the European 
Council in October, 2008. The introduction of this 
is pact states that “Although real progress has been 
achieved on the path to a common immigration 
and asylum policy, further advances are neces-
sary”. In 2009, the Council adopted the Stockholm 
Programme which highlighted once again the 
European Commission’s commitment to the Policy 
Plan on Legal Migration from 2005. Yet, the only 
directive that has been implemented until now 
is the Council Directive 2009/50/EC of May 25th, 
2009. This directive, also called the “Blue Card 
Directive”, allows high-skilled workers from third-
countries to live and work in the European Union 
with the exception of Ireland, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark. Even this directive is found to be 
“rather a symbol of good-will than than a strong 
measure for attracting highly-skilled migrants” 
(Meyer, 2010).
The lack of commitment from the different 
member states regarding a common legal 
framework on seasonal circular migration can 
partly be explained by the feeling of most states 
that the migration issue is directly related to 
their sovereignty. They do not want to leave the 
decision power to another authority, as they fear 
a loss of control over who lives in their national 
territory. However, the evolution that has been 
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observed at the European level, starting in 2005 
with the Policy Plan on Legal Migration, has 
continued with a directive on seasonal migrants 
proposed in 20109. The explanatory memorandum 
of the directive proposal clearly states that “This 
proposal forms part of the EU’s efforts to develop 
a comprehensive immigration policy. The Hague 
Programme of November 2004 recognized that 
‘[l]egal migration will play an important role 
in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in 
Europe, in advancing economic development, and 
thus contributing to the implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy’”. This directive proposal, called 
the “Single Permit Directive” has been adopted in 
December 2011. It established rights for workers 
from third countries residing within the European 
Union. In May 2011, the European Union started 
a consultation on migration and climate change. 
This consultation influenced the revision of the 
EU Global Approach on Migration from November 
2011. This shows that the European Commission 
is interested in implementing a common 
legislative framework to facilitate the mobility of 
temporary and circular migration and recognizes 
the advantages that this can bring to European 
national economies if correctly implemented.
CONCLUSION
One of the main advantages of the TCLM project 
compared to other migration programs is that it 
links environmental degradation to development 
strategies. It tries to create not only a win-win situ-
ation between the migrant and the destination 
country but a win-win-win situation between the 
migrant, the destination country and the region of 
origin. The migrants become “agents of develop-
ment” (De Moor, 2011) through the remittances 
sent back home and the skills they learn abroad and 
apply at home. This has been recognized in many 
official international publications, for example in 
the UN Secretary General’s Report on International 
Migration and Development (2006). The degrada-
tion of the environment is taken as a starting point to 
promote development by giving the affected people 
the opportunity to enhance their skills and knowl-
edge in the hope that this will indirectly trigger 
economic development at a local level. It tries to 
turn a negative situation into a positive one. The 
people who choose to take advantage of the TCLM 
project may not have done so if their living resources 
9. “Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of seasonal 
employment”
such as their land and/or housing had not been 
affected. This can be deduced from the testimonies 
of migrants involved in this project who are reluc-
tant to leave Colombia. They do not wish to leave 
their families and friends behind but confess that 
they nonetheless had to do so because of the finan-
cial need of their families (IOM, 2010). Without 
them leaving and acquiring new skills, the develop-
ment which has been observed after their return to 
their home communities would not have occurred. 
Furthermore, the rights of the migrants are 
being better protected as movement takes 
place within a clearly defined project which 
accompanies migrants and makes sure their rights 
are respected. At the same time, all measures are 
taken so that  migrants do respect their duties and 
do not overstay their welcome.
In the case of Colombia, the objectives of the 
project have been met and it can be said that 
the project has been, and still is, successful. The 
resilience of the Colombian workers to climate 
change consequences has been increased and the 
development of the local communities is promoted. 
The implementation of a similar project between 
other countries is possible and is even advised in 
certain cases. For example, a developing country 
with a climatic event which disturbs greatly, but at 
the same time only temporarily, the ecosystem and 
the means of subsistence of the population would 
be a good candidate for the implementation of a 
temporary and circular migration project.
Migration, and especially environmental 
migration, is becoming an international concern. 
Thanks to globalisation, travelling great distances 
has become increasingly easy. The number of 
those who want to increase their income and living 
standards by migrating and working in countries 
with more developed economies are seizing their 
chance in a legal, and sometimes also illegal, way. 
The global community needs to cooperate and 
work out a common strategy regarding labour 
migration so as to provide the migrants with 
the best possible conditions to enable states to 
fully benefit from co-development. Temporary 
circular labour migration would make irregular 
migration less attractive and would help manage 
unwanted migration flows. Supply and demand 
could be better monitored and help international 
economies to adapt better to the rapidly changing 
conditions of the global markets. Temporary 
circular migration can be an asset to adapt to the 
effects of global climate change but can foremost 
be a mitigation strategy. International cooperation 
is required for it to work successfully. Policy-
makers need to keep this in mind when mapping 
the response to the biggest challenge they have 
ever faced: climate change. ❚
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The earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident 
that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011 induced 
important population movements that can be 
qualified as “environmental migration”, according 
to the definition set by the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM). The Japanese govern-
ment had to organize and manage population 
displacements that were of unprecedented scale 
in the country. The displaced populations faced 
three major challenges: long-term relocation in 
the wait for decontamination and reconstruction; 
the vulnerability of the territory which makes it 
vulnerable to other natural risks in the near future, 
and the multi-faceted risk of nuclear radiation. 
The triple disaster also raised the question of the 
confidence in public authorities, which is crucial 
for the implementation of the recovery program 
and the cohesion of society. 
For this paper, we chose a chronological ap-
proach to describe the population movements 
caused by the March 11 events, as well as their 
management: we begin with the description of 
the evacuation, then proceed to its aftermath, and 
conclude with the long-term policies for recon-
struction, return and recovery. 
1. AN UNPREPARED 
CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO
1.1. A country prone to 
natural disasters
Because of its geographical position, as an archi-
pelago situated on the Ring of Fire, Japan has 
always been subject to natural risks such as earth-
quakes, tsunamis, typhoons and volcano erup-
tions. For the Japanese people, nature is inherently 
risky and they have to coexist with that risk – this 
is called the “saigai” conception (Augendre, 2012). 
When natural disasters happen, they reflect an 
unbalanced relation to nature or the result of inad-
equate preventive measures. Humans can prepare 
themselves to respond to those risks. The term 
zeijaku, meaning vulnerability, is very little used 
by Japanese people—they consider it derivative of 
a Western point of view (Ibid). 
The awareness to natural risks, and the need to 
prepare for them, are part of Japanese education 
and legislation. People receive training, beginning 
in childhood, which includes safety instructions in 
the case of an earthquake or a tsunami. On Sep-
tember 1st, every year since 1960, the country cel-
ebrates the National Day of Disaster Reduction. In 
1981, the New Building Standard Act was adopted; 
requiring buildings to be designed to sustain slight 
cracks in case of a medium-scale earthquake, and 
to avoid collapse when a major earthquake oc-
curs (United Disaster International Strategy for 
Risk Reduction, 2005). After the traumatic Great 
Hanshin (Kobe) Earthquake of 1995, systematic in-
spection of buildings, as well as the improvement 
of standards to strengthen their resistance, was 
implemented by law in 1995 and 2006 (Augendre, 
2012). More recently, Japan adopted, in 2005, the 
10-year Hyogo Framework for Action, to reduce 
disaster losses and increase resilience. 
Though Japan is prone to earthquakes and 
tsunamis, the prevention measures proved largely 
inadequate and could not prevent the March 11 
earthquake and tsunami from causing massive 
damage, nor could prevent the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. 
1.2. Miscalculation of the risks 
induced by the March 11 events 
1.2.1. The triple disaster
The March 11 events refer to the succession of three 
major disasters: two natural disasters that induced 
a third one – an industrial disaster. 
THE 11 MARCH TRIPLE DISASTER IN JAPAN
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At 2.46 pm, on March 11th, 2011, the fourth larg-
est earthquake in history hit the Sanriku coast in 
Japan. The quake, of a magnitude 9 on the Rich-
ter scale, was followed by a tsunami spreading 
from Hokkaidô to Tôhoku, and then to the Kantô 
region. The waves reached 40.4 meters at their 
highest point, and they travelled as fast as 15 km/
hour inland. The most affected prefectures were 
those of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. 
The earthquake damaged the Fukushima 
Daiichi I Nuclear Power Plant, one of the 25 larg-
est nuclear power stations in the world, entirely 
built and run by the Tokyo Electric Power Com-
pany (TEPCO). ‬The earthquake resulted in the 
loss of the offsite power which is the normal 
power supply to the plant; reactors shut down 
automatically and emergency diesel generators 
started and powered the station’s emergency 
cooling systems.
Approximately one hour later, the station was 
struck by the tsunami, which inundated the fuel 
tanks. This disabled the emergency diesel gen-
erators needed for backup power. Consequently, 
the site lost all emergency power supply. The off-
site power could not be restored and the pumps 
that circulate to cool water in the reactors ceased 
to work, and hydrogen was produced from met-
al-water reactions in the reactor. As workers 
struggled to cool the reactors, several hydrogen 
explosions occurred. ‬
Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, March 2011. 
Map 1. The March 11 earthquake and tsunami.
The State of Environmental Migration 2011 
STUDY 06/2012 3 7IDDRI
Japanese authorities initially assessed the ac-
cident as Level four on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES). The level was successively 
raised to five and eventually to seven, the highest, 
causing widespread contamination with serious 
health and environmental effects (Japanese Min-
istry of Economy, Trade and Industry, April 12th 
2011). The Fukushima accident is registered as the 
second largest nuclear accident after the Cherno-
byl disaster, which occurred in Ukraine on 26 April 
1986. It was the only level-seven accident on re-
cord before March 2011. 
1.2.2. Inadequacy of the safety and 
emergency procedures 
The preventive measures to mitigate the effects of 
the earthquake and the tsunami were insufficient, 
showing a lack of anticipation by the Japanese 
authorities.
The reduction of the tsunami’s impact was 
planned via the construction of dykes 10m high 
and 2.5m long in Miyagi city, called the Great Wall, 
and the world’s biggest breakwater - 63m deep in 
the sea and 8m above in Kamaishi. The breakwater 
collapsed after the 2011 tsunami hit. 
The earthquake alarms operated properly in 
the targeted region; the tsunami warnings be-
gan three minutes after the first main shock from 
the earthquake and were disseminated through 
media, sirens and wireless system. However, as 
the earthquake hit Tôhoku, electric power was 
cut off. Consequently, individual radios did not 
work and sirens at the top of electric poles fell 
down. According to surveys conducted by Reiko 
Hasegawa, researcher for the DEVAST project1, 
“residents could not hear the second evacuations 
alerts. When they could, they were told to flee in 
a very polite, Japanese way, with a calm voice say-
ing things like ‘Please, evacuate’.” People did not 
understand the urgency of the situation and the 
survivors have complained that the evacuation 
orders were not transmitted appropriately for the 
gravity of the situation. Furthermore, people did 
not expect a second wave to hit, nor that it would 
be higher than six meters – which was thought as 
the maximum possible height from previous expe-
riences of tsunami in the region. Ten minutes after 
the earthquake came the first wave. It gave time 
for people to escape, to keep themselves safe while 
the wave entered the city and then to come back 
home. Forty minutes after came the second wave, 
the “real” tsunami, taking people by surprise. As 
Hasegawa notes, “their experience became their 
vulnerability”. 
1.  See http://www.devast-project.org 
With regard to the Fukushima accident, the 
Japanese authorities admitted that the nuclear 
disaster found them unprepared. In this case, the 
lack of preparation was caused, in part, by a public 
myth of “absolute safety” that nuclear power pro-
ponents had nurtured over decades (Behr, 2012). 
‬Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, declared 
in March 2012 that the Japanese government 
shares the blame for the Fukushima accident since 
officials had been blinded by a false belief in the 
country’s “technological infallibility” (Tabuchi, 
2012).
Although nuclear regulators and plant op-
erators had been thoroughly trained on security 
measures, the accident was seriously worsened 
by an overall underestimation of the possibility of 
significant natural disasters and serious accidents, 
an inadequate design basis of the nuclear power 
plant taking into account a massive tsunami event, 
and poor coordination between the Fukushima 
nuclear operators and the Japanese government. 
Plant workers had no clear instructions on how 
to respond to such a disaster, especially after the 
loss of all energy supply. They did not understand 
immediately what was going on and did not know 
how to follow the emergency procedure and there-
fore made significant mistakes.‬
1.2.3. The concept of environmental 
catastrophes redefined.
The conjunction of the three disasters was 
surprising and unexpected. It found the Japa-
nese authorities unprepared to face the tsunami 
and even less the consequences of the nuclear 
accident. The March 11 disasters represent a new 
category of “environmental disaster” and a major 
shift in the way of thinking about risk. They frame 
a global conception of “environment” which does 
not refer only to nature and in which one specific 
risk unleash a chain impact on other components 
of the environment. In this case, the earthquake 
and the tsunami damaged the nuclear power plant, 
affecting in turn the natural environment through 
nuclear contamination. The nuclear contamina-
tion becomes a polymorphic risk that is present in 
the sea, in the soil and in the food, involving envi-
ronmental and health issues. Moreover, the risk 
scales up as it can have consequences worldwide. 
1.3. Public confidence and 
trust toward the authorities 
The disasters caused huge damage across the 
affected region. Fires following the earthquake 
and the tsunami destroyed around 90,000 houses 
and 128,651 buildings (Japan Centre for Inter-
national Exchange, 2011). The fishing industry, 
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which is a cornerstone of Tohoku’s economy and 
provides a significant share of Japan’s seafood, 
was completely wiped out. The agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors were also deeply affected. 
The earthquake damaged the transportation 
network, transmission lines, and power plants 
were forced offline, causing continuous blackouts. 
The Japanese government estimated the total 
costs to be $216 billion (¥17 trillion). Collapses of 
buildings also caused debris to fall in the sea and 
on the ground. The debris has now to be stocked, 
sorted and treated – which will take time. In 
Miyagi prefecture alone, the debris is estimated 
between 15 to 18 million tons (Asian Disaster 
Reduction Center, 2011). The disaster took place in 
an impoverished region suffering from a chronic 
loss of population. The remaining population was 
mostly made up of fishermen living by the sea and 
therefore exposed to tsunami.
Figures about human loss and displacement 
should be carefully considered. They vary ac-
cording to official governmental and prefectural 
reports. The Japanese National Police Agency, in 
May 2011, stated that 15,129 people died during the 
tsunami. Among those, 13% were unidentified and 
9,034 people were counted as missing people (The 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011). Senior citizens over the 
age of 60 formed the largest proportion of victims, 
accounting for 65% of deaths. Before the disasters, 
30% of Tôhoku’s population were 60 years old or 
above (Japan Centre for International Exchange, 
2011). These figures reflect the fact that the evacu-
ation measures were not adapted for a vulnerable 
population such as the elderly, who need assis-
tance in emergency situations. Crossing informa-
tion coming from different reliable sources, it is es-
timated that two days after the disasters there were 
more than 450,000 evacuees from the tsunami and 
170,000 related to the nuclear accident. On top of 
these numbers, one needs to add the number peo-
ple who decided to leave by themselves, though 
this number is unclear at the time of writing.
Following the March 11 events, public distrust 
and hostility over the government’s response to 
the disasters have arisen and the level of confi-
dence of the victims toward national and local 
authorities has declined steadily. A distinction can 
however be made between two categories. Evacu-
ees from the tsunami-hit areas, who used to have 
a close relationship with municipalities before the 
disaster, tend to blame the latter, saying that it is 
a human-based disaster rather than a natural one. 
They blame the municipalities for carelessness in 
the placing of evacuation centres for earthquakes 
in coastal areas, located on the lower grounds of 
the cities that were swept away by the tsunami. 
However, it may be understood as a way to vent 
their frustration at somebody (Hasegawa, 2012). 
On the other hand, evacuees of the nuclear disas-
ter tend to blame more heavily the central govern-
ment. Trust in the government has considerably 
faded, and this undermines the governmental 
management of the population as well as the so-
ciety’s cohesion. 
2. PEOPLE DISPLACEMENTS
2.1. The confusing 
organization of people’s 
evacuation and housing
The Japanese response to the crisis was impeded 
by delays in issuing evacuation orders, and delays 
in releasing data about dangerous radiation leaks, 
difficulties in keeping records and documenta-
tion about the key meetings held during the early 
and crucial days of the crisis. All of these factors 
contributed to the disaster worsening, and to the 
loss of confidence of the Japanese population 
towards the central government, which has been 
highly criticized by the evacuees for its handling of 
the emergency and lack of transparency. 
According to Reiko Hasegawa, local municipal-
ities and the population basically shared the “same 
destiny” and “feeling of abandonment; they were 
both in the dark as to what should be done with 
regard to evacuation, because of a lack of commu-
nication from national officers. Municipalities had 
to decide by themselves, and most declared the 
evacuation of the whole population without wait-
ing for the evacuation orders from the central gov-
ernment). Such orders would often fail to reach 
the municipalities because of flooded or broken 
communication systems.
Evacuation orders succeeded day after day. Af-
ter the official declaration of a nuclear emergency 
at 19:03 on March 11, the Fukushima prefecture 
ordered the evacuation of 1,864 people within a 
distance of two kilometres from the nuclear power 
station. This zone was extended to three kilome-
tres during the evening by a directive from Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan, which affected 5,800 peo-
ple, together with instructions for residents living 
within ten kilometres of the plant to take shelter.
In the following days, residents living within 
twenty kilometres from the plant were obliged to 
evacuate. Over 50,000 people were evacuated on 
12 March. The Prime Minister also advised resi-
dents of the Fukushima area to take shelter, stay 
inside, close doors and windows and turn off air 
conditioning. They were also advised to cover their 
mouths with masks, towels or handkerchiefs as 
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Displaced persons camp, Tohoku area, March 2012.
Photo credits: © 2012. François Gemenne (IDDRI)
well as not to drink tap water. Air traffic was re-
stricted in a twenty kilometres radius around the 
Fukushima Daiichi site (Weisenthal, 2011). 
After officials admitted the possibility of a 
meltdown, on 13 March, some 170,000 people were 
evacuated, joining more than 450,000 evacuees 
from other regions affected by the earthquake and 
the tsunami (Harlan, Mufson, 2011). On the morn-
ing of 15 March, the Prime Minister issued instruc-
tions that any remaining people within a twenty-
kilometre zone around the nuclear plant had to 
leave, and advised those living between twenty 
and thirty kilometres from the site to stay in their 
houses and shut windows and doors. The evacua-
tion area was further extended during April. Resi-
dents in the thirty-kilometre circle were urged to 
leave their houses as well (Makinen, 2011) and the 
Japanese government created a “no-go zone” for 
the 20 km radius zone. This order affected more 
than 80,000 residents.
The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) recommended expanding the evacua-
tion area further, having found contaminated soil 
samples in the village of Iitate, about forty kilo-
metres northwest from Fukushima, but the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano stated that the 
government would wait to see if the high radiation 
continued before widening again the evacuation 
zone (Takahara, Nagata, 2011). 
In May, the Japanese government began the 
evacuation of people from the area that had an air 
radiation dose of 20 mSv/year. As of September 
2011, more than 100,000 Fukushima Prefecture 
residents were reported to be still subject to sev-
eral kinds of evacuation measures, forcing them 
to live outside and sometimes far away from their 
home cities and towns. 
Right after the disaster, people were evacuated 
to shelters such as municipal buildings, schools, 
and gymnasiums. The second step was to move 
to transitional shelters, also known as temporary 
housing, provided by public authorities. Transi-
tional shelters were made available by the pre-
fectural governments; the municipality made the 
selection of the sites for housing, and the funds 
came from the central government. The final step 
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of the process is permanent housing: either peo-
ple build their own houses, or they live in rented 
public housing with a discount on the rent (In-
ternational Recovery Platform and Kobe Univer-
sity, 2012). 
There are different types of transitional 
shelters. Temporary houses are pre-fabricated 
houses whose size is around 29 square meters. 
People can also rent private houses as temporary 
housing, and the local government pays the rent. 
This solution is mostly found in urban areas, and 
is cheaper, more comfortable than temporary 
houses. Finally, there are also public housing and 
government-owned accommodation, for which 
the rent is also paid for by the government.
Criticism has been raised regarding the sys-
tem of temporary housing. Housing is allocated 
to evacuees on a lottery basis. Information was 
not circulated properly and some people were not 
able to be present at the place where the lottery 
was drawn. The houses are small, conceived of 
as single-family homes. They are located far from 
the places people used to live in and are built on 
inland areas, much colder than coastal areas. In 
the coastal areas, where the tsunami hit, tempo-
rary houses had to be built quickly and without 
some special materials, as manufactures were 
destroyed: this raises questions about the dura-
bility and quality of those buildings (Brice-Asa-
numa, 2011). To counterbalance those issues, the 
government and non-profit organizations have 
emphasized the support for residents of the tem-
porary houses. They provided improvements to 
the houses (insulation and soundproofing, inte-
rior furniture) and a transportation network, and 
they manage projects for people to earn some in-
come by selling their handmade products.
Continuous attention needs to be paid to 
the displacement of evacuees, since their life 
condition is unstable: they do not know how 
long they will have to wait before they can 
come back to their houses, and they still won-
der whether such a return will be possible or 
not. Some locations close to the nuclear power 
plant are estimated to be contaminated with 
accumulated radiation that diminishes the 
residents’ hopes to return home any time soon. 
Those zones have to be decontaminated to re-
duce radiation levels, and there is no certainty 
about the length of the decontamination pro-
cess. The situation of families and farmers in 
the region remains delicate. Some of them had 
to leave their houses, their lands, their animals, 
kill their cattle and destroy their harvests. The 
suicide rate among evacuees, especially among 
those in temporary housing, is not negligible 
(Hasegawa, 2012). 
2.2. Voluntary evacuation
2.2.1. Leaving abroad
The nuclear threat provoked departures from the 
country, despite reverse recommendations from 
the Japanese government to foreigners as well as 
local population.
The departure abroad of foreign nationals can 
be understood as a strategy of precaution rather 
than a forced migration. In Japan, the three largest 
foreign communities are the Chinese, the South 
Koreans and the Brazilians of Japanese descent. 
In the four weeks following the disasters, 531,000 
foreigners left with or without their country’s gov-
ernmental assistance: amongst them were 185,000 
Chinese, 107,000 South Koreans and 39,000 
Americans (Richard, 2012). Pressure from family, 
instructions given by the head offices of foreign 
firms, and recommendations from embassies and 
consulates played a role in the decision of foreign-
ers to leave Japan. American nuclear experts rec-
ommended an evacuation of a much larger perim-
eter than that recommended by Japanese officials 
(Sanger, Wald, Tabuchi, 2011). Also Spain, Germa-
ny and South Korea advised their citizens to stay 
much farther away (at least 80 kilometres) from 
the nuclear plant (Ibid). 
On the other hand, Japanese nationals left the 
country by their own means, with no governmental 
assistance—official figures about those departures 
have not been released. Foreign countries showed 
their interest in attracting Japanese talents and of-
fered them to settle down. As an example, the offi-
cial communication from the Hong Kong Immigra-
tion Department (April 4th, 2011) states: “Countries 
all around the world are fighting over talent exiting 
Japan because of the earthquake. We hope that they 
consider long-term settlement in Hong Kong.” A 
visa done in 48 hours was made available for execu-
tives working in banks or multinational companies 
of finance, earning between $150,000 and $300,000 
a year (The Wall Street Journal, 2011). 
Table 1. Departures outside Japan in the weeks following 
the tsunami, according to figures from the Japanese 
Ministry of Justice 
Period relative to Tôhoku 
earthquake
Arrivals Departures Net
Week minus 1 157,000 140,000 + 17,000 
Week 1 58,000 244,000 - 186,000
Week 2-4 244,000 287,000 - 43,000
Total weeks 1-4 302,000 531,000 - 229,000
Source: Richard J.L. 2012. 
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2.2.2. Internal migration
At the internal level, if most of the population in 
the evacuation areas were forced to leave their 
homes, many more, especially those who lived in 
the zones affected by the instructions to remain 
indoors, decided to evacuate voluntarily as the 
provision of supplies in the region was not always 
assured and they suffered from a severe lack of 
resources (Isoda, 2011a). Residents evacuated 
with the institutional evacuation scheme left their 
communities with buses provided by the local 
government. Others, who wanted to leave on their 
own because they feared the radioactive leak, 
decided to travel with their own car and sought 
shelter with relatives and friends (Isoda, 2011a). 
The regions directly affected by the natural dis-
aster and the nuclear accident are the Hamadori 
region along the coast, separated by Abukuma 
Mountains from the central and more populated 
Nakadori region, and the western Aizu region.
It is difficult to analyse the geographical spread 
of the population after the earthquake, the tsu-
nami and the nuclear disaster, since voluntary 
migrants have no legal obligation to report to the 
authorities their whereabouts and those who take 
shelter with relatives or friends do not necessar-
ily report their change of address to the municipal 
government. Although the exact number of evacu-
ees has not been captured and no reliable statistics 
on the evacuations are collected, some data are 
available and can help to grasp an overall picture 
of the Fukushima Hamadori diaspora. These are 
presented below.
Table 2. List of evacuees and destination of relocation 
Cities within the Fukushima Prefecture Number of evacuees
Fukushima City 4,773
Tamura City 4,621
Koriyama City 3,713
Iwaki City 2,657
Cities outside the Fukushima Prefecture Number of evacuees
Katashina-mura (Gunma Prefecture) 1,959
Yuzawa-cho (Nigata Prefecture) 935
Nagaoka City (Nigata Prefecture) 877
Nigata City (Nigata Prefecture) 869
Source: Fukushima Prefecture, April 15th 2011.
The majority of evacuees from the regions 
under evacuation orders were evacuated outside 
their own municipality. Most of these evacua-
tions are registered in surrounding municipali-
ties including the largest cities of the Fukushi-
ma Prefecture. The remainder evacuated to the 
Ibaragi, Saitama, Akita and Tochigi Prefectures. 
Further to the west the number of evacuees de-
creases as the distance from Fukushima Prefec-
ture increases. 
Families coming from the regions affected by 
the tsunami and the nuclear disaster coped with 
the crisis through different strategies and solutions. 
In April, 2011, Yuzuru Isoda conducted a study in 
which he examined the situation of the institution-
al evacuees hosted within evacuation facilities.2 
According to the author, there has been a general 
tendency to use family separation as a strategy to 
handle the trade-off between maintaining a link to 
the original community in order to better access an-
nouncements and opportunities in the native mu-
nicipality and having safe and sound living condi-
tions in other municipalities (Isoda, 2011a). 
Indeed, he found that young children and their 
mothers, as well as young adults, evacuated more 
frequently to distant locations outside Fukushima 
Prefecture while older male workers and their 
parents 3 usually stayed in Hamadori region near 
their home towns (Isoda, 2011a). However, family 
separation does not always reflect a precise strat-
egy but sometimes is the result of tension between 
husbands (who usually preferred not to leave) 
and wives (who were worried for their children’s 
health and see the displacement as a necessary so-
lution). Many self-evacuees mentioned that sepa-
rations may result in divorces (Hasegawa, 2012).
According to a survey conducted in June 2011 
by the municipality of Okuma, which hosted the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station, soon after the 
nuclear disaster, some sort of stratification oc-
curred among the evacuees from Fukushima Pre-
fecture, especially depending on individual or fam-
ily connection to regions outside the affected area 
(Isoda, 2011b). People who worked for a company 
based outside the region affected by the disaster or 
people who had part of their family in a different 
Japanese prefecture were better off, while evacu-
ees who worked for a local company, who had all 
their relatives in the region or who were owning 
a house within or in the proximity of the evacu-
ation areas were highly disadvantaged. Among 
the former, more than 50% of the full-time work-
ers were still employed full-time after the disaster 
(Isoda, 2011b). They usually continued to work for 
the same company and had the chance to be trans-
ferred to a different branch. The fact that they had 
a full-time job enabled this category of workers 
to rent private housing while full-time self-em-
ployed workers found it much more difficult to be 
2.  His study takes into account the age and sex of evacuees. 
The author warns that his analysis could include some 
bias since there can be double counts of evacuees who 
moved to different facilities, came back home, were hos-
pitalized or were host by families and relatives in private 
evacuation location.
3.  aged 75 or more.
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employed and rent accommodation after the nu-
clear accident. A significant number of male work-
ers in their 30s and 40s were evacuated to Niigata 
Prefecture. This is probably associated with the 
transfer of personnel working in nuclear related 
activities to the Kariwa Nuclear Power Station.
2.3. Tensions within the 
local community
A disparity exists between those who left their 
municipalities and those who could not leave and 
were obliged to remain in their home prefectures 
because of their jobs, family obligations or posses-
sions in those regions. This is particularly true 
for those regions that were not declared under 
the evacuation orders. Indeed, in the Hamadori 
region, the easternmost of the three regions of 
Fukushima Prefecture in Japan, many were forced 
to leave because of government decisions and 
the population showed great solidarity. On the 
contrary, in those regions that were not under 
evacuation orders, but were significantly contami-
nated, tensions between those who left and those 
who stayed arose. 
In addition, people who decided to leave vol-
untarily were considered as cowards, betray-
ers, traitors, “anti-Fukushima” and “anti-Japan” 
(Hasegawa 2012). Those people knew that, once 
they left, they would not be welcomed back. The 
psychological suffering of both groups, those who 
left and those who stayed, cannot be ignored. 
Compensation is also an important element to 
understand the jealousy of people who could not 
leave, and therefore do not receive any assistance 
from the central government, as well as a crucial 
element to analyse the decisions made by evacu-
ees. Compensation may encourage evacuees to 
start a new life, but also deter citizens from doing 
so, allowing them to rely only on payments from 
TEPCO. 
Because of the long-term consequences of the 
disaster, in February 2012 the government’s centre 
for settling disputes over compensation for nu-
clear accidents set new restitution standards for 
the on-going Fukushima nuclear crisis. These new 
standards are very specific and call on TEPCO to 
pay to every person that has left their home $1,246 
per month as well as a compensation for the psy-
chological pain. This amount will not be halved 
after 7 months,4 as was initially planned. In addi-
tion, TEPCO should pay to all voluntary migrants 
the cost of transportation and accommodation 
4.  The duration of these compensations has not been 
defined clearly. 
Map 2. Evacuees by municipalities in Fukushima. 
Source: The 2011 East Japan Earthquake Bulletin of the Tohoku Geographical Association, April 2011.
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expenses in excess of the amounts listed by the in-
terim guidelines set by the government’s Dispute 
Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage 
($5,037 for children and expecting mothers, and 
$1,000 for all others persons). However, this is a 
one-time payment that applies only to the volun-
tary evacuation that occurred before December 
2011. The operator of the Fukushima Daiichi Nu-
clear Power Plant is also required to pay compen-
sation for any damage caused by the nuclear acci-
dent to properties in evacuation areas on the basis 
of residents’ demands. 
If some restitution standards have been gradu-
ally set, there are some important elements that 
are very difficult to evaluate and quantify such as 
the loss of value of houses and properties in the 
region affected by the nuclear accident, the right 
to ‘life-time’ employment, personal and profes-
sional network and membership to a community. 
The prolonged evacuation has important mental, 
physical and economic consequences on evacuees, 
but it remains difficult to determine the appropri-
ate level of compensation.
3. CONCLUSION:  
IS A RETURN POSSIBLE? 
The government has been actively promoting the 
revitalization of the disaster-hit zones through 
a reconstruction policy and the attraction of 
migrants, whether internal or foreigners. 
Special measures have been taken to enhance 
reconstruction projects proposed by municipali-
ties, and approved by the state: flexibility regard-
ing regulations and financial or monetary aid, 
allowing deregulation for medical services, agri-
culture industry and manufacture in the affected 
zones. For instance, the Iwate prefecture has 
launched a “special zone for health, care and wel-
fare” project since February 2012. It benefits from 
flexibility regarding the repartition of medical per-
sonnel in disaster-hit zones for them all to have ac-
cess to sanitary services. Another example is that 
of Miyagi prefecture’s project to promote private 
investment: it plans to create 389 industrial poles 
in 34 municipalities, including automobile and 
food industries, renewable energies, aeronautics, 
etc. The firms recently settled in the region will 
benefit from tax exoneration for five years and, for 
those already present, tax deductions for the same 
period. 
Employment is key for the sustainable develop-
ment of the region and the population. The Minis-
try of Health, Labour and Welfare defined in Oc-
tober 2011 the third phase of the “’Japan as One 
Work Project”, launched in April 2011. Its aim is to 
support job creation through the reconstruction 
of local industries. Through subsidies, it provides 
support for enterprises that establish themselves 
in the zone and for the creation of small-and-me-
dium firms. Emphasis is upon agriculture, forestry 
and fishing industries. The creation of companies 
hiring disaster victims is also encouraged. The 
third phase of the project is expected to generate 
around 500,000 jobs and support 70,000 already 
existing. The previous phases have resulted in the 
job placement of 64,000 people in Iwate, Miyagi 
and Fukushima prefectures (Japanese Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare, 2011). 
The Japanese government has also called on 
foreign countries to take part in the “Open Recon-
struction Plan” organized by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry. It consists in at-
tracting tourists, talented students, highly quali-
fied professionals and foreign investment. 
From November 2011 to March 2016, foreign-
ers who wish to stay in the affected prefectures 
will benefit from flexible administrative arrange-
ments, including an exemption of visa fees. For-
eign companies established in Special Zones for 
Reconstruction will be exempted of corporate tax 
as well as receive financial support for research 
and development. So far, the presence of foreign 
firms in North of Japan has not been significant 
(Hasegawa, 2012). 
In interviews reported by the national and in-
ternational press, the elderly Japanese have ex-
pressed their willingness to rebuild the villages 
where they and their ancestors were born. They 
want to rebuild the community as it existed before 
the tsunami. A 76-year old man, living with his wife 
and disabled son, said, “If we leave Nagahara (in 
Miyagi prefecture) we’ll have no friends. I want to 
die where I know everyone’s face” (The Mainichi, 
7 April 2012). This feeling is called “kizuna”, which 
means connections with people, and local authori-
ties place it at the core of their reconstruction pro-
jects. However, it does not take into account the 
young generation’s preference for safety, since they 
form a demographic minority and are used to de-
ferring to their older relatives. As a consequence, 
young people tend to leave the coastal areas and 
the fishing villages for higher grounds, and to find 
jobs in other big cities. As Yoshiaki Suda, mayor of 
the affected town of Onagawa, put it, “For whom 
are we rebuilding?” (The New York Times, 12 Feb-
ruary 2012). The issue of villages becoming de-
populated is an important issue when considering 
long-term reconstruction (Hasegawa, 2012). 
The situation of the people displaced by the nu-
clear accident is very specific. In order to prepare 
the return of displaced people, the government 
STUDY 06/20114 4 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2011 
reorganised in April 2012 the evacuation zones into 
three categories in the Fukushima prefecture: a for-
bidden zone, where radioactivity levels are equal or 
superior to 50 millisieverts (mSv) per year, a “no-
residence” zone where radioactivity levels are be-
tween 20 and 50 mSv/year, and one where return 
will be possible with radioactivity levels between 1 
and 20 mSv/year. The two latter zones will be de-
contaminated: whereas the “no-residence” zone 
will remain uninhabitable for several years, the 
zone for return will benefit from the reconstruction 
of its infrastructures (Le Monde, February 24th 
2012) and the progressive lift of entry ban, town af-
ter town. Nonetheless, big challenges may prevent 
a massive return: unachieved decontamination, 
unrestored infrastructures and public facilities. 
The issue of return is highly sensitive and po-
liticized. The tsunami survivors keep on paying 
housing loans for houses that disappeared. When 
they attempt to buy other land to build their 
house, they end up paying double loans. Hasega-
wa has noticed a difference in the assistance of-
fered by different cities: “in Sendai, land is offered 
for free whereas in other cities, you have to pay 
for it. This will delay considerably the reconstruc-
tion process”(Hasegawa, 2012). In addition to 
that, psychological suffering often prevents people 
from resettling in places where they lost relatives 
and friends. 
More than one year after the 3/11 events, both 
people who left voluntarily and people who have 
been displaced are still in a very vulnerable posi-
tion, as they are still, for most, unable to go back 
home. The study of the population movements 
highlights the necessity for Japan to reinforce its 
risk prevention and its assistance policies for the 
displaced population. This is an urgent issue, since 
the country expects greater natural catastrophes 
to hit in the coming years – such as the “Big One” 
(earthquake) in Tokyo. ❚
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1. FLOODS AS A HISTORIC PROBLEM
The legend tells of Yu the Great, son of Gun and 
a morally upright ruler, devising a successful 
system of flood controls, which led to the pros-
perity of the Chinese heartland, hence allowing 
him to found the Xia Dynasty (2100-1600BC). 
Not adhering to his father’s method of “blocking” 
(directly damming rivers), he sought to “relieve” 
river flows, by opening irrigation canals, diffusing 
water into fields, and dredging riverbeds. This 
technique was studied and repeated in historical 
water regulation strategies such as by: Emperor 
Suai (6-1BC) of the Han dynasty, Emperor Ming 
of the East Han dynasty (69AD), and then more 
substantively in the Yuan and Ming dynasties. 
Just as the story of Yu stays with the Chinese peo-
ple today, so does the problem of floods. Since an-
cient times, floods have been plaguing the Chinese 
soil. Partnering with drought, earthquakes, and 
slower onset hazards like desertification with the 
Gobi desert growing at 10,400 km2/year, floods 
represent themselves as only one of China’s num-
bered natural disasters. (Stojanov, 2005) They fall 
into a greater compound crisis circle of water secu-
rity of the country. Rapid growing rates or urban 
areas and industries compete with high agricul-
tural consumptions of water resources. In a state 
where 21% of world’s population feeds on only 7% 
of the world’s cultivated lands, water poses itself 
as a food security issue to Chinese; whereas ur-
ban economic development needs of water creates 
social security tensions; safe drinking water then 
threatens human security; and deforestation and 
soil erosions make environmental security fragile. 
Of the two main Chinese rivers (the Yellow River 
and the Yangtze River), reports say the Yangtze is 
accountable for 70% to 75% of all China’s floods. 
(Butler, 2007) It is known to recurrently overflow 
its banks and flood huge plains of land along the 
river basin. These floods occur every year dur-
ing the monsoon season from June to September. 
While on average a couple hundreds of people die 
annually as a result, the Yangtze floods had noto-
riously produced catastrophic floods. In the 20th 
century alone, four major floods in 1931, 1935, 1954 
and 1998 had taken more than 300,000 lives. 
THE 2011 SOUTH CHINA FLOODS - DROUGHT, 
THREE GORGES DAM AND MIGRATION
NADJA JELENKOVIC
The Three Gorges Dam is modern China’s most 
ambitious project and the largest construction work 
taken place. The multi-folded purpose of the ven-
ture includes: 
– Flood prevention: would enhance the Jing River flood regulation capacity so 
that gigantic floods with unordinary disastrous effects happen once in 100 
years instead of once in 10 years; and reduce flood threats to middle and lower 
reaches of Yangtze.
– Power generation: hydropower as a renewable energy, production measuring 
up to 84 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, or one eight of the country’s 
total electricity output.
– Transport and trade: improve navigability of the Yangtze, allowing ships 
to reach as far as Chongqing, and promoting economic development of the 
Southwest. 
– Water diffusion: support water needs in cities and economic zones located in 
mid and lower streams of Yangtze; and facilitate water diffusion for Northern 
uses. 
– Other benefits: agricultural irrigation. (source: The fifth meeting of the Sev-
enth People’s National Congress, 1992)
When it was first approved in 1992, the Three Gorges Dam construction was 
estimated to cost USD 8.3 billion. The World Bank originally intended to provide 
loans for the project, but was discouraged due to pressure from environmental 
and human rights groups and the United States. 
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2. THE FLOODS
In 2011 rains from tropical cyclones and typhoons 
caused a series of floods in the central and southern 
parts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
China Flood Control Office first reported on June 
10, 2011 that tropical storm Sarika would be landing 
between Shanwei city of Guangdong province and 
Zhangpu city of Fujian province. (Xinhua, 2011a) 
Subsequently on June 12, the Chinese Meteorolog-
ical Administration sent out a level III flood emer-
gency warning for the Yangtze River Basin. The 
alert had then been raised to the maximum level 
of IV as of June 17 2011. Southern China suffered 
a further hit from June 16 to June 25 due to trop-
ical storm Haima (Egay), which landed at the 
Guangdong province; while the east was struck 
by Sever tropical storm Meari (Flacon), flooding 
the Zhejiang, Shandong and Liaoning provinces. 
(Xinhua, 2011b; 2011c) Two tropical depressions 
reached coastal China in mid July and the southern 
province of Fujian took the final blow from typhoon 
Nammadol (Mina) from August 21 to August 31. 
Water levels recorded a new height since 1955, 
surpassing the safety benchmark at the Dongting 
and Boyang Lakes, the two largest natural lakes 
that help store and regulate water along the 
Yangtze River, and overflowing smaller reservoirs. 
(BBC China, 2011a) In Zhejiang province, hefty 
rains caused the Qiantang River to swell hazard-
ously, amounting to 2.4m above safety levels. Au-
thorities evacuated 292,000 people in the city of 
Lanxi for fear of breaches of the 70 kilometer-long 
dykes along the Lan River, which was “already 
overflowing at some points while other dyke sec-
tions barely holding.” (Martin, 2011) Meanwhile 
two dyke breaches were reported in smaller lakes 
affiliated to Boyang Lake. (BBC China, 2011b) 
As much as 3m of floodwater was observed in 
certain areas such as the Jiangxi province. (Xin-
hua, 2011b) To aggravate the situation, saturated 
soil from over precipitation also caused many 
landslides.
Reports show a total of 13 provinces and autono-
mous regions being heavily hit by floods. With the 
floods spreading over a huge area, coherent cen-
tralized official data regarding the whole series of 
floods is absent. Centralized official reports with 
the highest figure of casualties record 239 deaths, 
88 missing persons, 36.73 million people affected, 
106,500 houses collapsed, 1.16million hectares of 
farm land destroyed, and a direct economic loss 
standing at RMB 43.2 billion (USD 6.65 billion). 
(Xinhua, 2011d) 
Map 1. Chinese provinces affected by 2011 South China floods
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3. THE DROUGHT
The greatest paradox that occurred regarding the 
floods was the six-month long severe drought that 
haunted various parts of the PRC and continued in 
certain parts as the floods ended. 
In the middle reaches of the Yangtze, drought 
left many reservoirs dry or filled with “dead” wa-
ter, as was the case of the 1,392 reservoirs in Hubei 
province. Long expanses of the Yangtze River itself 
was closed to water transport, leaving hundred of 
vessels beached in the shallows. (Hays, 2011) Sta-
tistics of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in May 2011 
showed 35 million people affected by the drought, 
4.24 million people suffering from acute water 
shortage, and 370,000 hectares of harvestable 
crops being destroyed. At the middle and lower 
streams of the Yangtze River, average precipitation 
since spring 2011 was only 194mm, which meant 
51% of normal precipitation, a record low in 60 
years. (BBC China, 2011c) In regions such as Hu-
nan and Jiangxi provinces, that allow villagers to 
own small farmlands as well as fishponds, news 
reports mention drying up of land and ponds de-
prive people of livelihoods. Many villagers flocked 
to search for job alternatives in cities. (BBC China, 
2011c).
Upon the first two to three days of torrential rain 
in early June, drought situations in the middle and 
lower streams of the Yangtze River got alleviated. 
Government representatives from Jiangxi province 
expressed relieve but warned of the catastrophe 
turning from drought to flood, and cautioned the 
people against land and rockslides. (BBC China, 
2011b) According to provincial government statis-
tics, 3.3 million people and 22,000 hectares of land 
were still affected by drought in Jiangxi; as for the 
neighboring Hunan province 6.1 million people 
were in acute water shortage conditions while 6 
million were affected by various levels of floods. 
(BBC China, 2011b) The central government Flood 
Control Office later announced that despite the 
rains, 37% of drought-hit lands in the five prov-
inces at mid and lower Yangtze stream remained 
arid, and 22% of the affected population contin-
ued to suffer from acute water shortage. This un-
precedented drought followed by huge floodwater 
exacerbated local afflictions. 
4. DROUGHT, FLOOD,  
AND THE THREE GORGES DAM
In May 2011, as the drought crisis worsened, a lot 
of spotlight had gone to the Three Gorges Dam. 
Pent-up anger released as torrents of blames on 
the construction project, not only for causing the 
drought situation but also earthquakes in the 
nearby regions, environmental pollution, and great 
misery suffered by the 1.4 million original inhabit-
ants relocated to make way for dam building. 
There had been suspicions that the operators 
of the Three Gorges Dam hydropower plant were 
holding back drought-relief water and resisted re-
lease so as to sustain optimum power generation. 
At the end it took a highly publicized command 
from the central government to open the gates and 
let out 3.7 billion tones of stored water, roughly 
equal to 10% of the Three Gorges reservoir vol-
ume, downstream at a rate of 11,000 cubic meters 
per second as compared to 7,000 cubic meters per 
second as prior to May 7. (Lee, 2011) Apart from 
this operational issue, the artificial accumulation 
of water in the upstream led to reduced volumes 
reaching the Dongting and Boyang Lakes. Surplus 
water that helped to enlarge or maintain the sizes 
of the two lakes before 1998 was now replaced by 
the gradual drying up of the lake borders, hence 
reducing both their reserve capacities for drought 
and regulation capacity as flood basins. (Dingzhi 
Peng et al., 2005).
General criticisms on the Three Gorges Dam project 
include:
– Submerging 13 main cities, 140 minor ones and towns and 1,352 
villages. Relocation of 1.4 million people in respected areas of the 
Yangtze basin to make way for the dam construction. Often transferred 
in blocks, people were sent of various parts of China. While some are 
happy about relocating, some have been complaining about poor com-
pensations, corruptions that have taken away their entitlements, and a 
shortage of jobs or land in the newly resettled areas.
– As water level of the reservoir rose, landslides have become a prob-
lem. As of autumn 2007, directly related landslides exceeded 4,700 and 
required the evacuation of or concrete reinforcement for 1,000 localities.
– Links have been made to earthquakes, when a government seismolo-
gist study published in 2011 revealed a 30-time increase in minor local 
shakings since the construction of the dam. (Adams, 2011)
– Silt and sedimentation is said to be a major issue, as coarse gravels 
and rocks from Sichuan could not be flushed out and would stay behind 
the dam, while reduced discharge volume causes silting in the mid and 
lower courses as well.
– Of pollution resulted from dam construction, environmentalists esti-
mate 250 billion of raw sewage and other industrial contaminants are 
trapped behind the dam.
– Environmental catastrophe for aquatic animals.
– Sinking of valuable archeological sites, promoting illegal excavations 
and smuggling of national properties to foreign countries for sale. 
– Corruptions yet to be unmasked, vis-à-vis residents relocation in par-
ticular, pollution causation, dam construction and operational benefits.
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However, these claims were being rebuked 
as absurd by hardcore government officials like 
Zhang Boting, Deputy General Secretary of the 
China Society for Hydropower Engineering, who 
said in an interview, “there are more than 20 dams 
in the world larger than the Three Gorges Dam. 
But I have never heard of them causing droughts. 
The big flood last year (2010) could be a good refu-
tation of this claim. It is impossible for it to cause 
both drought and flood.” (Global Times, 2011) 
By increasing the water storage level to 175m be-
hind the dam in October 2010, the dam had been 
highly praised by its operators, the China Three 
Gorges Project Corporation, to have prevented a 
dire flood. The highest previous record had been 
172.8m, set in 2008. The company chairman Cao 
Guangjing held that the 2010 act was a “historical 
milestone” that would enable the project “to ful-
fill its functions of flood control, power genera-
tion, navigation and water diversion to the full”. 
(Kurtenbach, 2010) Yet the flashfloods of summer 
2011 put the Three Gorges Dam into question once 
again. 
While drawing a straight line between the Three 
Gorges Dam and the 2011 droughts and floods 
would be oversimplifying the causal relationship, 
it is an underlying fact that the dam is built to 
hold back Yangtze water and gives to its planners 
powerful flexibility in managing the retention and 
discharge of water, as appropriate according to ex-
tremities in rainfall. 
Meanwhile, following the prolonged drought 
catastrophe, the central government made a rare 
acknowledgment of the downside of the project. 
In the State Council meeting on May 18 2011, Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao openly addressed the “urgent 
problems” faced by the Three Gorges Dam and 
announced another RMB 20 billion (USD 3 bil-
lion) spending to deal with relocation, pollution 
and landslide issues. Particularly worthy of men-
tioning is the first of the six directives established 
in his “Post-Three Gorges Working Plan”, which 
provided that livelihoods of dam construction af-
filiated relocated persons should equate that of 
residents of Hubei province and Chongqing city 
by 2020; a strategic economic plan would be put 
in place for transport, water and other urban fa-
cilities development, as well as a social security net 
that covered both urban and rural areas. (Xinhua, 
2011e) In fact already in 2008, when the Premier 
halted the Leaping Tiger Gorge Dam after reading 
an investigative article published in the Guang-
zhou newspaper Southern Daily, the central gov-
ernment’s position on mega projects seemed to 
have shifted. In the case of the Three Gorges Dam, 
whether it was to promote the caring facet of the 
government or a genuine response to popular 
discontentment, his words had drawn great atten-
tion and appreciation. Headlines of western press 
wrote for example “China drought renews debate 
over Three Gorges Dam”. (Zi, 2011) Other govern-
ment responses to the droughts and floods are to 
be examined further below.
5. FROM EMERGENCY RELIEF TO 
RELOCATION AND MIGRATION
Government emergency relief of the 2011 floods 
saw the substantial mobilization of soldiers of the 
People’s Liberation Army, military police, firemen 
and civil defence units. In the hard hit Wangmo 
county of Guizhou province for example, 1200 
military persons were involved in rescue, evacu-
ation and relief work, and another 3000 party 
officials in logistics, communication and coordina-
tion. (Xinhua, 2011f) In other places news reports 
carry photos of uniformed young men maneu-
vering boats crowded with people stranded in 
floods. (BBC China, 2011d) 
People were relocated to nearby areas to await 
the retreat of water, which took a few days to a 
week’s time. The displacement of people followed 
a number of different initiatives. While those in 
most dire need benefited from the government-
provided public shelters and temporary tents, oth-
ers found more accommodating refuge in homes 
of families and friends. In Huainan city of Anhui 
Province for instance, of the 6061 evacuated, 4770 
were unable to return home three days after the 
flood, 3324 stayed on for a longer period in homes 
of relatives and friends, 1104 in government public 
shelters, and 342 in government emergency tents 
scattered over 14 localities. (Ye, 2011)
About relief supplies, Victor Kan, World Vision 
program quality director was quoted saying, “food 
is (was) urgently needed. It is (was) estimated 
that the affected communities will suffer from 
food shortages over the next two to three months. 
Farmers have been struck twice, first with drought 
and then floods. Many of them are likely to face 
total crop failure this year.” (Xinhua, 2011g) In 
places like Zhejiang and Hunan, major crops like 
corns, soybeans, sugar canes and peanuts were 
destroyed by the flood, and fishes in ponds were 
washed away. One Zhejiang city had 70% to 80% 
of all paddies damaged. People lost their life bear-
ings. (Xinhua, 2011h)
Newspaper reports have noted government de-
liveries of cup noodles, rice, blankets, medical sup-
plies, temporary shelters and cement (for recon-
struction purposes) to victims. (Xinhua, 2011i) In 
Guizhou province, as one of the first emergency re-
sponse plans for the summer floods, the National 
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Commission for Disaster Reduction and the Min-
istry of Civil Affairs ordered 2,000 quilts, 3,000 
clothing and over 100 tents to be delivered. (Xin-
hua, 2011j) In later rounds of floods, the Guizhou 
people’s government assured that there were ad-
equate food supplies and that each flood victim re-
ceived 0.5kg of rice per day until the sufficient bet-
terment of their situations. (People’s Daily, 2011)
Given that it was a short sudden on-set event, 
all relief efforts were meant to be provisional, until 
daily lives return to normal. Government direc-
tives were limited to the emergency response pe-
riod, whereas local initiatives were encouraged 
in post-disaster recovery. According to Art. 4.18 of 
Regulation on the Relief of Natural Disasters prom-
ulgated by the State Council and revised in 2011, 
evacuation and resettlement was to be 
“organized by the locality’s people govern-
ment, under the pretext of safe situation. It 
would decide on the best resettlement measures 
for a transitional period. The process would be 
a mixed method of government directed resettle-
ment and people’s self-directed resettlement.
Resettlement locations should be chosen based 
on transport accessibility, and ease to facilitate 
recovery and production. Areas prone to poten-
tial hazard recurrence should be avoided, so 
should cultivated farmlands.
Locality’s people’s government should encour-
age and organize people for self-help recovery.”
Articles 4.19 to 4.20 then provide for reconstruc-
tion and reparation of houses destroyed in the 
natural disaster. After individual or collective ap-
plication from the people, the government would 
review needs and realities and provide appropri-
ate financial and material aid. 
As the statute denotes, the return to and recov-
ery of flood-struck areas were the optimum goals. 
As if it were a habit, the Yangtze River floods re-
currently every year, though with different inten-
sities. And people habitually return as well. Those 
who try to avoid the adverse effects of floods may 
move, but these displacements are more often re-
garded as a part of the rural-urban migration trend 
in the PRC, where economic considerations tri-
umph. In China’s recent history, the largest known 
mass migration resulting directly from Yangtze 
overflows is a state planned mass relocation as a 
response to the devastating 1998 floods. The event 
brought attention to the vigorous illegal land en-
croachment by farmers and developers that deeply 
harmed the environment and reduced of the na-
ture’s water regulation capacities. The slogan of 
the project was called “return of farmlands to for-
ests and lakes”, suggesting a return of grain plots 
on slopes and reclaimed land to forests, grasslands 
and lake areas. 2,460,000 people over four prov-
inces along the Yangtze were reported to have 
been resettled since 1998. (China News Weekly, 
2011) Otherwise, no separate data indicate migra-
tion directly and solely as result of Yangtze floods, 
apart from government initiated relocations such 
as that pertaining to the Three Gorges Dam con-
struction or others related to water and environ-
ment regulatory projects. 
Both kinds of displacements meanwhile face the 
same problem of household registration (Hukou) 
restriction (planned relocation to a smaller extent, 
as residency status in properly handled cases are 
changed accordingly). The Hukou systems links 
social welfare of nationals to their places of birth, 
which means that rural-urban migrants are often-
times denied social benefits like public health care, 
housing and education when they leave their vil-
lages to work elsewhere. The system was created 
in 1950s to prevent formation of ghettos in urban 
areas, but eventually resulting in a worrying situa-
tion where rural-urban labor migrants are treated 
as second-class citizens in cities. They also con-
stitute China’s huge floating population. Most of 
them earn as low-skilled labors, go back home for 
Spring Festival during the annual hump of human 
migrations, and do not return to the previous work 
place anymore, prompting wage rises and other 
economic problems. Although Hukou require-
ments have been relaxed to a degree to accommo-
date economic growth, the floating population is 
still not officially authorized to dwell permanently 
in the receiving cities and towns. This is the major 
social policy obstacle for any permanent migration 
as a solution to floods.
6. LEGAL ISSUES
Three main laws govern issues surrounding our 
topic of discussion. To start with is the Water and 
Soil Conservation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, as amended by the 18th meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s 
Congress of the PRC in 2010. The law is:
“formulated to control and prevent water and 
soil loss; protect and reasonably utilize water 
and soil resources; reduce disasters of flood, 
drought and sandstorm; improve the ecological 
environment and guarantee sustainable eco-
nomic and social developments”, (Art.1)
where “the state shall give priority to preven-
tion, make overall planning, exercise compre-
hensive control, adopt measures suited to local 
conditions, strengthen scientific management, 
and lay stress on efficiency” (Art. 3)
under the supervision of “the water 
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administrative department of the State Council 
(which) shall be in charge of the water and soil 
conservation work of the whole nation.” (Art.5) 
Sub-authorities then include the “river basin 
administrative bodies” and departments of for-
estry, agriculture, and land and resources at or 
above the county level. (Art. 6 and 7)
This statue emphasizes long-term prevention 
and protection, overall monitoring of water and 
soil conditions in the country, and sees itself more 
appropriately applicable in slow onset, or smaller 
scale natural or man-made damages to the natu-
ral environment. For sudden catastrophes, as the 
flash floods of summer 2011, other statutes play a 
more important role. Also about prevention is the 
Regulation on the Defense Against Meteorological 
Disasters, enacted by the State Council in 2010. El-
ements of meteorological disasters include 
“damages caused by typhoons, rain and snow 
storms, sand storms, cold spells, extreme temper-
atures, droughts, thunders, hails, frosts and fogs.
Prevention against direct and indirect damages 
from flood and drought disasters, soil and tec-
tonic disasters, oceanic disasters, as well as forest 
and prairie fires shall be governed by respective 
laws and administrative provisions.” (Art. 2)
“Disaster prevention stresses human-oriented, 
scientific research and development, inter-de-
partmental communication, and societal partici-
pation.” (Art.3) 
“Guiding and coordination efforts should be 
stressed at the people’s government at the county 
level and above; where meteorological disaster 
preventions are incorporated into economic and 
social development plans, related financial esti-
mates reflected in budgetary plans.” (Art.4)
Finally, emergency relief work is governed by the 
Regulation on the Relief of Natural Disasters prom-
ulgated by the State Council. It details response in-
tensity level (I-IV), supervising authority (headed 
first by the Natural Disaster Reduction Office, re-
viewing various demands from localities and co-
ordinating works of various departments, such as 
transport, logistics, agriculture, trade, food, com-
munication, etc. when the intensity level reduces, 
work is transferred back to the State Council) and 
relief procedures, post relief aid and rehabilita-
tion work. What they have in common is a desired 
cooperation between various government depart-
ments at different levels, headed by a strong cen-
tral office at the top.
These laws have been working in line with a 
number of other natural-disaster relief laws, in-
cluding the Emergency Response Law of the PRC 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 
the PRC Regulation on the Defense against Earth-
quakes and the Regulation on the Defense Against 
Drought in PRC put in place by the State Council. 
The Twelfth Five Year Plan announced by the Na-
tional People’s Congress in March 2011 recognized 
the successes in disaster management during the 
Eleventh Five Year Plan but accentuated the in-
creased frequency and severity of natural disasters 
in the same period, naming specifically the Wen-
chuan and Yushu earthquakes, Zhouqu land and 
rock slides, snow and cold rains over the South, se-
vere floods, droughts, typhoons, wind hails, ocean 
ice, heavy snow, heat waves and forest fires. (State 
Council, 2011) It called for amelioration of disas-
ter prevention and management mechanisms and 
pertaining legal systems. Further, the Five Year 
Plan reviewed and republished the five legal in-
struments discussed above. 
Follow up government efforts were observed 
henceforth, especially in disaster review and doc-
umentation at the national level. In the annual 
disaster report issued by the Office of Disaster 
Reduction, it is stated that floods and droughts 
across the PRC in 2011 accounted for 40% and 30% 
of the nation’s total natural disasters in the year. 
(Civil Affairs Department Office of National Disas-
ter Reduction, 2012) In another flood prevention 
meeting that took place in Chongqing in February 
2, 2012, data from the 2011 floods had been taken 
as reference for 2012 estimations and selected area 
focuses. It reported a total economic damage from 
floods and the prolonged drought of RMB 23.92 
billion. Damages of floods stood at RMB 31.01 bil-
lion, affecting 31 localities. As much as 260 rivers 
countrywide had water levels reaching the alarm 
benchmark, out of them 50 surpassed the safety 
guarantee level, and 11 of all documented historic 
levels. Qujiang, the tributary of Jialing River saw a 
volume surpassing the 1939 records, making it the 
biggest flood in 100 years. (Lu, 2012) 
From the Three Gorges Dam reevaluation to 
emergency statutes review and to post disaster 
policy articulation meetings, differing government 
actions indicate greater eagerness to better ad-
dress disaster prevention and management. 
However though, according to Zhang Qingfeng, 
water specialist at the Asian Development Bank, 
China “has a stunningly agile disaster response 
system but not a corresponding system of risk re-
duction and management. In other words, China 
does not prepare for climate-related disasters; it 
only reacts to them.” (Zhang, 2011) His critic came 
in June 2011 right in the midst of the devastating 
floods that followed the second spell of drought in 
the Yangtze River basin.
He pointed out that damages of natural dis-
asters could not be reduced because most local 
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governments missed the opportunity to guard 
their locality against the impact of the hazards. 
There was a lack of a comprehensive national poli-
cy compelling local governments to keep watch for 
natural hazards like floods and droughts.
Two studies completed by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) in 2010 on Chinese flood and 
drought management found the two management 
strategies highly similar, and “stuck in a reactive 
mode”. (ADB, 2010a; see also ADB, 2012b) Reac-
tions were limited until after an emergency situa-
tion had been declared.
Zhang attributed the problem to an absent sepa-
rate disaster risk management agency. As articles 
5-7 of the Water and Soil Conservation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, article 4 of the Regula-
tion on the Defense Against Meteorological Disasters, 
and various provisions of the Regulation on the Re-
lief of Natural Disasters show, risk management re-
sponsibilities in the PRC are divided among a num-
ber of agencies, which are then brought together 
by means of a strong central control. This structure 
limits optimum policy focuses on resources direc-
tion and determination of hazard cycles; instead, 
allows room mainly for an alone-insufficient “re-
action” to natural disasters.
7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
As already proposed by the ADB report in 2010, the 
PRC’s disaster management should be extended 
“to a six-step risk management: early warning, 
monitoring and forecasting; risk assessment; risk 
mitigation; impact mitigation and emergency 
responses; recovery, evaluation and contin-
gency planning; and stakeholder participation 
and public education and awareness.” A sound 
monitoring and early warning system would help 
greatly diminish response time and cost, hence the 
flood damage and restoration cost. 
A well-defined disaster management policy 
should be considered together with other dimen-
sions to build a comprehensive integrated ap-
proach. Critical it is that long-term plans devise re-
serves and healthy ecosystem services that would 
function during floods and drought. In the case of 
Yangtze River, ecological degradation both related 
and not related to the Three Gorges Dam are seen 
and known. They serve to reduce the resilience 
of the ecosystem to counter impacts of climate 
change such as extremities in precipitation. 
The State Forestry Administration’s large-scale 
national lake and wetlands survey showed more 
than 1,000 natural lakes and wetlands disap-
peared since the establishment of new China, and 
lake areas totaling 1.3 million hectares reclaimed 
for either urban or agricultural development. It is 
not an avant-garde suggestion that more afforesta-
tion programs be put in place as a remedial meas-
ure. As for conservation and prevention, existing 
related legal instruments must be applied with 
greater vigor. They should together form an inte-
grative river basin management model. 
Despite the fact that this paper does not draw a 
direct causal link between the Three Gorges Dam 
and the natural disaster discussed, it does try to 
explore their inter-relatedness. To reduce envi-
ronmental damage and the need of displacing 
persons, some experts have suggested limiting the 
maximum height of the water behind the dam for 
30m. Technical solutions as such worth much in 
depth study, but would be beyond the scope of 
this study. Meanwhile, holding the manipulation 
power, the dam operators must be more vigilant of 
water needs and water conditions in the mid and 
low reaches of Yangtze. Power generation can in 
no way override humanitarian needs. 
Regarding the flood victims, post-disaster finan-
cial compensation had proved to be inadequate. 
Recovery burden had not been sufficiently shared 
by the government. Ecological compensations and 
later-stage assistance mechanisms should be given 
greater emphasis in government response policies. 
To facilitate rehabilitation of both urban and rural 
lives, soft-mechanism social assistances must be 
provided, such as aid to employment, trainings to 
strengthen skills, etc. Migration as a post-flood so-
lution to better livelihood has been limited largely 
due to the Hukou system. Calls for the system’s re-
form are already heard. Now or later the govern-
ment must consider it seriously. Allowing broader 
population mobility will be a need in the PRC’s fu-
ture development.
CONCLUSION
Floods as a historic plague on China reappeared 
in 2011, devastating the Yangtze River basin 
and other areas of PRC. The fact that they came 
following months of detrimental droughts show 
the imbalances and uneven distribution of precipi-
tation brought by climate change. The two disas-
ters depict also the compound water crisis the PRC 
is facing; the floods and drought caused direct 
human and food insecurity, aggravated by envi-
ronmental degradation, and threatening social 
and economic securities. The 2011 floods must 
therefore be looked at as part of China’s overall 
water problem.
The Three Gorges Dam was built under strong 
central government directive to address the plight. 
With its full operation commencing only a few 
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years ago, and in view of the recent government 
admission of its downsides, the project is open 
to debate once again. Whether the Three Gorges 
Dam is a mere “blocking” mechanism like the one 
used by Yu’s father, or a more flexible combination 
of “block” and “relief”, is yet to be demonstrated by 
the central government’s future policy directives. 
The people affected by the discussed natural 
disasters and the dam construction portray also a 
population problem to the PRC. For the 2011 South 
China floods affected population, evacuation and 
relocation had been provided when the disaster 
struck. But people were expected to return to their 
places of origin, despite annual recurrences of the 
problem. Appropriate post-disaster social assis-
tances given to individuals were restricted in both 
the time and material extent. For government 
directed permanent relocations pertaining to the 
Three Gorges Dam, critics have long been pin-
pointing the deprival of human rights, as people 
were forcibly moved, settled in worse living envi-
ronments and given little social assistance. Head 
of Hehai University Migration Research Centre 
and Expert Advisor to Three Gorges Dam Migra-
tion Development Shi Guoqing estimated that 
by 2050, more than 5 million Chinese would be-
come environmental migrants, either due to gov-
ernment regulatory projects over the major river 
basins or other natural disasters. (China News 
Weekly, 2011) Present social systems, notably Hu-
kou would be one of the leading obstacles to per-
sonal mobility as a solution to natural disasters. 
These would need to be better addressed by the 
government. ❚
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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the 2000s, the Indian govern-
ment estimated that over 20 million Bangladeshis 
were residing illegally in India (Voice of America, 
2003). The decision to migrate stems from several 
economic, political and social reasons, but envi-
ronmental factors also play an underpinning role 
as they shape the conditions in which migration 
waves are triggered. Bangladesh is especially 
prone to flooding, 25% of the territory is inundated 
during the monsoon and up to 70% is ‘’exposed to 
intermittent extreme flooding’’(Hossain, 2005, 1). 
Such floods occur in one the most densely popu-
lated areas in the world, and more than a million 
were directly affect 2011 (IRIN Reports, 2011). 
Environmental crises force Bangladeshis to adapt 
or to leave as their homes and sources of living 
are destroyed. This takes place in the context of 
a larger displacement of population phenomenon 
and has become a regional issue. Due to important 
economic discrepancies and political instability 
in the region, illegal migrants crossing the Indian 
border are considered by the the Indian govern-
ment as potential sources of trouble that have to 
be stopped. (Kumar, 2011)
Thus, migration resulting from annual episodes 
of flooding in Bangladesh has quickly turned into 
an important migration issue and a key element 
of bilateral relationships between India and 
Bangladesh. This study aims at presenting a specific 
case of environmental migrations, with a focus on 
the reports of the 2011 floods in Bangladesh and 
considerations on the particular context of Indo-
Bangladeshi relations. The objective is first to show 
the complex link between floods and transnational 
migrations in Bangladesh, then to analyse the 2011 
episode and the political response that emerged, 
and finally to contextualize Bangladeshi flood-
induced migrations to India in order to present the 
specificities of this international issue. 
1. FLOODS AND MIGRATION IN 
BANGLADESH: A STUDY OF PATTERNS
1.1. The threat of environmental 
disasters and climate 
change in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is at present widely considered as 
one of the most vulnerable countries in the world 
regarding climate change and environmental 
degradation. (Panda, 2011) It is threatened by a 
large range of sudden-onset disasters including 
storms, earthquakes,tsunamis, and floods as well 
as long-term processes such as sea-level rise and 
salt-water intrusion. (IOM Reports, 2010). It is 
interesting to start by explaining these natural 
phenomena and analysing the context in which 
they take place.
1.1.1. Risk profile of Bangladesh
When trying to draw up the risk profile of Bangla-
desh, one must first look at geographic and demo-
graphic factors. The population of Bangladesh was 
142 million on a territory of 144 384 km² in 2005. 
Even more importantly, it is expected to reach 
243 million by 2050 (Demeny & McNicoll, 2006, 
257). Therefore extremely densely populated, the 
country is almost entirely located on a gigantic 
delta of three rivers : ‘’floodplains of the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, Meghna and smaller rivers occupy 
about 80 per cent of the country; hills occupy 
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12 per cent and uplifted fault blocks (so-called 
terraces) 8 per cent’’ (Brammer, 1990, 12). With 
230 rivers, of which 57 are international, Bangla-
desh is in most cases ‘’the lower riparian country’’, 
(Hossain, 2005, 1), and almost 70% of the entire 
national territory is less than one meter above the 
sea level. 
Map 1. Bangladesh’s population density
Source: USAID.
Located on the Tropic of Cancer, Bangladesh 
experiences heavy monsoons, with the most 
significant precipitation occurring between 
May and September. Their intensity also varies 
geographically, since ‘’mean annual rainfall 
increases from about 1250 mm in the centre-
west to over 5000 mm in the extreme north-
east’’. (Brammer, 1990). It is considered that ‘’in 
an average year, 40% of Bangladesh’s total land 
area is flooded and river erosion washes away 
1% of arable land’’ (Hagerty, 2008, 182), These 
floods are caused by monsoon rains as well as 
by rare and extreme storms, but they are also 
linked to the melting glaciers in the Himalayas, 
and by 2030 Bangladesh could lose up to 20% 
of its land (Wax, 2007). Such predictions make 
even more sense when you consider that ‘’half of 
Bhola Island, Bangladesh’s biggest island, was 
swallowed by rising sea levels, leaving 500,000 
people homeless’’(Ibid). 
According to the 2008 Census, 88.45 per cent 
of Bangladeshi households are located in rural 
areas (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2008,), 
and though the level poverty decreased from 
59% to 40% between 1991 and 2005 (Government 
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2008,), 
more than 50 million people still live in poverty 
in the most ecologically endangered areas of the 
territory (IOM reports, 2010). If rapidly adapting 
to the floodplain environment and developed new 
sources of living has been necessary, Bangladeshis 
remain highly dependent on traditional rice 
production as occupies about 80% of the cropped 
area (Brammer, 1990, 13). 
Bangladesh experiences a multitude of 
environmental problems, from tsunamis to water 
scarcity, and their considerable effects, though 
varying tremendously, are tragically affecting the 
economic and social development of the country.
Environmental and humanitarian catastrophes 
often feed off each other feeding themselves, as 
in 1974 when heavy storms produced a flood that 
was followed by a famine killing 30,000 people. 
(Brammer, 1990, 12). In 1989, a tornado killed 
about 1,000 north-west of Dhaka after a several-
month long drought that destroyed most of the 
crops (Ibid). 
The impact of environmental disasters on the 
population can be calculated, and statistics show 
the intensity of each catastrophe. Obviously, the 
consequences of cyclones, floods and drought 
depend on the characteristics of the region 
(population concentration, types of habitat, level 
of development and reactive capacity of public 
services among other factors) as well as on the 
seriousness of the natural event.
Table 1 shows the number of people affected 
and killed by natural disasters between 1980 and 
2010. One can already see that floods by far affect 
the most people, with 45 million and 36 million 
Bangladeshis affected respectively during the 
tragic years of 1988 and 2004. Storms, in the most 
extreme cases, kill more people, but on average are 
less damaging than floods.
Figure 1 confirms that floods are by far the most 
dangerous disaster for the Bangladeshis, both in 
terms of security for people and for goods. In terms 
of the number of citizens potentially affected by 
floods, Bangladesh ranks first out of 162 countries 
with economic damages reaching almost 10% of 
national GDP. 
Thus, diverse in nature and in their effects, 
environmental disasters have an extraordinary 
effect on the lives of Bangladeshis. They have 
weakened the development of the country and 
provoked tragic humanitarian crises several 
times during the last 30 years. Statistics show 
that among all of these disasters, floods emerge 
as the most dangerous for people and the most 
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Human exposure
Modelled number of people present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses
Hazard type   Population exposed   Percentage of population  Country ranking
Cyclone  4,641,060        6th out of 89
Drought  642,277        63rd out of 184
Flood  19,279,960        1st out of 162
Landslide  3,758        35th out of 162
Earthquake  1,330,958        17th out of 153
Tsunami  1,598,546        3rd out of 76
Legend: 
Tropical cyclones (Saffir-Simpson categories)
Earthquake (modified Mercalli scale classes)
Economic exposure
Modelled amount of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses
Hazard type   GDP exposed (billions-US$)  Percentage of GDP  Country ranking
Cyclone  2.39        12th out of 89
Flood  9.74        3rd out of 162
Landslide  0.16        25th out of 162
Earthquake  6.81        42nd out of 153
Tsunami  0.66        15th out of 76
frequent. Extreme floods continue to kill people 
and destroy resources, proving the relevance 
of this issue and the potential threat it holds for 
millions of lives. In addition, not all Bangladeshis 
have shared equally in the growth of the country 
and many remain entrenched in extreme poverty. 
These populations remain particularly vulnerable 
to natural disasters that will grow in frequency and 
intensity in coming years. In 2010, the IOM stated 
that this destruction will become more and more 
important in Bangladeshis’ decision to migrating. 
The core articulation flood-migration remains to 
be analysed, but the looming danger of the issue is 
already observed.
”Environmental factors will be an increasingly 
important component of people’s migration 
decisions over the course of the 21st century. 
While it remains crucial—morally and 
practically—to be aware of the long-term threat 
from climate change, the best way to prepare for 
Table 1. Bangladesh top 10 natural disasters reported between 1980-2010
Source: PreventionWeb.net, based on EM-DAT: International Disasters Database, Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium.
the consequences of climate change in 2050 or 
2100 is to improve the ability to deal effectively 
with Bangladesh’s existing vulnerabilities now.” 
(Walsham, 2010, X)
1.1.2. Floods: history and explanation of the 
phenomenon in Bangladesh
According to the IOM, reducing the threat of 
floods constitutes the first priority for the Bangla-
deshi government (IOM Report, 2010). As shown 
before, one must distinguish normal flooding, 
induced by the monsoon season, and the seasonal 
melting of Himalayan peaks from their worsening 
by other factors such as storms and abnormal 
temperatures.
In his article on the geographical background 
of the 1987 and 1988 floods, Brammer accurately 
explains the seasonal flow characteristics of the 
three great rivers of Bangladesh : the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra and Meghna. Their seasonal 
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5
V & VI VII VIII XI to XII
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of many new wells resulting in the lowering of 
the water table and the subsequent subsidence 
of land making it even more prone to flooding’’ 
(Saifullah, 2009), but they can also be linked to 
external elements. For example, flooding has been 
impacted by the construction of dams in India 
over the streams that feed into these main rivers 
as it increased the problem of sedimentation in 
Bangladesh. Similarly, deforestation in Nepal and 
the Himalayas has increased the risk of floods 
downstream by changing the geological structure 
around the trans-boundary river system (Lhaled 
Saifullah, 2009). 
Thus, both socially constructed and taking 
place in a certain natural context, flooding in 
Bangladesh is the result of several dynamics that 
create conditions for disasters to occur. Even if 
these floods have consequences on the lives of 
the Bangladeshis that are statistically proven, 
it remains to be seen if they actually trigger 
migration from Bangladesh to India.
1.2. Linking floods and 
migrations : interests and limits 
of the Bangladeshi example
1.2.1. Methodological issues of searching for 
correlation
Indeed, this study tries to articulate the link 
existing between two phenomena : floods in Bang-
ladesh and migration patterns between Bangla-
desh and India. The most obvious answer would 
be to assume that they are linked by the pragmatic 
decision of Bangladeshis to leave the land that is 
destroyed by recurrent flooding. Human casual-
ties and economic damages explain the departure 
to less ecologically-fragile territories. 
Nevertheless, this mechanism remains 
unsatisfactory, as the rationale behind each 
individual’s choice remains unknown and that 
what may appears as a causality on the statistical 
tables is in reality barely correlated. To start with, 
the IOM provides a certain grid to read a potential 
link between climate change and migrations:
‘’These changes are expected to affect the 
movement of people in at least four ways: 1) 
the intensification of natural disasters—both 
sudden and slow-onset - leading to increased 
displacement and migration; 2) the adverse 
consequences of increased warming, climate 
variability and of other effects of climate change 
for livelihoods, public health, food security and 
water availability; 3) rising sea levels that make 
coastal areas uninhabitable; and 4) competition 
over scarce natural resources potentially leading 
to growing tensions and even conflict and, in turn, 
displacement .’’ (Walsham, 2010, 5)
fluctuations differ, since’’ the Brahmaputra and 
the Meghna begin to rise in March-April as a result 
of snow-melt in the Himalayas and pre-monsoon 
rainfall in Assam and the north-east of Bangladesh”, 
whereas ”the Ganges starts to rise later, in May, 
since its catchment is mainly in relatively drier 
areas where the rains start later” (Brammer, 1990, 
14). The three rivers continue to rise in June-July 
and reach generally their peak level in July-August 
in the cases of the Brahmaputra and Meghna, 
while the Ganges reaches its peak a month later. 
During the months of late September to November, 
they follow a similar pattern of decrease although 
some areas remain under waters until December-
January because of periodic depressions and 
congested drainage. (Ibid)
Thus, the cycles of the main rivers in the delta are 
potentially fluctuating, and early normal flooding 
can have tragic consequences since farmers do not 
expect it. Nevertheless, ‘’the flooding is mainly by 
rainwater and not, as is popularly supposed, by silty 
river water’’ (Brammer, 1990, 15) and the physical 
and human causes of the floods are therefore more 
complex as they affect other dimensions than the 
single flow of the river. 
These dimensions can be internal to 
Bangladesh, such as the population pressure and 
the urbanization that ‘’has resulted in the sinking 
Figure 1. Bangladesh top 10 natural disasters reported 
1980-2010
Source: PreventionWeb.net, based on Global Assessment Reports, Last update: 
2011-09-21.
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Table 2. Bangladesh migrants present in various States
Numbers in million States
5,4 West Bengal
4 Assam
0.5 Bihar
1.5 Delhi
0.8 Tripura
0.5 Rajasthan
0.5 Maharashtra
Source: Joyti M. Pathania, 2003.
The official figures of the Government of Bang-
ladesh, quoted by the IOM, give certain answers : 
‘’In the last 25 years, Bangladesh has experienced 
six severe floods, with the 1988 and 1998 floods 
alone causing 2,000-6,500 and 1,100 deaths re-
spectively and displacing as many as 45 and 30 mil-
lion people.’’(Walsham, 2010, 9). Anthropological 
studies show that these crises are clearly influenc-
ing the decision to migrate to other regions, either 
inside Bangladesh or internationally. For instance, 
research shows at the level of a village that floods, 
‘’are structural forces that have induced and shaped 
patterns of contract migration’’ (Rahman, 2010,), 
and that more generally, ‘’The environmental and 
economic backdrop of [the village] induced villag-
ers to look for alternatives’’ (Rahman, 2010, 113). 
Therefore, if larger collections of data are neces-
sary to conclude on the actual incidence of floods 
over migration patterns, it is clear that environ-
mental factors—among which floods, as we have 
seen, are the most important ones—participate in 
the decision to migrate, at least at the local level.
A closer look to the Bangladeshi migration to 
India seems to confirm this assumption.
Indian estimations of the number of Bangladeshis 
that have illegally migrated to North-East India 
since the independence of the country in 1971 are 
approximately 12 million (Kumar, 2011, 106). To this 
number must be added millions of Bangladeshis 
that have illegally moved to other parts of the 
country, especially the dynamic economic centres 
of New Delhi and Mumbai (Ibid). It is considered 
since the early 2000s that the number of these 
illegal migrants in India is closed to 20 million, 
though this remains contested by the Bangladeshi 
government (Panda, 2011, 9). These migrants have 
essentially settled in the neighbouring states of 
West Bengal and Assam. Hundreds of thousands 
are also said to reside in the main cities of mainland 
India, especially in Delhi and Mumbai. 
Table 2 figures, if they do not inform us of 
the reason for migration, tend to show that 
Bangladeshis that have left their country were 
influenced by the economic pull-factors—which 
explains the importance of Delhi and Mumbai 
in the statistics—but that other factors led them 
to stay in north-eastern states. One hypothesis is 
that migrants have moved to areas close to them 
culturally and from where it is easier to be in contact 
with the country of origin. Another explanation 
could be that migrants have been forced to leave 
their homeland because of a direct danger for their 
security. Similar to migration patterns in the case of 
armed conflicts, these migrants would have simply 
fled the most dangerous zones and settled as soon 
as it is possible. This would confirm the idea that 
Bangladeshis illegally crossing the Indian border 
are not only attracted by the opportunities of 
economic prosperity, but also to escape a situation 
of great danger for their lives. Floods appear thus 
as a pertinent answer for this assumption: not 
only depriving millions of Bangladeshis from their 
sources of living, they actually kill thousands and 
create violent humanitarian situations. Migrating 
becomes a possible response to the brutality of the 
environmental crisis. The choice of the destination 
is then made based on family or community ties, 
economic opportunities and cultural closeness. 
(TERI, 2009, 4)
1.2.2. The difficult distinction between 
migrants
The scientific approach of environmental migra-
tions studies faces the traditional pitfall of making 
objective phenomenon that cannot be scientifically 
defined. Indeed Looking at environmental migra-
tions means characterizing complex human situa-
tions in rational, closed concepts. The definition of 
an environmental migrant is problematic in itself, 
and the case of Bangladesh offers a remarkable 
insight into the complexity of such phenomena. 
The IOM states : ‘’while there is good data on 
initial displacement as a result of floods there is 
less evidence on longer-term impacts of floods 
on migration decisions. Evidence from India sug-
gests that floodplains are characterized by a va-
riety of migration dynamics, including periodic 
movements to high ground for shelter and tempo-
rary work as well as permanent migration where 
people’s livelihoods are more severely affected’’. 
(Walsham, 2010, 10)
It is therefore particularly difficult to clearly 
differentiate the economic and the security 
elements from the environmental one: floods, per 
say, press Bangladeshis to migrate as they fear for 
their lives and see all perspectives of economic 
prosperity disappear. The mechanisms are by 
definition highly intertwined. This is one of the 
most fundamental questions of environmental 
migrations, but it is all the more important in the 
case of the Bangladeshi displacement, as reports 
show the direct link between environmental 
damages and economic pressure (Black 2001; 
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Castles 2002). Estimations made in 1994 were 
that up to 17 million Bangladeshi had moved to 
India since the end of the Second World War due 
to ‘environmental scarcity’(Homer-Dixon, 1994, 
22). But these figures hardly create a real model 
of the link of environmental factors in the more 
general economic context, and ‘’despite evidences 
of people migrating from Bangladesh to India 
the debate is still unsettled as to how climate 
change will induce large influx of population to 
India, their extent and magnitude and will be the 
consequences’’ (Panda, 2011, 10).
For instance, the maps of floods and poverty in 
Bangladesh can be read in different ways, since 
economic problems and environmental crises are 
highly connected. Indeed, the correlation appears 
clear while studying the localisation of the most 
important floods and the regions where the level 
of poverty is highest. Yet, such statistics do not 
provide us with a causal link, since the damages 
yielded by the floods obviously create more 
poverty, but this poverty is also likely to produce 
an environment with poor infrastructure and high 
human density where heavy monsoon and river 
overflowing are likely to result into important 
episodes of flooding.
As a result, floods and migrations have to be 
considered in a more complex relationship than 
simple causality. However, if they do not create the 
migrations per say, floods create the conditions for 
these migrations to develop. They superimpose 
on social, political and economic factors an 
environmental crisis that can only strengthen the 
incentive for departure (Hagerly, 2008). In that 
sense, a real ‘flood-migration nexus’ has emerged 
in Bangladesh, both at the national level with an 
increasing displacement of rural populations to 
urban areas (Alam & Rabbani, 2007) and at the 
international level with important migration to 
India. Bangladesh is in the front line of countries 
affected by climate change, and this nexus is likely 
to gain in importance in the near future. 
The 2011 floods constitute an interesting case-
study of the development of such environmental 
catastrophes, and of the political responses that are 
organized in Bangladesh and by the international 
community. More than a mere illustration of an 
annual tragedy, the 2011 floods are remarkable in 
that they are considered as the symbol of future 
trends, as political actions try to take form while 
flood waters attain new areas and create new 
pressure on the lives of millions.
Map 2. Bangladesh’s map of poverty compared to map of areas affected by floods and tidal surges
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, “Updating Poverty Maps of Bangladesh”, 2009, p.10.
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2. THE 2011 FLOODS
2.1. Describing the phenomenon 
and the specificities of the 2011 case
The 2011 floods in Bangladesh were not extraor-
dinary in their intensity and the damages they 
caused. Yet, they present in their development 
and their consequences a pertinent illustration 
of flooding cycles in Bangladesh. According to 
an IFRC report in August, 2011, floods affected 
more than 1.5 million people and the situation 
continued to worsen as the monsoon depres-
sion kept fostering heavy rains. A million people, 
including 200,000 children, were left homeless, 
taking refuge in temporary shelters. (Fuller, 2011)
If, from an historical perspective, this year does 
not belong to the most tragic episodes of flooding 
of the last 30 years, as shown below, it neverthe-
less reveals perfectly what can be considered as 
the normal destruction that occur from June and 
July to October each year in most of Bangladesh.
Table 3. Bangladesh’s floods and their impacts (1984-2007)
EVENT IMPACT
1984 Flood Inundated over 50, 000 sq. km, estimated damage US$ 
378 million
1987 Flood Inundated over 50, 000 sq. km., estimated damage US$ 
1 billion, 2,055 deaths
1988 Flood Inundated 61% of the country, estimated damage US$ 
1,2 billion, more than 45 million homeless, between 
2,000-6,500 deaths
1998 Flood Inundated nearly 100, 000 sq. km., rendered 30 million 
people homeless, damaged 500, 000 homes, heavy loss 
to infrastructure, estimated damage US$ 2,8 billion, 
1,100 deaths
2004 Flood Inundation 38%, damage US$ 6.6 billion, affected 
nearly 3,8 million people. Estimated damage over $2 
billion, 700 deaths
2007 Flood Inundated 32, 000 sq. km, 85, 000 houses destroyed 
and almost 1 million damaged, approximately 1,2 
million acres of crops, destroyed or partially damaged, 
estimated damage over $1 billion, 649 deaths
Source: Government of Bangladesh, 2008, 8.
Yet, in 2011, although the intensity and the length 
of the monsoon rains were not particularly disas-
trous, flooding reached new areas previously pro-
tected. This change is likely explained by increas-
ing deforestation that causes the soil to loosen and 
finally accumulate in the rivers and channels that 
are then more easily overflowed (IRIN, 2011). 
The monsoon season lasted five months, from 
June to October, but flash floods and tropical 
storms were experienced almost the entire year. 
The lean seasons of food insecurity in Bangla-
desh—called Monga—took place from March to 
April and then again from September to November. 
In late May, the glaciers of the Himalayas had 
only started to melt and the level of the multitude 
of rivers running through the border between 
India and Bangladesh were not yet inundating 
the planes. The Brahmaputra River, clearly visible 
on the picture, still appears relatively narrow at 
that moment of the year. The rainy season usually 
begins during the first weeks of June. 
Two months later, the width of the Brahmaputra 
River increased dramatically, and the delta 
transformed into a gigantic flooded area. This 
zone of hundreds of square kilometres was then 
totally flooded by multiple channels. Crops were 
submerged and the living became extremely 
difficult.
However, Map 3 and Map 4 only show the 
Northeastern region and the 2011 floods touched 
the entire country, as the tragic reports from the 
Cox Bazar district in the extreme south-east of 
Bangladesh illustrate. Indeed, in late July 2011, 
more than 20,000 people had been forced to leave 
their houses in the Upazilas (administrative sub-
divisions of a district in Bangladesh) of Cox Bazar 
and Teknaf. In this region prone to such problems, 
the 2011 floods took many by surprise due to their 
severity (IRIN, 2011) . 
Similarly, in its official report of the flood situa-
tion in September 2011, the Government of Bangla-
desh lists the damages district by district and gives 
information concerning the expected evolution of 
the flooding. 
The official discourse is revealing of what can be 
the norm of such an event. For example, in the sin-
gle district of Naogaon, the situation is considered as 
‘normal’, even if water entered into the upalizas of 
Manda and Atrai, directly affecting 960 families in 
the former and 1100 in the latter, after embankment 
were breached. Agricultural resources were greatly 
damaged as ‘’according to the Agriculture Depart-
ment 3300 acre of land and crops went under water 
in Atrai Upazila’’. (Government of Bangladesh, 2011) 
The district of Satkhira, at the extreme south-
west of the country has been the most hard hit by 
the floods. ‘’Around 20,000 houses in 548 villages 
collapsed completely, and poor farmers and share 
croppers have lost their investment as over 66,000 
acres of standing crops have been either partially 
or fully damaged by the floods” (Ibid) . At the na-
tional level, the south-western districts of Satkhira, 
Khulna and Jessore faced the worst floods in 2011. 
Data on the damages of these regions remains 
scarce. The reports are indeed evolving strongly 
from month to month, and the situation of the 
people varies. By the month of August, 2011, in the 
six most affected Upazilas of Satkhira, more than 
68,000 people had been reported to have taken 
“temporary shelter in school buildings, roadsides 
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Map 3. Flooding in Bangladesh (Late May 2011)
Source: NASA Images, http://earthobservatory.nasa.org/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=51441
Map 4. Flooding in Bangladesh (Late July 2011)
Source: NASA Images, http://earthobservatory.nasa.org/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=51441
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and other buildings which were not affected by 
flood waters. […] The number of people without 
shelter is unknown as of the reporting date” (Ox-
fam, 2011, 2). The 2011 case also showed the risk 
of crisis spill over from one country to another. 
The situation experienced in West Bengal of India, 
with several barrages releasing water to decrease 
the pressure, has direct implications for the region 
of the South-Western Bangladesh. The inability of 
the Indian barrages to resist the rise of water levels 
during the monsoon season aggravated the situa-
tion in the other side of the border (Ibid3).
2.2. Political responses 
to the crisis
In 2011, an institutional framework existed for both 
risk prevention and damage reduction. The state 
of Bangladesh has worked on the limiting flood-
induced damage through the Ministry of Food and 
Disaster Management. It attempts to control the 
issue via the development of an efficient system 
of prevision of floods and of quick alerts to the 
population (Kholiquzzaman, 2006, 82). Thus in 
2011, the Bangladeshi state published regular fore-
casts on the evolution of the floods in each district, 
and information could be used to warn endan-
gered villages.1 However, this system could be 
improved, especially in remote areas where better 
means of sharing and disseminating information is 
required. (Ibid, 83). In the case of the 2011 floods, 
better knowledge of changes in the water levels 
of rivers coming from India would have enabled 
authorities to alert the populations of Upazilas 
of South-Eastern Bangladesh in advance. In prac-
tice, the limited agreement between Indian and 
1. The Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre was created 
in 1972 and release short daily reports on the water level, 
as well as regular maps of the inundations
Bangladeshi’s data recollection stations can have 
tragic consequences for the life of the inhabitants 
of the border. Indeed, without data coming from 
upstream, the Bangladeshi authorities are unable 
to design and implement quick responses to the 
crisis: the issue here is not related to a lack of infra-
structure, as facilities to gather accurate data exist, 
but to the weakness of sharing of information at 
the bilateral level (Ibid, 85).
At the national level Bangladesh is “one of the 
most active countries in terms of planning and ac-
tion on climate change” (Sterrett, 2011, 28). Sever-
al plans have been designed to combat the effects 
of global warming and environmental crises in 
general, the National Climate Change Strategy and 
Action Plan signed in 2008 being the most recent 
one. Working under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, several na-
tional programs also aim at supporting adaptation 
policies in Bangladesh. The National Adaptation 
Program of Actions adopted in 2005 is the best ex-
ample of the work done at the local level to help 
the population adapt to crises such as floods and 
reduce their human and material damages (Ayers, 
2011, 64). By 2011, the Bangladeshi government 
had already tried to push forward a more structur-
al approach to the issue in parallel to mechanisms 
to answer emergencies (Kholiquzzaman, 2006, 
84). It is important to note that these actions do 
not take into account the flood-migration nexus. 
Efforts have addressed the primary needs of peo-
ple directly affected by catastrophe. Thus, long-
term programs to alleviate pain and significantly 
reduce damage caused by floods exist, but there is 
a lack of mid-term programs to manage displaced 
populations.2 
2. See for example Bangladesh Center for Advanced 
Studies, “Scoping Assessment on Climate Change 
Adaptation in Bangladesh”, October 2010 
Source: “Bangladesh July-August 2011; Secondary Data review”, ACAPS, September 2011, 7. NASA satellite images enable detailed examination of their evolution from late May to late July. 
Table 4. WFP seasonal and hazard calendar 2011 for Bangladesh
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The 2011 crisis triggered international reactions 
from both NGOs and international organizations. 
On the 19th September, 2011, the European Union 
allocated €5 million to “respond to the urgent hu-
manitarian needs of Bangladeshis who recently 
have been affected by severe monsoon floods”. and 
another €8 million at the end of the year in order 
to finance the pumping out of flood waters (Euro-
pean Union—Delegation to Bangladesh, 2012, 1). 
Similarly, NGOs around the world provided better 
media coverage and alerted the population of the 
increased risk of such environmental catastrophes 
in the future. 
Nonetheless, the management of the 2011 floods 
has been criticized for the limited reactivity of au-
thorities. Oxfam reports stated, for example, that 
“no humanitarian support has been provided to 
the people in the most affected districts by the gov-
ernment, local, national and international NGOs 
as of 11 August 2011” (Oxfam, 12 August 2011). 
Similarly, the lack of coordination structure at the 
national level resulted “in a response that is prone 
to ad-hocism, overlaps and gaps” (Oxfam, 2011). 
To conclude, the 2011 floods provide an 
outstanding example of environmental disasters, 
their evolution, consequences, and responses 
designed at different levels. If the damages 
caused by the floods were terrible, they cannot 
be considered exceptional relative to recent 
Bangladeshi history. Hundreds of thousands 
were forced to move, the management of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system were 
rapidly overcome by the rains, and the dams built 
upstream put many lives in dangers. Precise data 
concerning climate-induced migrations remain 
extremely scarce and are urgently required in 
the region (Sterrett, 2011, 6) but reports show 
that patterns of flood-induced migrations to 
India are changing and numbers increasing 
(BCAS, 2011). 
The analysis of the political answers to the cri-
sis tend to prove that solutions can only emerge 
with additional action at the national, regional 
and international levels. Cooperation between the 
countries of South Asia is particularly fundamen-
tal given the influence of transnational rivers in 
flooding in Bangladesh. However, it is clear that 
the construction of effective responses is highly af-
fected by the difficult bilateral relations between 
India and Bangladesh regarding water manage-
ment and border control (Kholiquzzaman, 2006). 
In 2011, new attempts at finding agreement over 
water issues were observed, but the situation of 
millions that are directly threatened by seasonal 
floods in Bangladesh still depends on the ability to 
increase cooperation between the two countries. It 
is therefore important to understand the context 
in which these policies are formed, and how envi-
ronmental migrations have become a security is-
sue in Bangladesh. 
Koyra neighboorhood, South West Bangladesh, Sundarbans region, March, 3rd, 2012.
Crédits : © 2012. Pauline Brücker (IDDRI)
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3. CONTEXTUALIZATION: BANGLADESHI 
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATIONS TO 
INDIA AS A SECURITY ISSUE
As floods in Bangladesh trigger trans-border 
migrations, it emerged as an international issue 
that became both cause and consequence of the 
complex politics of India Bangladesh relations. 
Indeed, the literature treating the question of 
Bangladeshi migrants to India and the impact 
of environmental disasters on the issue insists 
on the political dimension of the international 
reaction (Kumar, 2011). In parallel to the ‘natural’ 
development of flooding and pressures on the 
population to migrate, a process of securitization 
has been happening, informed by the complex 
history of India-Bangladesh relations and from 
the geopolitical context of the region The speci-
ficity of the flood-induced migrations in Bang-
ladesh has to be considered in terms of national 
perception and discourse, as they influence the 
responses to the crisis and frame it as a security 
issue. (Hossain, 2005)
3.1. Readings of the phenomenon 
on both side of the border
The official position of Bangladesh is to refuse sole 
responsibility for the issue, and that Bangladeshis 
victims of others’ behaviours (Friedman, 2009). 
The question behind climate change enables them 
to point out the responsibility of industrialized 
nations in the dramatic increase of flooding and 
sea-level rise that are destabilizing the country 
(Government of Bangladesh, 2008). Bangladesh’s 
official discourse therefore stresses the efforts 
demanded of poor countries whereas the situ-
ation is by definition an international concern 
(Walsham, 2010). Cooperation at the interna-
tional level is necessary to tackle the issue of 
climate change, while regional dialogues are the 
only way to deal with environmental refugees in 
South Asia. 
However, other voices in Bangladesh claim 
that this position is sheer denial by a government 
that does not have the capacity to deal with the 
issue. Floods are, in this perspective, disasters 
that can be dealt with at a national level and 
even if Bangladesh is not responsible for climate 
change it should not use this to justify its lack 
of responses (Friedman, 2009). The difference 
of perspective between the two countries is also 
based on a war of figures between Bangladesh 
and India. The Bangladeshi government keeps 
blaming New Delhi for exaggerating the problem 
by artificially increasing its statistics regarding 
Bangladeshi immigrants. This struggle has been 
affecting scientific studies of the issue for decades 
and the conceptual pitfalls of the definition of 
‘environmental refugees’ can only aggravate the 
falsification of numbers. According to Homer-
Dixon in 1994, ‘’detailed data are scarce, since both 
India and Bangladesh manipulate their census 
data for political reasons, and the Bangladeshi 
government avoids admitting there is large out-
migration, because the question causes friction 
with India’’ (Homer-Dixon, 1994, 22).
Finally, the discourse of the government of 
Bangladesh insists on plans that have been 
designed to mitigate the effects of floods since the 
late 2000s. Real efforts have indeed been made, 
and are now showed as evidences of the good 
will of the Bangladeshi government and its work 
to improve the situation. For instance, a ‘Climate 
Change Action Plan over 10 years (2009-2018) is 
implemented in order to ‘’build the capacity and 
resilience of the country to meet the challenge of 
climate change’’. (Government of Bangladesh, 
2008, 28) Based on six pillars—food security/
health, infrastructures, comprehensive disaster 
management, research, mitigation, and capacity 
building—the programme tries to promote an 
optimistic perception of the future with the idea of 
a special adaptation capacity of Bangladesh (Ayers, 
2011). Nevertheless, concrete consequences remain 
to be seen, and the 2011 floods tend to show that 
despite past experiences and the adaptation of 
Bangladeshis to natural disasters, environmental 
damages continue to weaken the entire country’s 
development. 
On the Indian side, the migration of Bangladeshis 
is mainly pictured as a threat to internal stability. 
Again, historical events influence the perception 
of the issue as shown by statistics analysing 
the impact of the 1971 war on it (Pant, 2007). 
Traditionally, the Indian discourse insists on the 
security issues that are linked to migration. ““If 
one-third of Bangladesh is flooded, India can 
soak in some of the refugees, but not all,” Retired 
Air Marshal A.K. Singh, the former commander 
of India’s air force, told a London conference 
recently. “Low-lying coastal area flooding is 
a national security issue” (Friedman, 2009). 
Potentially, climate-induced migrations could 
accentuate competition for resources and ethnic 
tension at the border, and the resulting internal 
instabilities increase the risk of armed conflicts. 
(TERI, 2009, 3-4) 
Lately, in addition to this pragmatic vision 
has emerged the idea that the Bangladeshi 
migration was politically driven and used by 
Dhaka for geopolitical purposes, the existence of 
a large Bangladeshi diaspora in the region being 
a source of political influence (Kumar, 2011, 108). 
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Therefore, environmental migration is seen as 
the most recent facet of a long-term process that 
should not be treated differently than any other 
type of migration, which is to say as a tool for 
Bangladeshi, or even Pakistani, interests inside 
Indian. (Kumar, 2011; Pant, 2007, 242)
Nonetheless, knowing that certain perspectives 
already announce 200 million environmental 
migrants worldwide due to monsoon rains and 
floods, the Indian government takes the question 
very seriously (Panda, 2011). While India does not 
deny the emergence of an environmental crisis, 
its discourse blames Bangladesh for using climate 
change for political purposes. For India sees 
Bangladesh as ground zero of such migrations. Up 
to 78 million Bangladeshi are expected to be forced 
to move because of environmental impacts by 
2020 (D’Costa, 2012, 150). Therefore this concern 
is regularly tackled during bilateral meetings, 
especially as they are a bargaining tool for India in 
the question of water sharing. The intense upstream 
use of the main rivers crossing Bangladesh is 
considered by New Delhi as the sovereign right of 
the Indians to dispose of their national resources, 
but this process directly threatens Bangladesh’s 
agriculture and environmental stability. (Pandev, 
2011) The bilateral negotiations for an agreed use 
of these waters are therefore affecting the India-
Bangladeshi relationship and the settlement of the 
migration issue. In September 2011, Prime Minister 
M. Singh’s visit to Dhaka was the occasion to deal 
with water sharing as much as border security 
concerns, though it failed to lead to any agreement 
(D’Costa, 2012, 152).
To conclude, it appears that the Indian discourse 
is driven by security and political concerns, based 
on a rather pragmatic approach of the issue, 
without denying the looming environmental 
crisis. It is linked to a network of interconnected 
issues—from illegal trafficking to water sharing—
and is both cause and consequence of each of 
them. Thus, if floods in Bangladesh ‘’depend to 
large extent on the water sharing agreement 
between the two countries’’ (Panda, 2011, 14), such 
agreements are also dependent on the potential 
for cooperation over the flood-induced migration 
question.
3.2. ‘Securitization’ of the 
issue : when environmental 
migrations take place in the 
highly unstable area of the 
India-Bangladesh border
The constitution of Bangladeshi migration to India 
as a security issue stems from several political 
and historical factors, and the emergence of an 
environmental crisis is only the most recent layer 
of a decades-old concern. 
3.2.1. The politicization of environmental 
migrations: between history and electoral 
use of tensions
This securitization process is articulated according 
to political rationale, and environmental migra-
tions between Bangladesh and India are to be 
understood in this larger context, as it frames 
the antagonism and the potential cooperation 
between the two countries.
Due to historical reasons, Bangladeshi migration 
to India has existed since the Partition in 1947. Up 
to 1 million Hindus living in East Pakistan fled 
‘Muslim-led Pakistan’ in the late 1940s and the 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 triggered 
another wave of departures. (Homer-Dixon, 1994, 
22) Thus, this migration has always been highly 
politicized, and today’s security policy at the 
border is clearly influenced by electoral purposes 
(Pant, 2007). Nationalist and religious forces tense 
up the relationship as reports of discrimination 
towards the other’s citizens are released on both 
sides of the border (IDSA, 2012). The demographic 
dimension of the migration, especially in the north-
eastern states of India, where tensions between 
Christian, Muslim and Hindu communities are 
used to enhance political oppositions, is therefore 
regarded as a very serious menace for the ethnic 
balance of the region (Pant, 2007).
Bangladeshi migration takes place in a very 
sensitive area of the India. The north-eastern 
provinces are the crux of many security concerns 
for New Delhi, the Naxalites movements and the 
penetrations of Chinese agents being the most 
visible (Pant, 2007). Geographically, the north-
eastern states are connected to the mainland by 
the Siliguri corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s 
Neck’, a strip of land of less than 40 km of width and 
of great geostrategic importance. Any potential 
troubles are therefore regarded as a serious threat 
to the internal cohesion of the country. 
The instability of the region is also linked to its 
terrain, which makes any attempt at controlling 
the border difficult and enables the development 
of trafficking and political unrest (Pattanaik, 2011). 
As a result, illegal Bangladeshi migrations are seen 
as part of the general context of insecurity, and the 
struggle against migrants has to be understood 
through this lens (Kumar, 2011). 
3.2.2. Fences, violence and potential for 
cooperation: what expectations for the 
future?
India’s most significant measure to treat this issue 
as a security concern was taken in the mid 1980s 
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with the construction of fences along the border. 
This highly political decision embodied the ‘secu-
ritization’ of the dealing with Bangladeshi migra-
tions. Although it was supposed to be finished by 
2007, the work is still ongoing along 2,544 miles of 
the border. In 2010, India announced that it had 
completed 70% of the project (Banerjee, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the fencing policy is highly 
symbolic politically, but has yet to prove its 
efficiency in security terms. The terrain and 
the length of the border as well as the internal 
troubles of the north-eastern Indian states make 
it extremely difficult to control the frontier. The 
outcomes of the fencing remain to be analysed, 
but it risks being unsustainable economically 
and militarily in the case of a strong increase of 
Bangladeshi migration (Pant, 2007, 242). Besides, 
the very notion of a border can be questioned in 
the case of the India-Bangladesh frontier, For 
people living on both sides of the border traditions 
of migration in the region track back to centuries 
before the construction of the two nation-states 
(Pattanaik, 2011).
Parallel to the very concrete work of fencing the 
frontier, India has put into place patrols and a series 
of strict policies regarding illegal Bangladeshi 
migrants.3 These policies have been at the centre 
of controversy as they resulted in violence against 
and even killing of migrants trying to cross the 
border. This context of violence is all the more 
crucial as environmental migrations increase the 
tensions between the two countries and make 
each government less disposed to hear the other’s 
rationale : India fearing the displacement of 
millions of people and Bangladesh insisting on the 
regional dimension of the issue. 
Nonetheless, potential for cooperation exists, 
and the politicization of the issue can also bring 
the two parties to discuss and find an alternative 
strategy to a security issue. Indeed, both Dhaka 
and New Delhi consider the dealing of the border 
as unsatisfactory, and the emerging environmental 
crisis may oblige them to find a solution as early 
as possible. If environmental migrations are a 
security issue, then solutions are to be designed as 
3. The use of military to deal with environmental crises 
and especially with migrations that are triggered by 
such disasters has been particularly studied after the 
Hurricane Katrina and the controversies in the U.S. 
(Smith, 2007 ; Wisner & Walker, 2005) Refugees of such 
catastrophes share with conflict refugees the abruptness 
of the ‘pull-factor’ and their displacement becomes 
therefore a potential danger for the stability of the region 
of arrival.
strategies based on rationality and pragmatism. In 
this context, the last India-Bangladesh meetings 
over the sharing of water resources can be seen 
as reasons to be optimistic. The March 2011 
Agreement on the non-use of lethal weapons 
by the Border Security Force, as well as the 
Coordinated Border Management Plan signed 
in July, 2011, and the Protocol to the Agreement 
concerning The Demarcation of Land Boundary 
signed in September, 2011 are interesting steps in 
the appeasement of the situation (Das, 2011). 
CONCLUSION 
Flood-induced migrations from Bangladesh 
to India are a remarkable expression of the 
complexity of environmental migrations today. 
The Ganges Delta has a long history of destruc-
tive floods and the populations have had to adapt 
to regular damages due to environmental crisis, 
but the current trends are subjected to external 
phenomena such as global warning and intense 
use of river water. Besides, the flood-induced 
migrations take place in a tense regional context 
and solutions to the humanitarian crisis are highly 
influenced by security considerations. The 2011 
floods have showed the need for international 
cooperation and highlighted the need of better 
management of the issue at the bilateral level. 
Indeed, if actions are taken at the Bangladeshi 
national level to struggle against environmental 
crises, India has a great role to play in their resolu-
tion. The two countries are bound as they share the 
waters of the main rivers running through Bangla-
desh, and a better management of these resources 
is essential for any attempts at improving the exist-
ence of millions. Moreover, India cannot afford 
to reject the management of migrants fleeing the 
floods to its neighbour, especially considering the 
looming consequences of global warming on the 
Bangladeshi territory. That is why the question of 
environmental migrations here is highly political 
and is to be understood in its larger context of 
Indo-Bangladeshi relations. 
This study presents the different aspects of the 
issue of Bangladeshi flood-induced migrations to 
India. If the crux of the problem remains the long-
term reduction of damages due to floods, mid-
term responses have to be designed to deal with 
the increasing number of migrants that continue 
to suffer from this phenomenon. From this 
perspective, bilateral cooperation appears as the 
only solution to an increasingly important issue. ❚ 
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PART 2 SLOW-
ONSET EVENTS
Slow-onset events tend to attract far less attention from the media and 
the international community. Yet they induce diverse and complex 
migration patterns that are too often overlooked. The heterogeneity of 
these migration patterns makes them difficult to address and appre-
hend. Many of these slow-onset events will be exacerbated by climate 
change in the coming decades. This section addresses some these slow-
onset events that were particularly prominent in 2011, but have often 
been ongoing for several years. They include the dramatic drought that 
ravaged the Horn of Africa and led to massive population movements, 
but also the long-standing flows of migration between Mexico and the 
United States, whose environmental component is often neglected. 
But the section also features a case of a proactive policy-response to 
environmentally-induced migration, the Almeria model of circular 
migration by Morocco and the region of Almeria in Spain.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Somalia is prone to harsh climatic 
condition, distinguishing migration factors of 
Somali migrants is extremely difficult because 
of the strong inter-linkages between conflict and 
environmental condition. The drought that hit 
Somalia in 2011, after two years of rainfall inter-
ruption, was no exception, as it occurred in the 
context of the civil war that has been tearing 
the country apart since 1991. In fact, one of the 
reasons for Kenya’s military intervention in 
Somalia in October 2011 was to stem the flow of 
Somalis entering the country and the Dadaab 
camps because of drought and conflict. In the 
Somali case, armed conflict and environmental 
conditions seem to be mutually reinforcing factors 
for migration. Today, the Somali population is 
weakened by past droughts and floods and the 
ongoing conflicts, which paralyze the country’s 
activity. The lack of an effective Somali govern-
ment, which could play a role as stabilizer in terri-
tory, has left populations alone to manage crises 
like diseases, droughts, and floods on their own. 
As a result, they are highly dependent on inter-
national assistance and struggle to have access 
to sustainable livelihoods. In particular, migrants 
inside the country form a very vulnerable group, 
one example of this being that in 2001, internally 
displaced persons constituted more than 60% of 
the food insecure (Gundel, 2002). 
This case study concentrates on the 2011 drought 
in Somalia and the environmental migrations in-
duced both internally, within the Somali borders, 
and internationally, in the neighboring countries. 
Since July 2011, it has been estimated that more 
than 1.3 million people were internally displaced 
and 290,000 forced to flee across the border (UN-
HCR 2011c). 
Whether or not those displacements are direct 
consequence of climate change is difficult to as-
sess. The frequency of droughts—currently one ev-
ery two or three years, approximately, compared 
to one every seven years during the 1980s—could 
be a direct consequence of climate change.1
Before describing the conditions and factors of 
the migrations that took place in the context of the 
2011 drought, as well as the Somali migrants’ pro-
files and trajectories, we will try to understand the 
reasons why such a humanitarian disaster could 
not be prevented in Somalia, in spite of the gener-
al awareness of the climatic situation and the high 
probability of droughts. Finally, we will discuss the 
role of national and international actors, trying to 
pinpoint the difficulties faced by humanitarian 
and development aid actors.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Although we were able to gather different figures 
from available data, it is not certain that they 
encapsulate the totality of the phenomenon of 
migrations linked to the drought in Somalia. 
Two main methodological issues explain this 
acknowledgement. 
It is difficult to assess the number of migrants 
that moved because of the drought because dis-
tinguishing the migration factors in Somalia is no 
easy task. The complexity of the humanitarian cri-
sis that developed in Somalia makes it difficult to 
separate persons fleeing the drought from persons 
displaced by the conflict or moving to improve 
their economic situation. According to a USAID 
report dated April, 2011, both drought-related 
1.  The last droughts in Eastern Africa took place in 2006 
and in 2008-2009. 
DROUGHT IN SOMALIA: A MIGRATION CRISIS
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Map 1. Somalia Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, July 2011
Source: Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit—Somalia
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and conflict-related migrations were increasing at 
faster rates than usual during that period (USAID 
– FEWSNET, 2011). Accordingly, it seems reductive 
to explain the increase in the rate of migrations of 
Somalis in 2011 by the only drought: migrants af-
fected by the drought could also be migrating be-
cause of the insecurity induced by the conflict, as 
well as to improve their socioeconomic situation. 
This does not support the idea that talking about 
“environmental migrants” in the aftermath of the 
2011 drought is inadequate but rather that num-
bers should be used cautiously. 
Indeed, numbers available from the UNHCR 
mention the increase in the total number of refu-
gee, and not of migrants. As a reminder, we un-
derscore here that the persons registered by UN-
HCR under the Refugee Status Determination 
procedure is restricted to those falling into the 
legal definition of a refugee, enshrined in the 1951 
Geneva Convention. In many cases, category of 
environmental migrants and refugees are clearly 
distinguishable, which is yet hardly doable in the 
case of Somalia—as already argued. Accordingly, 
if these figures capture the numbers of migrants 
who actually went through the registration pro-
cess and obtain the refugee status, then it is likely 
that they give a low estimation of the number of 
migrants displaced by the drought. Yet, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that part of the huge influx 
in refugees in the spring and summer of 2011 was 
linked to the drought occurring at the same time in 
Somalia. This hypothesis is actually corroborated 
by elements developed below.  
1. DROUGHT-RELATED MIGRATIONS 
IN SOMALIA IN 2011: QUANTITATIVE 
AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
1.1. Droughts in Somalia 
and vulnerability factors 
Somalia has experienced many disasters before 
the drought in 2011 and we can draw numerous 
similarities with past experiences. In 1974-75, 2001, 
Map 2. Food Security and Humanitarian situation assessment in the Horn of Africa, as of July 2011
Source: FEWSNET-OCHA, Eastern Africa: Drought – Humanitarian Snapshot (as of July 20 2011)
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2006 and 2008, Somalia suffered droughts in 
different parts of its territory.
The food situation deteriorated in 2001 be-
cause of heavy rains in Ethiopia, which resulted 
in floods in Southern Somalia. Large migration 
flows were observed at the time and problems of 
food supply already existed. The 2001 flood was 
then followed by repeated droughts, limiting the 
future resilience of populations to stronger natu-
ral disturbances. 
As 2011 was the driest year in decades, the So-
mali population was hardly able to face it. In the 
summer, the drought transformed into a major 
food crisis, as acute food insecurity developed in 
certain regions of South Somalia. On July 20th, 
the state of famine was declared by the United 
Nations in two regions, Lower Shabelle and Ba-
kool (UN News Centre, 2011). By the beginning 
of August, the number of people needing urgent 
food assistance in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, So-
malia and Uganda had reached 12.4 million, twice 
the number of the beginning of year. The state of 
famine in Somalia extended to three other regions 
between July and August: some areas of Middle 
Shabelle, the Afgooye corridor refugee settle-
ment and the internally displaced communities in 
Mogadishu. The UN considered the food crisis as 
the most serious one Africa had known in the last 
twenty years. (L’Expansion, 2011). The two maps 
below show food security and humanitarian situ-
ation assessments for the month of July. Somalia, 
as can be seen, presents the most serious humani-
tarian situation, as entire areas have only limited 
humanitarian access while famine levels have de-
veloped in certain regions, and one quarter of the 
country’s inhabitants are displaced. 
The environmental situation on Somalia had 
strong impacts on the population, which, we ar-
gue, were partly predictable. The lack of environ-
mental regulations and disaster risk reduction 
policy in Somalia, to be put down to the extremely 
turbulent political context and the lack of na-
tional government since 1991 with the end of Siad 
Barre’s dictatorship, explains why civilians did 
not received national support and assistance. All 
attempts to bring a solution to the policy vacuum 
and address the lack of administration that So-
malia was experiencing were unsuccessful. Hopes 
were raised in 2004 with the establishment of 
Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, but 
the different parties of the civil war have been un-
able to bring peace, stability and protection. The 
conflict that has been concentrated in the South 
of Somalia since 2009 between the forces of the 
TFG, assisted by AMISOM (African Union Mission 
in Somalia) to various Islamist factions, namely 
Al-Shabaab, have further complicated the political 
situation. This lack of effective and unified sover-
eignty from national institutions over the Somali 
population has impeded a proper management of 
the crises that has affected the country. As a re-
sult, populations are left even more vulnerable af-
ter each crisis, in a region (the Horn of Africa) that 
is already considered the poorest in the world. 
Regional tentative to prevent drought and de-
sertification impact yet exists. In 1996, six coun-
tries of the Horn of Africa decided to create the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), which aims at reducing famine and 
starvation in the region by promoting develop-
ment and drought control through the creation 
of plans to cope with future disasters. As a result, 
some countries in the Horn of Africa succeeded in 
implementing prevention systems. For instance, 
Kenya and Ethiopia, dependent of humanitarian 
aid, were able to determine their future needs and 
foresee the management of the crisis. The lack of 
stable political institutions in Somalia partly might 
explain the failure of the initiative in the country. 
Other important factors explaining the vul-
nerability of the Somali population are the de-
mographic changes that the country has gone 
through in the past decades coupled with the lack 
of food production improvements. If Somalia’s 
population has more than doubled since 1970, the 
food production has not increased so as to satisfy 
the rising demand. Somalia attempted to respond 
to these growing needs situation by implementing 
development policies to enhance sustainable ag-
riculture, but these policies were impeded by war 
 Photo credits : © IOM 2011 - MKE0406 (Photo: Lovorka Ikovac)
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Source: UNHCR Offices, Various IDP assessments including the Somalia IASC PMT project Global Insight digital mapping
Map 3. Snapshot of Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa, as of July 20th, 2011
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expenses. Food shortages and the lack of econom-
ic opportunities from agriculture greatly increase 
vulnerabilities. Indeed, the livelihood of Soma-
lia’s rural population is greatly dependent on the 
agricultural sector, but it suffers from a lack of 
elementary tools to increase its productivity (ma-
chinery, fertilizers, etc.). Land aridity in the Horn 
of Africa has never been tackled, which explains 
the difficulty for farmers to produce enough 
yields to feed the population. Even in good years, 
farmers are unable to produce enough reserves to 
prevent future possible disasters. 
Accordingly, it appears impossible to understand 
the impacts of the 2011 drought without address-
ing the linkages between the famine and previous 
socio-economic patterns. Not only farmers face 
extremely worrying threats to their livelihoods, 
Somali pastoral societies are also extremely weak-
ened by environmental conditions. Because of the 
premises of drought witnessed in 2009 and 2010, 
with strong interruptions of rainfalls, nomadic pas-
toralists, who represent the major part of the So-
mali population, lost their livestock. Without any 
back-up resources, the pastoralist population did 
not have enough resources to prevent the effects of 
the 2011 drought nor to adapt to the new situation.
1.2. Quantitative assessment 
The drought that hit the Horn of Africa in 2011 
generated complex multi-directional flows of 
migrants, both inside the affected countries 
and outside. Prior to the drought, migrations 
were already a distinctive feature of the region’s 
dynamics, as highlighted by IOM’s Director of 
Operations and Emergencies Mohammed Abdiker, 
according to whom “drought related migration 
is exacerbating an already complex situation of 
displacement and movement, triggered by conflict 
and instability and the returns of many Ethiopians 
and Somalis from Yemen” (IOM, 2011). In fact, the 
power struggles taking place across the southern 
and central regions of Somalia have already 
caused mass displacement within the country. 
Drought appears as an additional migration 
factor, in a context where migration has been and 
remains the unique source of immediate security 
for Somali citizens (Thiollet, 2009:81). 
The regions where famine was declared were 
pastoral areas. The effects of the drought in these 
areas included an increase in the price of cereal 
and water and higher livestock mortality rates. 
Pastoral families were left in a situation where 
their survival was threatened by lack of water, 
pasture and food, and they decided to leave their 
land, at least temporarily. Massive flows of Soma-
lis arrived in Mogadishu during the peak of the 
crisis, but many others decided either because 
of connection abroad or geographical proximity 
to cross national frontiers and enter neighboring 
countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, or more 
faraway ones from Yemen to South Africa. 
Although quantitative data on environmen-
tally induced migration are scarce, numbers are 
available from different report published by hu-
manitarian agencies, operating in Somalia and 
neighboring countries. Occasionally they were 
able to survey the number of migrants whose 
main reason for moving was the drought. Ac-
cording to the OCHA Somalia Situation Report 
issued on July 26th, the number of new internal-
ly displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia between 
Table 1. Comparison of the number of Somali arrivals in 
Yemen, between 2010 and 2011, and between the 2nd and 
3rd quarter of 2011
Period Number 
of Somali 
arrivals on 
the Yemeni 
shores
Percentage 
increase
Number of 
non-Somali 
arrivals on 
the Yemeni 
shores
Percentage 
increase
April-June 
2011
4,415 103, 26% 15, 740 27, 89%
July-
September 
2011
8,974 NA 20, 130
January-
September 
2010
10,051 92, 92% NA NA
January-
September 
2011
19,390 NA NA
Source: Own elaboration, from Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, July-September 
2011 quarterly review
Table 2. Origin of registered Somali asylum seekers in 
Yemen, during the 3rd quarter of 2011
Origin of Somali 
asylum seekers in 
Yemen (July-Sept 
2011)
Number of 
migrants 
Percentage of total 
Middle and Lower 
Shabelle
3,711 42,59%
Bay 1,977 22,69%
Banadir 1,653 18,97%
Other 1,372 16,75%
South-Central 
Somalia
NA
97%
Puntland 
NA
2%
Somaliland
NA
1%
Source: Own elaboration, from Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, July-September 
2011 quarterly review
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June 6th, 2011 and July 26th, 2011, amounted to 
62,500, of whom 82% had moved because of the 
drought. The rate of migrants entering Kenya 
and Ethiopia during this period, considered as 
the peak of the crisis, amounted to 3,500 per day 
(UNOCHA, 2011). 
The map below, constructed with data from 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) offices in countries neighboring Soma-
lia, gives an assessment of the numbers of Somali 
refugees registered by the agency in the region as 
for July, 2011. The map shows that the main coun-
tries that received Somali refugees during the 
drought were Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Kenya 
received the biggest share of these migrants, with 
68,890 new refugees coming in between January 
and July 2011. Ethiopia came second, receiving 
56,720 refugees and Yemen third with 10,208 refu-
gees. Between May and June, the number of new 
Somali refugees in the region increased therefore 
by 80%. 
Finally, it is possible to know the number of 
migrants coming from Somalia who arrived in 
Yemen during the period of the drought. The 
numbers are presented in the table below, which 
shows the evolution of the number of Somali ar-
rivals on the shores of Yemen from one period 
to the other during the year of the drought, and 
from one year to the other, comparing 2011 to the 
previous year.
Table 1 shows that the number of Somali arriv-
als on the Yemeni coasts more than doubled be-
tween the second and the third quarter of the year 
2011, while at the same time the number of non-
Somali nationals only increased by less than 30%. 
Data collected by the Mixed Migration Task Force 
(MMTF) also shows that a large majority of Somali 
asylum seekers registered in Yemen during the pe-
riod of July to September 2011 came from regions 
were famine or acute food insecurity was reported 
during the period. If the link establishing a direct 
causality between drought-affected areas and mi-
gration could be debatable on the sole analysis of 
origin of Somali asylum seekers, the Yemen Mixed 
Migration Task Force was able to assess for a 10% 
sample of the registered new arrivals, their main 
reason of departure. While insecurity was the 
main reason evoked during the April-June period, 
drought and the inability to access basic needs, as 
well as other economic factors, had become the 
primary reasons for fleeing by the July-September 
(Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 2011). 
I.3. Migrant profiles and 
migration factors: who are 
the migrants, where do they 
go, why do they move?
Somali migrants moved from their homes to urban 
areas and other countries because the degrada-
tion of environmental conditions posed a threat 
to their livelihood and even their survival. For 
pastoralist communities, which represent more 
than the half of the Somali population, the conse-
quences of the drought were the incapacity to find 
pastures to feed their livestock as well the lack of 
water. Somali nomadic populations have always 
used short-distance mobility as an answer to 
drought, mobility being one of the conditions 
for survival in this arid area. However, several 
factors including the growing population in rural 
areas, the competition for land and water, the 
ecological damage to resources and the restricted 
mobility across political boundaries have made 
it harder for them to continue to depend on 
this as a coping mechanism. Regions where the 
famine was declared in July 2011, Low Shabelle 
and Bakool, were areas where the armed conflict 
between the government troops and the Shebab 
rebels was taking place. Conflict prevented pasto-
ralist families from getting access to assistance 
Map 4. Source of displacement of Somali IDPs arriving in 
Mogadishu, July-September 2011
Source: UNHCR BO Somalia, Nairobi, July to September 2011
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during the food crisis, forcing them to migrate 
to more faraway places. Those who did not move 
from the areas worst affected by the drought were 
usually Somali families with too little economic 
resources to leave or the families of male migrants 
that stayed behind waiting for the return of the 
head of the family. 
Some of the migrants headed for Mogadishu, the 
capital of Somalia. Others took the direction of the 
two northern regions of Somalia, Somaliland and 
Puntland, sometimes to settle temporarily there, 
or to head to other destinations, namely the Arabic 
Peninsula. Other migrants headed to neighboring 
countries, mainly Kenya and Ethiopia, where they 
could receive shelter and assistance by entering 
the refugee camps located next to the borders. For 
a fraction of the migrants, going to Kenya was only 
one step in a longer journey that was supposed to 
take them to Southern African countries, especial-
ly South Africa. 
Internally displaced people (IDPs)
During the month of July, the number of IDPs 
migrating away from the South-Central region of 
Somalia started to decrease. Possible reasons for 
this decline include the arrival of Islamic NGOs 
distributing relief aid in some of the areas worst 
affected by the famine, such as the Bay and Bakool 
regions, but also the fact that internally displaced 
people also started heading for surrounding towns, 
such as Baidoa, Wajid, Berdale, Qasaxdhere and 
Bardera (not just to Mogadishu or the Northern 
regions of Somalia). Other possible reasons include 
the fact that after some time, those who could 
afford to move had already done so, while the situ-
ation of those who remained behind without suffi-
cient means to move had not changed.
Mugadishu
According to a document based on IASC Popula-
tion Movement Tracking data published by UNHCR 
on November 18th, 2011, the largest influx of IDPs 
coming into Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, 
occurred in January, 2011, However, starting in 
March, the rate of new IDPs arriving to the capital 
started increasing steadily. Here are the key 
numbers and features of these IDP flows, for each 
quarter of the year.
From January to March, 2011, the total IDP arriv-
als in Mogadishu amounted to 31,400. The highest 
number arrived in January. Sixty-six percent of the 
IDPs had been displaced because of the drought. 
Twenty percent said they had migrated because of 
lack of livelihood. These movements are actually 
likely to be related to the drought. Seven percent 
of the IDPs coming in had moved because of in-
security. Seven percent of the displaced had been 
evicted from IDP settlements in the Afgooye corri-
dor. Most of the IDPs arriving in Mogadishu during 
this period came from the Lower Shabelle region. 
From April to June 2011, the total IDP arrivals in 
the capital of Somalia amounted to 8,500 (a signifi-
cant decrease compared to the previous period). 
83% of these arrivals were linked to the drought, 
while 16% were linked to insecurity. The IDPs most-
ly came from Bay region. 
From July to September 2011, the total number of 
IDPs arriving in Mogadishu was 35, 800. Seventy-
seven percent of these migrants arrived during the 
month of July when the state of famine was declared 
in Lower Shabelle and Bakool. Ninety-eight percent 
of arrivals during this period of time were drought-
related, according to the UNHCR report. 
From October to November, the reasons for 
displacement were reversed, as the effects of the 
drought disappeared and military conflict started 
again between government forces and Al-Shabaab 
rebels in the region of Mogadishu. Ninety-three 
percent of the total arrivals during that period 
were linked to insecurity.
The Afgooye corridor
It is the main road between the cities of Moga-
dishu and Afgooye. This corridor is the area where 
Somali migrants go when intense fighting in 
Mugadishu creates serious safety risks. It is actu-
ally the largest single concentration of internally 
displaced people in the world. 
In August 2011, the prevalence of acute malnu-
trition and the rates of mortality surpassed fam-
ine thresholds in the Mogadishu IDP community 
and in the Afgooye corridor IDP settlement (FN-
SAU– FEWSNET, 2011). In fact, the UN declared 
on August 3rd that the famine had spread to three 
more regions of Southern Somalia since July 20th: 
the Afgooye corridor, Mogadishu, and the Middle 
Shabelle region. 
Migration to Puntland and Somaliland
Migrations inside the country happened inside a 
context of growing securitization because of the 
conflict. Upon arriving in Somaliland and Punt-
land, migrants from the South of Somalia faced 
suspicion from the part of the local populations or 
police forces. In the semi-autonomous Puntland 
state, identity cards were handed out to IDPs from 
Southern Somalia in order to distinguish them 
from militia or criminals. Poor local communi-
ties in these regions have helped to settle unusu-
ally large numbers of displaced people, sometimes 
drawing on traditional and Islamic principles. Sufi 
brotherhoods that are known for linking people 
from different clans and origins played a role in 
this integration process.
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Entrance into other countries 
Yemen
The majority of migrants arriving to Yemen 
were male. According to the Yemen MMTF, Somali 
males often left their families behind in Somalia, 
Kenya or Ethiopia to make the journey to Yemen. 
Their objective was to find employment in Yemen 
and to send back money to their families. Also, 
they were afraid of getting conscripted by the Al-
Shabab insurgent groups or arrested by them on 
pretext that they were supporting the government 
if they stayed in Somalia. 
Figure 1 shows the complexity of the reasons 
pushing Somali and Ethiopian migrants to the 
coast of Yemen during the period of July through 
September, 2011. The data reflect the importance 
the drought had as a primary factor for migration, 
especially for Somalis. Twenty six percent of new 
Somali arrivals during that period were caused pri-
marily by the drought. The majority of the Somali 
arrivals were migrants coming from the South-
Central regions of the two Shabelles, Bay and Bana-
dir regions. In the previous quarter, encompassing 
April through June, 2011, insecurity had been the 
main factor of migration to the Yemeni coast. 
Many of these migrants wished to move to Saudi 
Arabia after getting to Yemen. Yet, because of the 
ongoing conflict in Yemen, this was not possible. 
Work opportunities were also lacking for migrants 
from the Horn of Africa. The report explains that a 
part of the young migrants were disappointed and 
wished to go back to their country. 
Kenya and Ethiopia
Both countries have had a leading role in wel-
coming Somali refugees during the 2011 drought, as 
can be observed on the map in section I.2. Both Ke-
nya and Ethiopia possess legal standards concern-
ing refugees and have created government bodies 
geared to these issues, which work in close coop-
eration with UNHCR for refugee registration and 
status determination (Yemen Mixed Migration Task 
Force, 2010). In Kenya, refugees from Somalia are 
accepted on a prima facie basis, which illustrates 
how normalized Somalia’s humanitarian situation 
has become from the perspective of its main neigh-
boring and host country2. Yet in both countries, al-
though Somali migrants enjoy recognition of the 
refugee status, they are only granted limited access 
to social protection and benefits, such as employ-
ment, education, health care and even freedom of 
movement, namely because of the difficulty they 
face in obtaining documentation in those countries. 
During the drought, although Kenya and Ethiopia 
were used by some migrants as transit countries 
when heading to the Arabic Peninsula or to South-
ern countries of Africa, the bulk of Somalis arriving 
in both countries was headed for the refugee camps, 
which played a crucial role in welcoming migrants 
affected by the drought and food insecurity. 
Although there are several refugee camps inside 
Somalia, the camps that welcomed the most mi-
grants during the drought were located in neigh-
boring countries. The Dadaab complex, located in 
the North-East of Kenya, is by far the most impor-
tant in terms of size. The camp features an impor-
tant UNHCR base. The international humanitarian 
organisation CARE is UNHCR’s partner for manag-
ing the camp. During the first eleven months of 
2011, Dadaab received over 160,000 new refugees, 
most of them coming from the drought-stricken 
southern and central parts of Somalia (Dar and 
Khan, 2011). In July 2011, at the peak of the crisis, it 
was receiving 1,300 migrants per day. The second 
most important refugee camp is Dollo Ado, located 
in the South of Ethiopia, close to the frontier with 
Somalia. Although these complexes are relatively 
old, the intensity of the influx of migrants arriv-
ing during the drought led to the opening of new 
camps within these complexes. In Dollo Ado, three 
additional camps were opened between June and 
November, 2011, in order to relieve the congestion 
that increased everyday due to the arrival of new 
migrants. The last one, Bur Amino, was opened in 
November 2011, when the four existing camps at 
Dollo Ado had a total population of 137 000. After 
much negotiation, the Kenyan government agreed 
to open two additional camps, Ifo-2 and Kambioos 
in the context of the growing humanitarian crisis 
caused by the drought.
2.  This is also the case in Yemen (Yemen Mixed Migration 
Task Force, 2010).
Insecurity
Lack of basic needs
Economic reasons
Somalis Ethiopians
Drought
Other
Source: Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 2011*
*Taken from a 10% sample of the 12,507 registered arrivals.
Figure 1. Main reasons for flight among Somali and 
Ethiopian migrants arriving in Yemen between July and 
September 2011
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South Africa 
Migration of Somalis to South Africa during the 
drought is revealing on this issue. Since 1994 South 
Africa has prided itself on having officially welcom-
ing arms for all migrants. According to Loren B. 
Landau, Director of the African Center for Migra-
tion and Society, South Africa’s refugee law guar-
antees freedom of movement, access to numerous 
social services, and rights to compete in labor and 
housing markets. It is intended to maximize the 
refugee’s freedom and protection and to promote 
their temporary integration into local communities 
(Landau, 2006). South Africa’s refugee and asylum 
seeker policy was lauded in 2007 by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Gutierres, for 
its progressiveness and commitment to ensuring 
access to basic services to refugees. 
However, the reality experienced by Somali 
migrants arriving at the South African border in 
the wake of the drought was very different. Since 
they were coming from a country experiencing a 
military conflict, they could legitimately ask for 
asylum and refugee status in the country. Yet, ac-
cording to the Chairperson of the Somali Com-
munity Board, a local organisation defending 
the interests of Somalis in South Africa, a new 
unofficial policy restricting entrance for Somali 
and Ethiopian asylum seekers developed start-
ing in May 2011, as the level of migrants coming 
into the country from the Horn of Africa to seek 
asylum began to increase rapidly (IRIN News, 
2011a). A June 2011 issue brief by Roni Amit from 
the African Center for Migration and Society 
suggests that the justification used by the Home 
Affairs Department for refusing asylum to mi-
grants was that they should have sought asylum 
in the first safe country they reached. According 
to the researcher, not only does South Africa’s 
use of the ‘first safe country’ principle lack any 
basis in international or domestic law, but it 
also fails to consider claims individually before 
turning asylum seekers away, as demanded by 
international law (Amit, 2011). Its implementa-
tion thus deprived migrants arriving from the 
Horn of Africa as a result of the drought and/or 
the civil war of any legal or effective protection, 
forcing them to remain in a situation of physi-
cal insecurity, whereas they could have asked for 
asylum given the political situation of Somalia. 
The South African policy had effects on other 
countries in the region, for instance Zimbabwe, 
which closed its borders to migrants unable to 
present an identity document. One of the reasons 
for the strengthening of Zimbabwe’s immigra-
tion policy was that migrants coming into the 
country and seeking asylum would just stay long 
enough to receive material assistance, and then 
go away again, before their case was adjudicated. 
For Zimbabwe, this meant extra administrative 
and social costs and a weakening of the refugee 
procedure. 
This change in the South African immigration 
policy also caused a reaction by Mozambique, 
one of the transit countries for migrants head-
ing to South Africa. Border authorities started 
restricting the movements of asylum seekers 
outside of the country’s only refugee camp (the 
Maratane refugee camp, in Nampula Province). 
In June, 2011, because of the large influx of mi-
grants, border officials and police started inter-
cepting migrants arriving at Palmaand deporting 
them back across the border to Tanzania, regard-
less of their status. In August 2011, 833 Ethiopian 
and Somali migrants were detained in Mtwara 
prison in the south-east of Tanzania. 
2. PROTECTION AND SECURITY 
CONSIDERATIONS
2.1. Migration and security issues
Internal migration related concerns
The absence of efficient administration services 
led to a lack of control over refugees and migra-
tion flows in the south and the center of the 
country. The conflict increased the risks as well 
as the benefits associated with migration. Indeed, 
very striking migrant behavior has been observed, 
especially migration flows in areas directly 
affected by the conflict. The location of IDP camps 
requires Somali migrants to move inside rebel 
zones, even when these zones are witnessing 
episodes of violence. Sometimes, migrating to 
an IDP camp does not guarantee improved living 
conditions, because these settlements, located 
near the capital, are affected by violence, poverty 
and disease. However, the lack of information led 
to huge migration flows toward these areas.
The other choice, moving from conflict zones 
to neighboring regions or countries, is a risky. By 
exiting stable zones migrants and refugees expose 
themselves to other dangers including insecure 
roads and security checkpoints demanding illegal 
payments. 
Puntland and Somaliland proclaimed foreigner 
expulsion policies in 2011 concerning migration 
flows toward the the Gulf of Aden. This worsened 
migration conditions, despite strong condemna-
tions from international actors, especially the UN. 
The need to move away from the area of conflict can 
be seen as a push factor which explains these long 
distance migrations. Besides, Somalis can often 
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rely on transnational networks and communities 
abroad.
Some attempts have been made to improve So-
mali migrants’ conditions in Puntland. The Dan-
ish Refugee Council worked on the customaries 
with traditional elders, representing a legitimate 
authority without an effective state administra-
tion. The reform of Xeer (unwritten traditional 
rules) was promoted to recognize minorities’ and 
foreigners’ rights. But there are no measures of 
behavior improvements which have followed the 
decision of the elders.
Regional migration
The environmental migrations caused by the 
drought in the Horn of Africa confronted countries 
with the problem of mixed migrations. According 
to IOM, mixed migrations are “complex migratory 
population movements including refugees, asylum 
seekers, economic migrants and other migrants” 
(IOM, 2004). They constitute a policy issue for 
welcoming countries since these countries are 
compelled by international law to accept asylum 
seekers, but do not want to bear the costs of large 
numbers of other types migrants flowing into 
their country. Part of their dilemma is that it has 
become increasingly difficult to separate refugees 
and asylum seekers from other types of migrants. 
There have been growing concerns about letting 
people abuse national asylum systems. Moreover, 
migrants from the Horn of Africa are seen as a 
threat to national security. 
The huge flows of migrants coming from the 
Horn of Africa during the period of the drought 
have thus revealed the challenge faced by certain 
African countries who experience large influxes 
of “mixed migration”, as well as the many threats 
imposed to migrants, in this case Somali, arriving 
in these circumstances: even as asylum seekers, 
they risk being refused entrance into the country. 
The shift in policy that took place in South Africa 
had a knock-on effect on other countries in the re-
gion. As a result, many migrants, including envi-
ronmental ones fleeing drought and famine, were 
forced to seek help elsewhere or enter countries il-
legally. In these cases they remained in a situation 
of deprivation and physical and legal insecurity. 
The deportation and imprisonment of several 
hundred migrants coming from Somalia during the 
drought casts light on the dangers resulting from 
the lack of a coherent immigration strategy among 
countries in the region and more generally the ab-
sence of any kind of law aiming at taking care of 
environmental migrants. This case highlights how 
relevant an international law for environmental 
migrants could be. For one part, it would not leave 
the fate of environmental migrants in the hands 
of States, which tend to shun the responsibility of 
welcoming large flows of foreign “refugees”, espe-
cially during a humanitarian crisis and when these 
refugees come from a fragile country like Somalia. 
Secondly, it could provide environmental migrants 
with more protection and security than what they 
are receiving today. 
2.2. Safety conditions of 
regional displacement
One of the particularities of the migrations due 
to the drought in Somalia is the harsh safety 
conditions they took place in. These conditions 
epitomize the vulnerability of part of the Somali 
population during the period of the drought, 
deprived of legal protection by the absence of 
an effective national government, deprived of 
assistance because of the conflict and the pres-
ence of Al-Shabaab, weakened by the drought 
and famine, and exposed to the threats existing 
in the region. To give an example, a mapping 
technique commissioned by IOM showed that 
85% of drought-affected Somali refugees and 
host pastoralist communities were using nearly 
1,230 kilometers of unofficial border routes 
to reach Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp in the 
second half of 2011. The migrants faced dehy-
dration, lack of access to health services, rape, 
theft and extortion. Only 10% of official routes 
were being used to reach Dadaab. Yet even the 
official routes lacked essential infrastructure, 
such as mobile water points, medical facilities 
and resting points. 
Crossing the Gulf of Aden to go to Yemen was 
another path taken by Somali migrants fleeing 
the drought. It is an extremely dangerous jour-
ney. Cases of drowning on the way to Yemen are 
not rare. The maps below, taken from the Yemen 
MMTF Report for the period July-September 2011, 
illustrate the geography of the flows of migrants 
between the Horn of Africa and the Yemeni coast 
and also the risks inherent to the journey of mi-
grants fleeing drought and conflict in the most 
risk-exposed parts of the Horn of Africa. 
Smuggling appears a necessary part of most of 
the environmental migrants’ journey. Migrants are 
smuggled by boats, sometimes carrying several 
thousand, from Somalia to Kenya, and then from 
Kenya to Mozambique, or from Somalia to Djibouti 
and then to Yemen. Migrants often do not know 
how to swim. They can also get robbed and physi-
cally assaulted when they arrive at their destina-
tion. According to Sheikh Amil of the Somali Com-
munity Board in South Africa smugglers charge up 
to $3,000 to bring Somalis from Kenya to South 
Africa. Migrants have to pay half before they leave 
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Map 5. Key migration flows from Somalia to Yemen (July to September 2011)
Source: Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 2011.
Map 6. Risks incurred by the migrants
Source: Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 2011
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and half when they arrive. If they fail to do so they 
can be held as hostages. 
Another serious threat known by Somali en-
vironmental migrants, especially women and 
children, is human trafficking. In fact, there 
have been reports of women and children flee-
ing drought in Somalia being trafficked into Ke-
nya and sold into prostitution or forced labour. 
Generally speaking, according to Jean-Philippe 
Chauzy, Head of Communications at IOM, the 
huge influx of refugees into Kenya during the 
drought increased the vulnerability of people to 
trafficking, smuggling, and exploitation (Guard-
ian Development Network, 2011). Nairobi appears 
as the central market for girls who are distributed 
to Kenya and other countries, where underage 
girls are frequently trafficked for sex tourism in 
other parts of the country. Hence drought, pover-
ty and conflict represent a windfall for the econ-
omy of smuggling and trafficking in the Horn of 
Africa. 
2.3. The particular case 
of refugee camps
The humanitarian challenges faced by these 
complexes increased significantly as a result of the 
drought and subsequent famine, which translated 
into overcrowding, extremely high malnutrition 
levels and disease prevalence. Overcrowding of 
the camps had several negative implications: it 
placed greater strain on existing resources, while 
increasing the risks of disease spreading among 
refugees, and creating more insecurity for fragile 
groups within the camps. Another problem raised 
by the existence of these refugee camps is the rela-
tionship between the refugees and the local popu-
lation living next to the campsite. For example, 
Somali refugees outnumbered Kenyan locals in 
Dadaab by a quarter of a million at least during 
the drought crisis. The unequal access of locals 
compared to refugees to basic needs, as well as the 
pressure exerted on resources in the region by the 
camps, created tensions between the two groups at 
a time when food insecurity was generalized in the 
region (IRIN News, 2011b). 
What will be the future of the “refugees” who 
have fled the drought? Will their situation con-
verge with that of the political refugees, fleeing 
the civil war in Somalia, some of whom have been 
living in Dadaab since its creation in 1991-92? 
The lack of a long-term plan or exit strategy in a 
refugee camp such as Dadaab appears as a crucial 
problem because the situation of the complex is no 
longer sustainable.
3. POLITICAL ANSWERS TO 
THE MIGRATION CRISIS
Apart from the migrants’ profiles and trajectories 
which explain the higher vulnerability of Somali 
migrants during the drought crisis, it is indispen-
sable to look at other explanatory factors for the 
lack of support and of adequate policy responses 
that might be particularly relevant to explain the 
difficulty of defining the impact of the environ-
ment on Somali migrations.
3.1. Somalia’s “failed state”, 
acute human insecurity 
and consequences for 
international assistance 
The livelihood crisis reached its peak in the areas 
controlled by the Shebab rebels. The presence of 
these armed groups impeded the mobility neces-
sary for people to have access to water and food 
when drought strikes. In 2011, 1.7 million people 
suffered and still do not have access to humani-
tarian aid because of al-Shabaab control of the 
regions in the south. The absence of a state trans-
lated into the absence of disaster risk prevention 
linked to droughts in the country, as well as the 
lack of implementation of any adaptation strategy 
at the national level (migration or other). Hence, 
it increased the need for these populations to 
migrate along greater distances to Somaliland, 
Puntland, to neighboring countries and to more 
far away countries, as this article described.
The transitional government has been recog-
nized internationally as the only actor able to 
take charge. With the support of the African 
Union, the Transitional Federal Government 
took back the capital Mogadishu from al-Sha-
baab troops in 2011. However, Somalis consider 
this effort to stabilize the country as an attempt 
of one militia to surpass the others. Moreover, 
the international support for the TFG is seen as 
interference in the conflict and not always un-
derstood. This intervention of other countries 
has raised the suspicion upon international aid 
and especially NGOs. In January 2012, the Islam-
ic group Al-Shabaab banned the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from South 
Somalia after accusing the organisation of at-
tempting to poison food that was past its use by 
date (Mahmoud, 2012). In addition, al-Shabaab 
denied access to the World Food Program, UNI-
CEF since 2010. The introduction of the political 
struggle into the context of humanitarian crisis 
has worsened the possibilities of international 
assistance agencies to work among the internal-
ly displaced and the populations in need.
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3.2. What is at stake  
for international  
organisations? 
As was described before, political and security 
issues in Somalia make the conditions of inter-
national intervention harder. Nevertheless, UN 
agencies and other international organisations are 
present on the field, and have played an important 
role in trying to respond to the needs of migrants 
and refugees in the region, despite more difficul-
ties since the drought. This non-exhaustive list will 
present major actors and programs which have 
contributed to providing assistance to the environ-
mental migrants in Somalia during the period of 
the drought. 
The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has set up 
aid programs to provide shelter and emergency 
relief to drought victims and environmental mi-
grants. Two monitoring systems, the Population 
Movement Tracking and the Protection Monitor-
ing Network, have been designed to inform agen-
cies on IDP migrations paths and to list violence 
against Somali population. Moreover, UNHCR 
works in cooperation with other UN agencies and 
NGOs to ensure more support for the IDPs.
UNHCR action aims to prevent conflict due 
to drought: the analysis of the Commissioner 
highlights a strong risk of violence emerging on 
competition for the control of resources. Further-
more, UNHCR is working on IDP integration in 
host regions to reduce xenophobia towards mi-
grants and refugees. A revision of the legislation 
in Somaliland and Puntland that considers IDPs 
as foreigners is in discussion. This intervention is 
part of the Regional Protection Program designed 
by UNHCR to enhance cooperation of neighbor-
ing states (Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia) for the 
protection of refugees.
UNHCR intervention also concerns refugee 
camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, especially the Dada-
ab camp. Recently with the increase of arrivals, 
UNHCR has tried to implement other ways of as-
sisting refugees. For instance, the Commissioner 
tried to involve communities in the management 
of the camp, ensuring training for volunteers. 
Services are maintained with more efficiency to 
detect needs and respond to them thanks to this 
involvement of the local population and of mi-
grants. UNHCR is also improving sanitation use 
by creating sanitation committees who are acting 
at the household level. Other services have gained 
by this new implication of refugees in the camp 
management: teachers have been recruited from 
the refugee population and schools have remained 
open (UNHCR, 2012). 
The International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) is also working with the Somali Transi-
tional Federal Government to implement capaci-
ty-building in migration management. Precisely, 
the office is trying to improve the management of 
migration to facilitate the work of international 
agencies and NGOs. The creation of IOM migra-
tion desks and migration data centers has helped 
to provide more precise information of the situa-
tion. IOM is also working with migrants to improve 
their conditions or remediate their situation. Ex-
amples include assisting the voluntary return of 
Somali willing to come back to their origin region 
and counter-trafficking projects to tackle human 
traffic development.
Initially proposed by the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development, the African Union 
Mission in Somalia is a peacekeeping mission 
created by the African Union Peace and Security 
Council and approved by the UN Security Coun-
cil. Its mandate has been extended until 2013. This 
mission of peace enforcement aimed at the reas-
surance of TFG’s control area and the liberation of 
Mogadishu. 
Thanks to the contribution of the UNHCR and 
IOM, a Somalia Mixed Migration Task Force 
(MMTF Somalia) was created in 2007. UN OCHA, 
the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council are also involved in this task force 
designed to “respond to protection and humanitar-
ian needs of migrants and asylum seekers transit-
ing through Somalia” (Mixed Migration through 
Somalia and across the Gulf of Aden, June 2010). 
In addition, another task force has been created in 
Yemen to build planning of the migrants’ recep-
tion in the region. The main role of this program 
is to reduce negative impacts often associated 
with migration in promoting coordination and dif-
fusing information. Moreover, the program sup-
ports the development of infrastructure designed 
to respond to the causes of migration, especially 
food insecurity. This second objective is dedicated 
to tackle migration by giving Somali populations 
the possibility to avoid taking the risky choice of 
economic migrations. The MMTF is co-chaired by 
UNHCR and IOM.
Despite this situation of cooperation, there is 
a lack of detailed information on these organisa-
tion’s activities in Somalia. Furthermore, the inter-
vention of UN agencies is limited by rebels groups 
such as al-Shabaab who are unwilling to open stra-
tegic areas of control to international actors.
With regard to NGOs, their leverage of action has 
been considerably reduced for two reasons: some 
areas under the control of rebels have been closed 
to international humanitarian actors and the 
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violence against NGO staff has increased. For in-
stance, Doctor Without Borders (Médecins sans 
frontières, MSF), which had returned in the coun-
try in 2007, left Somalia at the beginning of 2008 
because of the murder of 3 volunteers. Despite the 
lack of international staff on the field, MSF carried 
on its activities thanks to local personnel. MSF is 
still involved in Mogadishu with an emergency 
surgery service and continued temporary missions 
to help against malnutrition and cholera. 
Some NGOs still remain in the countryside re-
gions and in Mogadishu: Action Against Hunger 
(Action contre la faim, ACF) continued its action 
despite the danger and the increase of the needs 
since 2011. The organisation programs reached 
nearly 300,000 people and provide help against 
malnutrition and famine. However, ACF has been 
expelled from some regions, like Majid, leaving 
populations without solutions to their basic needs.
3.4. What is at stake for 
international diplomacy? 
In February 2012, a major conference took place 
in London, gathering representatives from over 
40 governments and multi-lateral organisations, 
in order to increase understanding on the Somali 
crisis. Several recommendations were asserted 
by the participants. Regional actors should use 
their influence to reach an agreement and build a 
strong state which will be able to face the different 
needs of the Somali population. However several 
criticisms have followed this conference.
First of all, the official Somali actors refuse to 
engage negotiations with al-Shabaab, despite a 
strong representation in the country. Secondly, 
policies aiming at security in the Gulf of Aden have 
been reaffirmed. Some observers have highlighted 
the fact that the funds devoted to the reassurance 
of maritime traffic could answer much more easily 
to the issue if they were devoted to humanitarian 
aid and Somalia’s development.
Finally, a lack of determination for developing 
the resilience of populations has determined some 
actors, like Oxfam, to criticize the conference re-
sults due to not accounting for the Somali popu-
lation’s true needs. Indeed, the occurrence of the 
drought in Somalia suggests that the phenomenon 
will happen again, destroying attempts to bring 
stability to the country and leading to more envi-
ronmental migrants in the future.
Moreover, the many security issues faced by en-
vironmental migrants from the Horn of Africa dur-
ing the period of the drought have confirmed the 
need to broaden legal migration channels in order 
to avoid problems of smuggling, trafficking and il-
legal crossing of borders. 
CONCLUSION
The 2011 drought has exacerbated pre-existing 
problems in Somalia. Relative to the civil war, 
the issue of famine and environmental migration 
received more attention but was less likely to be 
addressed by policy responses, because of the 
complexity of national and international actor 
interactions. 
As a consequence, the drought, which particu-
larly affected poor populations dependent on 
agriculture and pastoralism, raised the question 
of the vicious circle of uncontrolled violence and 
poverty. National policies designed by the Tran-
sitional Federal Government have aimed at pro-
moting international aid and the interference of 
UN and AMISOM. But the lack of recognition of 
this administration as a legitimate one, the lack of 
control over the national territory and the lack of 
resources explain the difficulties of enforcing ef-
ficient policies towards migrants.
As for now, there are major uncertainties about 
the future of those displaced: should they be re-
settled or can they return? Many families who had 
gone to Mogadishu to flee the drought decided to 
return in November, 2011, to take advantage of the 
rainy season. To a certain extent they were helped 
to do so by aid agencies, like the United Arab Emir-
ates Red Crescent Society, who helped resettle 
drought IDPs. Helping these environmental mi-
grants resettle required addressing their needs in 
food, transportation, shelter material, and money. 
For agropastoralists to start afresh and resume 
their livelihood, some kind of livestock was need-
ed. Some displaced families decided to send back 
the most capable in order to start again and left 
behind the elderly, women and children tempo-
rarily. In the refugee camps of Ethiopia and Kenya, 
families who wanted to go back also started doing 
so when the rain began to fall again, in spite of the 
conflict, in order to start over again.
Along with the protection of displaced popula-
tion, one of the most important challenges today 
is probably to ensure the emergence of a true 
national union government which would have 
enough support to facilitate reconciliation and 
manage the consequences of disasters such as the 
2011 drought.
Somalia is locked in a vicious circle of disasters 
contributing to instability and conflicts. The mix 
between refugees, economic migrants and envi-
ronmental migrants is huge and the region is in 
deep need of better tools and data on the migra-
tion nexus. Above all, Somali populations need to 
develop their resilience against drought, especial-
ly in a climatic, demographic and social context 
that has greatly changed and which impedes the 
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traditional responses from being fully effective. A 
regional adaptation strategy in the Horn of Africa, 
which would include Somalia, could help answer 
this problem, but this option is dependent on the 
degree of cooperation that regional actors are 
ready to foster. ❚
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Mexico ranked as the country with the 
highest rate of outward migration according to 
World Bank figures. It is clear that the specific 
dynamics of Mexico’s migration patterns are inex-
tricably tied to its economic and geopolitical prox-
imity to the United States. However, droughts and 
desertification—specifically their link to extreme 
poverty in the most arid areas of the country—
are a major factor driving outward migration for 
economic purposes. This study seeks to illumi-
nate the link between drought and migration by 
examining how low agricultural yields and food 
insecurity may have contributed to the migration 
of scores of Mexicans to the country’s northern 
neighbor, the United States. The first section will 
provide a survey of the incidence of drought and 
an analysis of the determinants of droughts and 
migration  by providing a snapshot of the state of 
international discourse on environmental migra-
tion between Mexico and the United States. The 
second section will describe the characteristics 
of the drought of 2011. The third section will 
describe the migration patterns between Mexico 
and United States. The fourth section will explore 
the various government structures designed to 
mitigate the effect of drought and desertifica-
tion on rural poverty. Finally, the fourth section 
will provide recommendations for a more robust 
government safety net for environmental shocks 
and will explore the potential of circular migra-
tion programs in mitigating the economic effects 
of climate change in Mexico. 
1. MEXICO’S VULNERABILITY TO 
DROUGHTS AND DESERTIFICATION
The effects of and implications of environmental 
degradation in Mexico are significant. Currently, 
most of the country’s territory is undergoing some 
process of degradation, and it is estimated that 
approximately 2,250 square kilometers of poten-
tially productive farmlands are damaged or aban-
doned every year as a consequence (Leighton & 
Notini, 1994). The implications of desertification 
are particularly deleterious for people whose live-
lihood depends directly on the quality and overall 
health of the soil, such as subsistence farmers. 
1.1. History of droughts in Mexico
Mexico’s experience with droughts and desertifi-
cation dates back as far as the eleventh century, 
and migration has been linked to this climatic 
phenomenon since the ancient civilizations of the 
Mexican valley (Liverman, 1990). In 1450-1454, 
it is believed that a famine caused by an intense 
drought led to mass out-migration from the Valley 
of Mexico under the Aztec Civilization. Although 
the Aztecs routinely distributed corn during times 
of famine, this drought period was so terrible that 
it led families to make human sacrifices to Tláloc, 
the god of rain, and to sell family members into 
slavery (Liverman, 1999). Recently, archeologists 
have also suggested that droughts could have 
played a role in the collapse of the Mayan and 
other Meso-American civilizations (Ibid 1990, Ibid 
1999). 
According to Florescanno (1995), droughts may 
have also played defining roles throughout Mex-
ico’s most important historical moments. He ar-
gues, for example, that the Hidalgo Rebellion of 
1810, which marked a moment of catalysis in the 
Mexican War of Independence, and the War of the 
Castes of the 1830s could be linked to food insecu-
rity crises due to droughts (Ibid; Florescano, 1980 
quoted in Liverman, 1990). Over a century later, 
the events leading up to the Mexican Revolution-
ary War may also have been compounded by a par-
ticularly severe drought. (1995). 
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Florescano further argues that historical records 
also give strong indications that the adaptive ca-
pacities of inhabitants in the territory of contem-
porary Mexico have declined over time (1995). The 
indigenous populations of the Mesoamerican pla-
teau are believed to have practiced conservation 
agriculture and other agroecological practices such 
as crop rotation; land management adapted to soil 
fertility; use of natural compost for fertilizer; and 
cultivation in terraces and embankments. Accounts 
from Toluca in the Mexico City Valley indicate that 
indigenous communities may have abandoned 
these practices by the sixteenth century with the 
arrival of Spanish colonizers. Over time, their tra-
ditional practices were replaced by the European 
parceling system and by mono-cropping, which 
severely compromised the health and productive 
capacity of their soils. The introduction of cattle, an 
animal species which is not endemic to the Ameri-
can continent, contributed to overgrazing, leading 
to further land degradation, and placed indigenous 
communities at a higher risk of vulnerability to 
droughts and food insecurity (1995; 35-43). 
Climatic data shows that droughts have be-
come less frequent but more intense from 1930 to 
1970 (in CONAZA, 1994). During this period, 20 
droughts were severe and six were extremely se-
vere. Florescano (1980) estimates that in 1949 and 
1969, losses linked to drought were 77% and 73% 
of total agricultural losses for each year respective-
ly (Ibid). Other sources indicate that in the past 
century, the most severe episodes include the 1957, 
1969, 1989, and 1997 droughts, which had ravag-
ing effects for agriculture (Quintero, 2012). Liver-
man (1999) indicates that the effects of droughts 
coupled with poor economic and social conditions 
can be observed in the variations in corn produc-
tion and imports since 1960. Using this data, de-
creases in production can be observed for the pe-
riods 1973-1976, 1979, 1982, and 1986-1989 which 
can be partly linked to droughts and compounded 
by economic crises. 
Generally, the patterns observed suggest that 
droughts are severe and cyclical and that this cli-
matic phenomenon has historically led to the loss 
of as much as 10% to 20% of the total planted area 
in Northern Mexico, particularly in the most vul-
nerable states of Aguascalientes, Nuevo León, and 
San Luis Potosí (1999).
1.2. Environmental 
determinants of droughts
One of the primary risk factors in the incidence of 
drought is desertification, which is the most preva-
lent form of land degradation in Mexico. Agenda 21 
of the 1992 Rio Declaration defines desertification 
as the “degradation of land in arid, semi-arid, and 
sub-humid dry areas caused by climatic changes 
and human activities…accompanied by a reduc-
tion in the natural potential of the land” (United 
Nations, 1993). In Mexico the primary anthropo-
genic causes of desertification include the exces-
sive clearing and cultivation of land unsuitable 
for agriculture, the exploitation of forests and 
biomass for fuel, overgrazing practices, unsuitable 
or inefficient irrigation practices, mining activities 
and urban expansion (Leighton & Notini, 1994, p. 
i). Droughts and desertification go hand in hand, 
and natural climatic changes are just as important 
as the evolution in political and economic frame-
works that define the way Mexico’s inhabitants 
interact with the environment. 
According to government figures, mild forms 
of desertification affect over 90% of the territory 
and 60% are affected by more severe forms (CON-
AZA, 1994). Expert findings in 1978 reached the 
same conclusion, estimating that approximately 
80% of the country’s surface was affected by de-
sertification, totaling over 150 million hectares of 
land (Leighton & Notini, 1994). A scenario drawn 
from the same study predicted that desertification 
would continue to overtake approximately 100,000 
to 200,000 hectares of land per year, which is 
consistent with the current trend experienced in 
Mexico. Sodification and salinization, physical 
degradation, biological degradation, and chemical 
degradation also comprise the process of deserti-
fication. Of these, sodification and salinization—
which are caused by inadequate irrigation practic-
es— are of particular concern, affecting arid states 
like Sonora severely. It is estimated that about 10% 
of the country’s surface is highly salinized. More-
over, between 50% and 80% of lands are arid or 
semi-arid. Of these lands, approximately 8 million 
hectares, making up 45% of land used for agricul-
ture, are farmed or used for grazing. Overall, about 
87% of desertification is believed to be caused by 
anthropogenic factors, while 13 percent is believed 
to be the result of natural climate change (Leighton 
& Notini, 1994). More specifically, 80% of the loss 
in soil fertility nationally is believed to be linked to 
inadequate use of the land (CONAZA, 1994). 
Environmental shocks in Mexico are also the ef-
fect of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), 
a non-regular cyclical (5-7years) climatic phenom-
enon associated with the changes in sea surface 
temperature and pressure in the tropical Pacific 
Ocean; and its counterpart La Niña (Aguilar and 
Vicarelli, 2011). ENSO generates extreme weather 
effects such as floods, heat waves, and droughts, 
while La Niña causes extreme precipitation. Both 
of these phenomena affect Mexico in a significant 
manner, particularly its southern regions such as 
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the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Pueb-
la, and Veracruz, among others (Aguilar and Vicar-
elli, 2011). 
1.3. Political determinants in 
vulnerability to droughts
Mexico’s vulnerability to droughts should be 
assessed within the host of social, political, 
economic, and technological processes over 
time. Modernization of agriculture, for instance, 
may have contributed to the intensification of 
droughts indirectly by encouraging the expansion 
of farming activities into highly degraded water 
scarce areas (Liverman, 1990). Other stress factors 
that contribute to land degradation and the inten-
sification of drought include population growth 
over time—the Mexican population has more than 
quadrupled over the past forty years—as well as 
the expansion of commercial agriculture (Ibid; 
Leighton and Notini, 1994). 
Drought and extreme poverty
Perhaps most importantly, there is a high overlap 
between the segment of the Mexican population 
comprised of rural subsistence land ownersand 
those who live in extreme poverty conditions. 
Some estimates suggest that over 60% of rural 
dwellers live in extreme poverty, while more 
recent figures indicate that this proportion may be 
as high as 70% today (World Bank in Leighton and 
Notini 1996; La Jornada, 2012). Furthermore, it is 
estimated that currently over 40% of rural inhab-
itantsare affected by food poverty (La Jornada, 
2012). Some of the causes of the high incidence of 
extreme poverty among subsistence smallholders 
can be attributed to the losses in agricultural and 
plant productivity that are linked to droughts and 
desertification. 
Land tenure reform
The Plan de Ayala, which stipulated that one third 
of all lands held by large landowners be redistrib-
uted to landless farmers, served as the basis of the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) (Lewis, 2002). 
The new agrarian law was one of a set of measures 
to enhance the autonomy of the peasant classes in 
Mexico, seeking to rectify the inequalities created 
during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, which 
spanned over three decades from 1876 to 1910. At 
the completion of the Diaz dictatorship, over 96 
percent of the Mexican population was landless, 
and 97 percent of the land was concentrated in the 
hands of 1 percent of the population (2002).
Some studies argue that despite its lofty inten-
tions, the implementation of the communal land 
tenure laws or ejido system had serious flaws. 
While the ejido system was modeled after pre-
hispanic systems, in the original granting of the 
land, the government promoted agricultural ex-
pansion and grazing in marginal lands, instead 
of taking land from large landowners (Liverman, 
1990; Leighton and Notini, 1994). This has had a 
two-fold effect over time. First, peasants have con-
tributed to the degradation of the marginal lands 
distributed by the government. Secondly, as these 
lands became increasingly less productive, small-
holder farmers sought the authorization to take 
over other marginal lands that were also unsuit-
able for agriculture (Leighton and Notini, 1994). 
With amendments in the laws that allow ejido 
owners to sell or rent their land, this mechanism of 
marginalization through resettlement has contin-
ued as commercial land owners purchase the lands 
of poor farmers, displacing them into even more 
marginalized soils (Leighton and Notini, 1994). 
Distorted fiscal incentives
Another important distortion in the safety net for 
smallholders stems from fiscal incentives given by 
the National Bank. Historically, the National Bank 
has financed the cultivation of staple crops such as 
beans and corn, often overlooking the suitability of 
these crops for the land in question (Ballin-Cortes 
and Vasquez Rocillo interview, 1993, in Leighton 
and Notini, 1994). These perverse fiscal incentives 
not only resulted in further land degradation, but 
in financial losses for the National Bank. Given the 
lack of productivity of these crops in certain areas, 
the loans given by the bank were often defaulted 
and reduced yields resulted in lack of profits 
(Leighton and Notini, 1994. 
Amendments to exploitation rights
Finally, the amendment of Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution in 1992, which allowed ejido owners 
to sell or rent their land, has led to a changing of 
the demographic and economic picture of land 
exploitation in Mexico (Lewis, 2002). Almost two 
decades ago, Article 27 was amended to put an 
end to the repartition of ejido lands and to liber-
alize the use of these communal properties (Ibid, 
La Jornada, 2012). As a result of the new 1992 
Agrarian Law, recent estimates indicate that 60% 
of ejido lands in the municipalities of northern 
Mexico are rented out to commercial farmers or 
for other economic land exploitation purposes 
such as mining (La Jornada, 2012). 
Changes in economic and export/import 
patterns
Other important changes in the 1990s led to 
further marginalization of small holder farmers. 
In the past two decades the share of imported 
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agricultural products has risen by a factor of five 
from 10% to 50% (La Jornada, 2012). This process 
has been accompanied by the emigration of over 
2 million Mexicans since the implementation of 
the new agrarian law in 1992. Moreover, a fall in 
credit of over 80% during the 1980s and 1990s has 
resulted in the abandonment of agricultural activi-
ties in over 10 million hectares each year and over 2 
million rural jobs lost (La Jornada, 2012).
The fall in investment in agricultural activities 
and productivity losses have led to two impor-
tant demographic trends in the last two decades. 
With the emigration of young male farmers, 
there has been a feminization of the agricultural 
sector in Mexico. In the past fifteen years, there 
were relatively no female official landowners. 
Currently, 1,138,969 women are official owners 
of about 11.6 million hectares and 25% of rural 
households are headed by women (Ibid, 2012). 
Another trend is the aging of the rural popula-
tion. Currently, the average age of agricultural 
landowners is 56 years.
2. THE STATE OF THE 
DISCOURSE ON MEXICO-US 
ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION
According to the World Bank, Mexico is the largest 
sender country of emigrants in the world, and the 
United States-Mexico corridor is unparalleled in its 
scope (World Bank, 2011). Although it is difficult 
to produce precise data for these migration flows, 
estimates range from 150,000 to between 500,000 
and 600,000 migrations per year (Leighton and 
Notini, 1994). Many studies have been conducted 
to understand the determinants of international 
migration and its different modalities. However, 
in assessing the empirical evidence available on 
the topic, we have ascertained that environmental 
considerations have only recently become promi-
nent in the literature on Mexico-US migration. It 
is thus instrumental to recognize that although 
environmental degradation is pointed to in the 
literature as a potential determinant of migration, 
there has been no significant political recognition 
of environmental migrants on either side of the 
border. 
2.1. Environmental Determinants 
of Mexico-US Migration
Although studies often point to the potential 
role of environmental degradation as a causal 
factor of migration, there are a limited number 
of studies that have directly examined the envi-
ronment-migration nexus in Mexico. Notably, in 
1978, Fernando Medellin estimated that around 
600,000 Mexicans resorted to migration as a 
survival strategy in the context of poor agricultural 
outputs linked to land degradation and desertifi-
cation (Quoted in Alscher, 2008). In 1993, Norman 
Myers called this tendency, coupled with other 
stress factors such as high population growth, an 
“agricultural squeeze” (141, quoted in Alscher, 
2008). In 1994, Taylor deployed data from an 
investigation in Oaxaca highlighting that there is 
a negative correlation between rural productivity 
and migration, and suggesting that migration 
results in disinvestment in land-quality dependent 
activities. An important takeaway from this study 
is that the higher incidence of livestock raising 
can exacerbate overgrazing and land degradation, 
and the opportunity cost of land conservation in 
the context of migration can serve as a disincen-
tive for practices that decrease the vulnerability to 
droughts (Correspondence with Taylor, 1994, in 
Leighton and Notini, 1994). 
In 1990, the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform was authorized as a bipartisan effort to 
analyze the socioeconomic, demographic, and en-
vironmental effects of US-Mexico migration poli-
cy. One of the outcomes of the commission’s initia-
tives was a report that examined the link between 
desertification and migration carried out by the 
Natural Heritage Institute in California. Although 
an exhaustive research undertaking was beyond 
the scope of the study’s mandate, the authors used 
an analysis of geo-statistical and migration data to 
conclude that for individuals whose livelihood de-
pends primarily on the agricultural output of their 
land, the economic costs of desertification are a 
strong inducement to migrate toward the United 
States (Leighton and Notini, 1994). 
Table 1. US migration outlook – Mexican migrants (2010)
Country Population
Total US population 308,745,538
Number of migrants in the US 39,956,000
Share of the population 12.9%
Number of Mexican migrants in the US 11,587,250
Share of the migrants population 29%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
2.2. The 2011 Situation
In 2011 alone, more than 28 states in Mexico were 
affected by droughts (Notimex, 2012). In the states 
of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango, this drought 
period constitutes the most severe in the past 
70 years. Although it is estimated that droughts 
will not subside until the start of this year’s rainy 
season, droughts have already affected over 2 
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million hectares of land at the national level, 
leading to the total loss of over 7% of the country’s 
agricultural land (El Universal, 2012; Zabludovsky, 
2012). Moreover, roughly 450,000 cattle have 
perished in arid lands, dams were at less than half 
of their typical capacity relative to the same time 
last year, and many farmers in states like Durango 
have begun to migrate due to the high levels of 
food insecurity (Torres, 2012). 
Drought coupled with cold snap in the begin-
ning of 2011 also led to significant losses in food 
production. Production of corn for example, has 
been predicted to fall from the projected 23 million 
tons to 20 million tons, and production of beans is 
expected to fall by 28% (Notimex, 2012). As one 
of the world’s top five producers of corn, Mexico’s 
drought crisis is likely to drive up the price of this 
staple crop. Ignacio Rivera, an official at the Mexi-
can Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment predicted that corn production would likely 
recover to 25 million tons in 2012, aided by govern-
ment assistance. Thus far, of the 8.1 million hect-
ares insured against natural disaster—Mexico has 
total arable land of 22 million hectares—approxi-
mately 600,000 claims have been filed, reporting 
losses on 3.8 million hectares. The government 
has allocated over 1.6 billion pesos to cover these 
losses (Ibid). 
Although the government has a permanent 
safety net of programs against drought in place, it 
responded with large sums of disaster relief aid in 
late 2011 and the early months of 2012. It is impor-
tant to note that Mexico is no longer a recipient 
of humanitarian or foreign development aid, so 
the bulk of disaster management and assistance 
falls within the jurisdiction of the national gov-
ernment. Reports indicate that the government 
became aware of the severity of the drought in 
May, 2011, and responded by creating a Strategy 
to Assist States Affected by Drought (Pérez, 2012). 
Since then, it has approved over $2.63 billion pe-
sos in aid, including the creation of temporary 
jobs in the areas most affected by drought, the 
distribution of potable water and food aid. The 
National Comission of Watter (CONAGUA) , and 
other agencies have also distributed water for 
personal consumption, and doctors and nurses 
have been deployed to the most affected states. 
Recently, the government has also created a new 
mechanism within the Inter-ministerial Commis-
sion for Sustainable Rural Development to evalu-
ate and measure the impacts of the 2011 drought 
(Michel, 2012). 
The 2011 drought is not the first to have hit Mex-
ico in the past decade, but it is different for a num-
ber of reasons. First, this crisis has attracted more 
attention and support from the government due 
to the media coverage that it has received from 
national and international sources alike. In early 
January 2012, an independent group posted a vid-
eo on social media claiming that crop failure had 
driven more than 50 Tarahumara Indians to com-
mit suicide by jumping off a local cliff (BBC, 2012). 
Although this report was later denied by local au-
thorities, the news that the Tarahumara—who call 
themselves the raramuris and are known for their 
resilience and long-distance running abilities—
were being affected by the worst drought in 70 
years led to a wave of support including supplies 
and foodstuffs. However, the government’s strat-
egy has not escaped criticism. Notably, Javier Avila 
told El Informador, a Mexican newspaper, that hu-
man rights groups are “interested in tackling the 
causes, not the effects, because every year food 
and blankets are sent, but…every year indigenous 
people suffer hunger” (2012). 
The plight of the Tarahumara has become em-
blematic of the mismanagement of drought haz-
ards in Mexico. Recently, Isaac Oxenhaut, national 
aid coordinator for the Mexican Red Cross, said 
that the situation of the Tarahumara could be con-
sidered extreme poverty, and that “[the Tarahu-
mara] don’t have anywhere to harvest absolutely 
anything” (Zabludobsky, 2012). A recurring mes-
sage in the media coverage of the 2011 drought is 
that this climatic phenomenon is not only cyclical, 
but also relatively predictable. Yet, as each drought 
hits with increasing intensity, the government con-
tinues to handle it as a temporal crisis situation. In-
stead, a systematic improvement of the programs 
in place should be undertaken so that the pre-
ventable conditions that increase vulnerability to 
drought such as inadequate land and water man-
agement, and unsuitable agricultural practices are 
addressed prior to the onset of a food crisis. 
2.3. Monitoring the 2011 Drought 
The Mexican National Weather Service estab-
lishes four different types of droughts. The first 
is Abnormally Dry, which is not considered as a 
drought it is just a dryness condition. It usually 
appears in the start or at the end of a drought. 
It affects the growth of crops or grasslands, and 
leads to higher risk of fire and water deficit. The 
first level of drought is the Moderate Drought. In 
this level there is direct damage to crops and grass-
lands and low levels of water deposits. In Severe 
Drought there is a probability of losing crops and 
grasslands. There is a lack of water. The last two 
levels that happen rarely are Extreme Droughts 
and Exceptional Droughts. The former means a 
larger loss of crops and grasslands, higher risk of 
fire and general water shortage. The latter has a 
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general and atypical loss of crops and grasslands 
and there are usually emergency situations due to 
water shortage. 
The National Weather Service is part of the 
North American Drought Monitor which is a sys-
tem created by Canada, Mexico and the United 
States that monitors drought across the continent. 
The analysis of the 2011 situation in Mexico can be 
found in the databases and maps of the system. 
Since December 2010, there have been abnormal 
conditions in Mexican temperatures and land in-
dicators. It was in this month that the dryer condi-
tions started and the first clues of extreme drought 
appeared. This was a consequence of the reduction 
of precipitation since fall of 2010. By the end of the 
month the levels of dryness in the country could 
be found in 40.1% of the territory. The conditions 
affected the spring-summer agricultural cycle and 
the growth of livestock directly.
Despite the fact that the northern territory of 
Mexico is characterized by its dry conditions, 
2011 was an atypical year due to the increase of 
extreme and exceptional droughts. Since 2006 
these cases of droughts did not happen and it is 
considered the largest period of extreme and ex-
ceptional drought since 1941 (the year when the 
meteorological measurements started). The year 
2011 was extreme because 95% of the territory was 
affected by droughts. There was a higher incidence 
of exceptional droughts, perhaps the natural dry-
ness of the northern region of Mexico. According 
to the National Meteorological System during the 
agricultural cycle of 2011 only 53.4% of the agricul-
tural lands were seeded. 
3. MIGRATION PATTERNS OVER TIME
3.1. General patterns
Mexico shares a 3,100 kilometer border with the 
United States.. Historically, as neighbor countries, 
they have had a conflicting relationship, sharing 
enormous flows of people crossing illegally every 
year. Mexicans make up about 93% of these border 
crossers (Henderson, 2011). Currently, the Mexico-US 
corridor is said to be the most important migration 
nexus in the world (Castles y Miller, 1998). According 
to Durand and Massey, migration has been recorded 
since the Mexican American war of 1848. And is still, 
nowadays, one of the biggest foreign affairs issues 
that have to be dealt by both countries.
Table 2. Timeline of key events 2011-2012
DATE EVENT DETAILS
May 2011 Government becomes aware of extreme drought Government prepares to respond
July 2011 First national policy response Establishment of the Strategy to Assist States Affected by Drought
Early November 
2011
National meteorological service announces 70% of 
territory is affected by drought
Authorities qualify drought situation as “dramatic” and historically 
severe
November 2011 Food production falls by 40% compared to previous 
year’s levels
Price increases of corn and beans predicted
2011 Over 50% of country’s municipalities affected 1,200 municipalities across Mexico are affected by drought
End of 2011 New funds added to Natural Disaster Fund 18,700 MP added to FONDEN for a total of 21,400 MP available for 
disaster relief
January 2011 Ministry of Interior announces 7 natural disaster 
declarations are underway
Affected states include Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, 
Jalisco, Sonora, and Zacatecas
January 5, 2011 Ministry of Social Development continues to disburse 
water support
9 million liters of water are distributed to 2.5 million people most 
affected by drought
January 23, 2011 Disaster relief funds fail to reach beneficiaries It is estimated that only 40.7% of funds have been received by 
beneficiaries in 19 states affected by extreme and severe drought
January 24, 2011 President Felipe Calderon announces emergency relief 
funding
33,000 MP are allocated to a comprehensive national program to address 
drought losses in 2012
February 4, 2012 Red Cross and DIF announce United against Drought National cash and food collection programs runs from February 7-20
February 2012 Ministry of Health sends medical personnel to 
affected states
Over 10,000 doctors and 19 nurses sent to 5 most affected states
February 2012 CONAGUA continues to administer support Over 3,000 MP are distributed in 596 municipalities in 21 states
February 20, 2012 Losses amount to 12,000 MP Losses in productivity and land decapitalisation reach record high
April 2012 Mechanism to evaluate and measure impacts of drought is instituted 
within the Interministerial Commission for Sustainable Rural 
Development
Source: Own elaboration with information from El Universal 
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The modern era of what is understood as Mexi-
co-U.S. migration began after the end of the Brace-
ro Program, which was a temporary labor program 
for the agricultural sector of the United States dur-
ing World War II. It has been the only program that 
implemented a legal framework to cover the labor 
shortages in the United States. Currently, there has 
been a tremendous change; that started with the 
highest peak of Mexican-American migration in 
1970-1980 (in the wake of Mexico’s debt crisis). Ag-
gregately, Mexico has sent 11% of their population 
and 18% of their labor to the United States (Alba, 
Castillo and Verduzco, 2010). In these last decades 
migration has increased in an unprecedented fash-
ion in both countries history. It has increased from 
30,000 migrants to 400,000 per year. 
In the last 40 years, the migration flows have 
changed in size, intensity and demographic char-
acteristics. They have passed from being tempo-
rary and circular, to being permanent and more 
stable. Most of the migrants used to be men, but 
currently one third of the migrant population is 
women (Verduzco, 2010: 168). According to the 
most commonly cited estimate, today there are 
almost 12 million Mexicans who have established 
themselves in United States (Alba, 2010).
It is said that immigration involves push and pull 
factors that include economic, social, cultural and 
demographic characteristics. In addition to these 
factos the Mexico-United States migration deals 
with the vast asymmetries within both countries. 
Finally, the environment also has an important 
role in explaining the dynamic characteristics of 
the Mexican-American border. Especially for the 
impact in agricultural performance and its impor-
tance in the northern region of Mexico.
3.2. NAFTA and Mexican 
agriculture
In the late 1980s there were important economic 
reforms in Mexico. Miguel de la Madrid brought 
Mexico into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (gatt) in 1986, showing the world Mexico’s 
willingness to open up its economy (Henderson, 
2011). In the following years, there was privatiza-
tion, deregulation and liberalization of the Mexican 
economy. Under Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s presi-
dency, negotiations began for the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (nafta) or Tratado de Libre 
Comercio (tlc). He pursued the idea of Mexico 
as a “first world” country. nafta was seen as a 
long-term solution to the immigration problem 
between Mexico and the United States. As Carlos 
Salinas said: “Mexico will soon be exporting its 
goods instead of its people.”Nevertheless, Mexico, 
the United States and Canada ignored the fact 
that Mexico was not in the same conditions to 
enter a trade agreement, especially as an equal 
partner. Not only was Mexico’s economy smaller, 
poorer and more unequal, it was plagued by many 
other internal problems (Henderson, 2001: 121). 
The free trade agreement was never what it was 
thought to be; it has eased the regional disparities 
and has exacerbated the local inequalities. Job 
creation in Mexico has been slow, poverty has not 
decreased and the volume of migration to United 
States has increased, from 370,000 1994 per year 
to 575,000 in 2004 (Henderson, 2011: 137). The 
continuous flow of migrants along the border has 
shown that the benefits attributed to nafta have 
not been materialized.
According to Henderson, Mexico’s agricultural 
policies continued to be heavily skewed in favor 
of larger agricultural business instead of local 
farmers. The harshest effect of nafta in the agri-
cultural sector was felt in 2009, when the 15 years 
Figure 1. Percentage of areas by droughts in Mexico
Source: National Weather Service
 Abnormally dry /  Moderate drought /  Severe drought /  Extreme drought /  Exceptional drought
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enactment that eliminated tariffs on corn imports 
from the United States and Canada was applied. 
Mexico’s small-scale corn farmers would have 
to compete with the subsidies given to American 
farmers(the United States in 2008 had farm subsi-
dies totaled $25 billion). Michael Pollan says that 
the US subsidized cheap corn is a plague impov-
erishing farmers in Mexico and in the countries to 
which they export (Oing Hing, 2010). The imple-
mentation of NAFTA in the Mexican context has 
had a direct significance in the income of agricul-
tural farmers. This has a relation with the impact 
of droughts, because impoverished farmers are not 
able to reverse the environmental effects in their 
production.
3.3. Rural emigration
International migration has to be understood as 
a central process of economic globalization, espe-
cially for its influence and effects in the labor and 
remittances markets. Most of the time people 
emigrate to improve their quality of life or to 
reduce the effects of unequal economic develop-
ment. That is why international migration flows 
usually involve developed and developing coun-
tries. This asymmetric relationship can be seen in 
the relationship between Mexican and American 
migration.
According to the National Survey of Rural Homes 
in Mexico 2007 (enhrum ii) since the 1980s, the 
rate of rural emigration has increased considerably, 
especially toward the United States. During this pe-
riod of time the median annual growth rate of rural 
emigration was 6.9%, while the urban migration 
was 4.7%. This means that since 2004, the number 
of rural migrants to the United States is larger than 
the urban ones (Yúñez and Mora, 2010).
Mexican migration is mostly attributed to the 
central-northern states of the country where ru-
ral areas predominate. According to the results of 
enhrum ii, the largest number of migrants come 
from the central-western and northern part of 
Mexico, even though the region with the low-
est development index is located in the southern 
states. In Mexico, migration has been concentrat-
ed in a traditional zone that includes the states of: 
Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, San 
Luis Potosí, Durango and Chihuahua.
The 8.7% of Mexican households have a migrant 
relative in the United States. Nevertheless, this 
rate doubles to 20% in the central, western and 
northern regions of the country (Verduzco, 2010: 
174). From the 2,443 municipalities in Mexico, at 
least 96% of them have a nexus with the migrato-
ry phenomenon. There are 97 municipalities that 
have a higher incidence of migration, 87% of these 
are rural municipalities with less than 20,000 in-
habitants (Verduzco, 2010). Their economy is prin-
cipally based in agricultural activities.
Map 1. Maps of droughts in Mexico (January-December 2011)
Source: Own elaboration with information of National Weather Service
 Abnormally dry /  Moderate drought /  Severe drought /  Extreme drought /  Exceptional drought
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Migration and desertification in Mexico have 
been both deeply studied. Nonetheless environ-
mental migration has not been properly analyzed, 
nor has a link been found between these two top-
ics. According to a study developed by Mora and 
Yúnez Naude in 2008, environmental variables 
might have a direct impact in rural emigration 
from Mexico. The authors measure the level of 
rural inhabitants who decide to emigrate either 
to the United States or domestically within Mexi-
co as a result of climate change based on the de-
mographic characteristics of the individual, their 
homes and their communities.
Using the average temperatures from 1971-2000, 
the results show that people living in communi-
ties with higher temperatures during spring and 
autumn are more likely to emigrate, especially to 
the United States. On the other hand, people living 
in communities with higher temperatures during 
the summer have a lower probability to be envi-
ronmental migrants. The authors also use precipi-
tation rates in the communities concluding that 
people living in communities with higher levels 
of precipitation during summer and winter have a 
lower probability to emigrate. The contrary effect 
appears in the communities with rain during au-
tumn (Mora and Yúnez Naude, 2008).
In a chapter written for El Colegio de México, the 
authors explain that climate change affects rural 
migration. Nevertheless there are not many stud-
ies that seek to explain the effects of this variable. 
Yúnez says that the need to expand and deepen this 
type of studies is relevant, important and urgent 
(Yúnez Naude, 2010:152). For example, it would be 
instrumental to build a model that estimates the 
effect of climate change in the productive activities 
of rural households and the effect of the latter on 
migration (Yúnez Naude, 2010:152). 
3.4. Internal migration
Internal migration has also been a characteristic 
of the Mexican population distribution since the 
second half of twentieth century. Rural-urban 
migration has been the primary type of move-
ment, as a result of the implementation of the 
Import Substitution Industrialization Model (ISI). 
Internal migration has had a huge impact on 
urbanization and metropolization of the principal 
cities in Mexico such as Mexico City, Guadalajara, 
Monterrey, Puebla and León (López and Velarde, 
2011). Even though economic factors are the main 
explanation of the migration tendencies in Mexico, 
there are other factors that might influence the 
domestic movements. For example, improved of 
quality of life; better education opportunities, 
security and natural disasters (Castillo, 2007:147; 
Rojas Wiesner, 2007: 26).
4. POLICY RESPONSES
4.1. Migration policy responses
The policy responses of the Mexican government 
are at a turning point looking for participation of 
both countries. The problem is that the economic 
crisis of 2008 and security reinforcement have 
increased anti-immigration policies in the United 
States. There has not been a direct Mexican 
response to reduce migration rates. According to 
Figure 2. Mexican population living in the US (1850-2010, in thousands)
Source: Gibson and Jung, 2006. US Census Bureau, 2009.
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IOM, the mexican government has only focused 
on services for migrants and giving assistance in 
the United States by improving return procedures. 
Most of the migration-related programs try to take 
advantage of the remittances that are sent by the 
citizens living abroad. The most famous program 
related to migration is the one called “3 x 1” the goal 
of the program is that for each peso that a migrant 
invests in their communities the local and federal 
governments will invest three. In this way, the 
Mexican government increases the commitment of 
the Mexican migrants to their local communities.
4.2. Temporary Worker Programs
Temporary work programs aim to add workers to 
the labor force without adding permanent resi-
dents to the population. The largest temporary 
work program between United States and Mexico 
was the Bracero Program that took place from 
1942 to 1964. In the 1990s some micro temporary 
work programs were implemented. Each of these 
programs had specific admission criteria, length 
of stay and change of immigrant status (Martin, 
2006). All of these programs have different visas 
requirements depending of their goal.
In Martin’s study (2006) for the United Nations, 
he says there are 20 non-immigrant programs that 
permit foreigners to work in the United States. The 
three major worker visa categories are H-1B for 
specialty workers, H-2A for agricultural workers 
and H-2B for nonfarm workers (Martin, 2006: 22). 
The first one allows employers to have foreign pro-
fessionals to fill specialized jobs. Usually, workers 
are asked to have a university degree and a certain 
degree of experience. On the other hand, there 
are programs for unskilled workers. They focus on 
agricultural and non-agricultural employees. In 
the case of H-2A (Agricultural Visa) the employ-
ers must receive permission to recruit them, have 
to offer higher wages and provide free housing to 
migrants (Martin, 2006: 17). 
The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Con-
sular Affairs says that in 2009, 55,693 Mexicans 
were employed with this type of visa and 55,921 
were employed in 2010 (USDS, 2012). Neverthe-
less, the program has the problem that most of the 
employees do not respect the temporary request of 
the work. Usually, the migrants change work from 
farm to farm, staying permanently in the United 
States. The temporary working programs, special-
ly the agricultural ones, represent a good and safe 
opportunity for Mexican farmers. 
4.3. Desertification 
policy responses
There is a need of governmental responses, not 
only for reducing the consequences of droughts, 
but for preventing the imminent damages they 
can cause. The Federal Government has designed 
different programs that have a diversity of objec-
tives. The main goals focus on prevention action, 
such as risk management or agricultural insur-
ance, research, development and emergency 
natural disaster funds. The Mexican case demands 
the implementation of policies that can reverse the 
effects of droughts and desertification on national 
productivity. 
4.3.1. CONAZA
In order to fight land degradation and desertifica-
tion problems and to drive the development in the 
northern part of Mexico, the government created 
a decentralized public organism called conaza 
(National Commission of Arid Zones) in 1970. The 
Table 3. Demographic characteristics of national and international rural emigration (2002-2007)
2002 2007
National Immigrants Immigrants to US National Immigrants Immigrants to US
Home demographics
Head of family average 
age
52.68 58.49 53.36 55.63
Years of school 3.69 3.58 4.92 4.37
Individual demographics
Average age 30.13 32.58 32.69 33.66
Years of school 7.43 6.64 8.47 7.38
Gender [percentage]
Masculine 67.28 84.36 78.02 76.15
Feminine 32.72 15.64 21.98 23.85
Civil Status [percentage]
Married 62.86 71.84 70.00 75.33
Single 37.14 28.16 30.00 24.77
Source: Yúnez Naude and Mora Rivera, 2010.
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commission works with a federal budget and it is 
in charge of studying the arid zones of the country 
to promote different economical activities that will 
improve their agricultural production. Currently, 
conaza is part of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(sagarpa) and develops programs to combat 
desertification and droughts.
conaza is part of the National Action Plan for 
Combating Desertification (pacd-méxico) whose 
main goal is to prevent and delay the advance of 
desertification in arid and semiarid zones and 
seeks to improve the quality of life for inhabitants 
in these regions. Moreover, it seeks to reinforce 
programs to fight poverty in arid zones. Lastly, its 
goal includes the creation of programs that will 
alleviate the effects of droughts in Mexico (pacd, 
2004).
Three programs are developed by conaza as 
part of the Ministry of Agriculture’s plan to fight 
desertification. The first program is for land con-
servation and sustainable use of water, the second 
is an alimentary program, and the third is the con-
struction of hydraulic infrastructure in arid zones. 
Currently, all of these programs are part of the 
National Development Plan 2007-2012 impelled by 
the current Calderon administration.
The program of Land Conservation and Sustain-
able Use of Water (coussa) aims to improve the 
country’s land management strategies and to war-
ranty the sustainable use of soil, water and natural 
resources required for agriculture. It supports the 
construction, establishment and development of 
rural projects related to the collection, transmis-
sion, storage and filtration of rainwater. It also 
supports rural projects that develop strategies and 
mechanisms to prevent soil degradation. It works 
directly with local governments or implements di-
rect programs in the communities (conaza, 2011).
A second program, the Transversal Project for 
the Development of Arid Zones (prodeza) not 
only attends farmers living in arid zones, but also 
seeks to improve the living standards of people liv-
ing in high-poverty municipalities that depend on 
agricultural production. It is the only program that 
focuses not only on the agriculture, but also pays 
attention to its relationship with marginal zones. 
This is relevant because 70% of the people living in 
rural areas live in conditions of poverty or extreme 
poverty (INEGI, 2011). PRODEZA attends 686 mu-
nicipalities in 19 different states, and almost 70% 
of the population attended live in semi-arid or arid 
zones.
In 2011, the situation of droughts and land deg-
radation required a larger reaction by the gov-
ernment. The federal government has started to 
implement programs to alleviate the effects of 
droughts in affected states for 2011-2012 (Programa 
Nacional de Atención a la Sequía 2011-2012). The 
program seeks to support schemes of coordina-
tion between the federal, local and municipal 
levels with producers and civil society in projects 
related to health, temporary employment, water, 
Map 2. Principal migration states in Mexico
Source: Own elaboration
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food markets and agricultural business. It is within 
these national goals that conaza, prodeza and 
coussa have played an important role as a govern-
ment response against the effects of droughts.
The Secretary of Agriculture, Francisco Mayorga 
Castañeda, announced on March, 2012, that there 
are several emergency preventive measures and 
that the resources will be invested in conserva-
tion and sustainable use of soil and water, mod-
ernization of irrigation patterns and the change 
of cropping production (Sagarpa, 2012). In 2011, 
there was a budget of 2, 392 million pesos invested 
in conaza representing an increase of 113% com-
pared with 2010. The Federal Government invested 
in 1,792 coussa projects through sagarpa, to help 
improve the conditions of water availability. This 
benefited 48,000,201 producers from 28 states of 
the country. In the case of prodeza, there has been 
an investment of 684 million pesos ($26 million) in 
308 different projects (Sagarpa, 2012). 
4.3.2. FONDEN (Natural Disasters National 
Fund)
The Natural Disasters National Fund (fonden) 
was created in 1996 with the goal of giving finan-
cial aid to states affected by a natural phenomenon 
whose magnitude overwhelms the operational 
and financial capacities of the state. The two main 
reasons for using the fonden are long-term or 
emergency natural disasters. Types of disasters 
include geological (earthquakes), hydrometeoro-
logical (which include droughts, floods, hurri-
canes and tornados) or fires. 
The damaged states ask for financial assistance 
from the federal government. The federal depen-
dencies corroborate the information and in the 
case of droughts the National Water Commission 
(conagua) is in charge of this task. conagua sends 
the evaluation and quantification of the damages 
to the Ministry of State (segob) and the Ministry 
of Finance and Treasury (shcp), which approve 
the necessary resources. Finally, these funds are 
allocated to the victims. At present, conagua has 
confirmed droughts in 1,213 Mexican municipali-
ties. In 90% of them the funds have been approved 
and are waiting to be allocated. 
CONAGUA is the office responsible for corrobo-
rating the environmental status of affected areas 
and also aiding the population by sending drink-
ing water pipes and the installation of storage 
tanks. In order to reduce the impact of droughts, it 
supports projects that make a more efficient use of 
water and temporary working programs. Accord-
ing to the director of CONAGUA José Luis Luege 
Tamargo, they will invest $5 million ($385,000 
USD) to mitigate the effects of droughts across the 
country. 
The fonden has been used in this atypical 
drought that has affected mostly the northern part 
of the country. According to José Antonio Meade, 
the Ministry of Treasury the Federal Government 
has allocated 23,800 million pesos from FON-
DEN’s 33,8000 million peso budget  for droughts 
(Notimex, 2012). The most affected states, Aguas-
calientes, Coahuila, Sonora, Sinaloa, Guanajuato, 
Durango, San Luis Potosí and Chihuahua, have re-
quested the aid of fonden to alleviate the effects 
of the disaster. The Ministry of State, Alejandro 
Poiré, said that during 2011 there were 54 emer-
gency statements, the resources from the fonden 
assigned helped 1,232,000 people affected in more 
than 400 communities in 17 of the 32 states (Noti-
mex, 2012).
Even though there have been several changes 
in the operational rules to account for the excep-
tional droughts affecting Mexico, the relief is often 
not delivered on time to the affected communities. 
This has produced a lack of solutions or direct in-
vestment in infrastructure to mitigate the impact 
of the droughts in 40% of Mexican territory. Nev-
ertheless, the resources are still there, waiting to 
be transferred from the federal government to the 
states and then to the municipalities. 
4.3.3. Agricultural Insurance 
(AGROASEMEX)
Droughts have had a significant impact on the 
production capability of the rural sector in 
Mexico. In recent years, weather-indexed insur-
ance has gained attention because it is considered 
to be an effective tool for providing coverage to 
farms against climatic shocks (Fuchs and Wolff, 
2010:2). For that purpose, an agricultural insur-
ance company known as agroasemex was created 
to guarantee the protection of the crops and cattle.
agroasemex is a public company that seeks 
to contribute to the formation of a national risk 
management system for the protection of the ru-
ral sector and to promote an insurance culture. 
agroasemex hast two main objectives: work as a 
private insurance company and as a subsidy to the 
insurance premiums agricultural producers pay. It 
is related to environmental catastrophes; seeking 
to mitigate potential losses related to the natural 
disaster of environmental changes. The climate 
risks are measured with the precipitation and tem-
perature levels that might cause a total loss in an 
agricultural cycle. A disaster takes place when pre-
cipitation is lower than expected or temperatures 
are higher or lower than a crop can handle. The 
insurance gives an indemnity of the total amount 
of crop covered.
Even though agrosemex works as an insurance 
company it also works with federal resources that 
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are used to subsidize the insurance premium paid 
by the agricultural holders. The Federal Govern-
ment allocated $397, 852, 016 pesos (29 million 
dollars) in 2002 to subsidize insurance premiums 
to the affected producers. Nevertheless the federal 
budget for agroaesemex has increased reaching 
its highest peak in 2011. According to the Taxable 
Year Report $ 1,118,100,000 pesos (87 million dol-
lars) have been allocated. 
This federal insurance focuses on crops and 
cattle. The agricultural insurance subsidies cov-
er the producer for environmental risks includ-
ing droughts, excess of precipitation, frosts, low 
temperatures, floods, hail, fire, hurricane, torna-
does, and heat wave, among others and biologi-
cal risks such asplagues. The program covers a 
total of $280 dollars premium subsidy per hect-
are. In 2011, 80.7% of the budget was allocated 
for agricultural purposes. The insurances covered 
2,671,939 hectares protecting 503,895 beneficia-
ries. In the beginning of 2012 the federal govern-
ment will allocate 2,000,785 million pesos, plus 
the contributions of the states estimated to be 550 
million pesos, to cover 30 states and 10.6 million 
hectares with a subsidy for insurance premiums 
(Sagarpa, 2012).
“In 2003, the emergency insurance coverage 
began with just 95 000 hectares of crops in 2012 
and aims to reach 10 million hectares in collabo-
ration with state governments. In the case of cat-
tle, in 2006 began with 261,000 animal units and 
by 2012 the goal is to reach almost six million.” 
(Mayorga, 2012) 
The agricultural insurance might sound like a 
panacea to the risks agricultural producers face, 
nevertheless it has some deficiencies. On one 
hand, it has developed an “insurance culture” 
within the agricultural community. According to 
a historical analysis of the budget, the number of 
beneficiaries has increased from 2002 to 2011. “The 
insurance presence positively and significantly af-
fects insured counties’ maize yields with respect to 
uninsured counties” (Fuchs and Wolff, 2010:4).On 
the other hand,
 according to design evaluations of the program 
applied by coneval, it has several deficiencies. 
First, as it works as a subsidy, it only reduces the 
prime, and does not give a monetary transfer to 
producers. This gives the feeling to the beneficia-
ries that they are not receiving direct governmen-
tal help. Second, the majority of beneficiaries end 
up being larger agricultural producers and not 
small rural farmers, for whom agricultural losses 
have larger consequences on their budget and their 
development. This unequal allocation of resources 
is related to a larger risk management “culture” 
of commercial farmers and small holders. These 
agricultural risks that farmers are exposed to with-
out insurance should be seen as a potential moti-
vation to migrate. According to Fuchs and Wolff 
(2010) insurance has poverty traps because most 
investment decisions are conflicted with risk man-
agement decisions: risk-averse farmers tend to 
under invest and concentrate in the production of 
lower yielding yet safer crops. 
5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A cross-sectional approach to enhance 
Mexico´s readiness to cope with the effects of 
droughts and desertification entails reframing 
the issue as an ongoing challenge rather than a 
natural disaster. Although the effects of drought 
are increasingly severe, the nature of this climatic 
shock is cyclical and the technology to predict the 
onset of drought exists. Improving the efficacy of 
Mexico´s current policies will require a long-term 
vision and abandoning the current “crisis” men-
tality. For example, shifting the focus to preven-
tion through more sustainable land use practices, 
rather than simply providing emergency work and 
food relief programs, could alleviate the severity 
of drought losses for subsistence farmers. 
2. The tightening of border controls on the part 
of the United States has significantly increased the 
number of undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
Although the increasing militarization of the 
border has not decreased the number of appre-
hensions of illegal migrants, it has increased the 
number of deaths at the border and has prevented 
Mexican workers from exercising their natural in-
clination to return to their home country. Shifting 
the focus toward an immigration policy based on 
enhanced guest worker programsi has the poten-
tial of regulating the risks of migration while giv-
ing workers the opportunity to derive the benefits 
of temporary labor migration. Specifically, enforc-
ing employers’ responsibility under the current 
guest worker program to provide workers with the 
means to return to Mexico after the end of the ag-
ricultural cycle would reduce illegal immigration. 
In the long-term, the United States could improve 
the functioning of its programs by emulating the 
highly successful temporary worker scheme be-
tween Canada and Mexico, by establishing a bilat-
eral collaboration to be regulated by the Ministry 
of Labor of each respective country.
3. Regarding the Agrosamex weather-indexed 
agricultural insurance program, the Mexican 
government should undertake a two-pronged 
approach. First, the government should address 
farmers´ lack of familiarity with the benefits of ag-
ricultural insurance by pursuing a comprehensive 
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awareness campaign among smallholder farmers, 
particularly those most impoverished and food 
insecure. Secondly, the prices of the premiums 
should be regulated so they remain within the 
reach of those farmers who need them most, and 
to reduce the inequity in the distribution of ben-
efits, which currently favors large agribusiness.
4. There is great untapped potential in the 
use of low-input, high-yield agricultural tech-
niques such as conservation agriculture, and 
agroecology. The government subsidy and fis-
cal incentive programs should be revised so 
that the crops and techniques they advocate 
and promote are in line with the productive ca-
pacity and natural ecosystem of the soils. More 
specifically, overgrazing, mono-cropping, and 
inadequate irrigation systems should be con-
trolled, and a more integrated vision that seeks 
to create synergies between the environment, 
livestock and the humans who derive a liveli-
hood from them be applied in Mexico’s agricul-
tural sector.
5. The current national plan to combat desert-
ification in Mexico is comprised of a fragmented 
network of programs divided among a variety of 
ministries and secretariats with different short-, 
medium-, and long-term objectives, as well as 
different fiscal and legal frameworks. An effec-
tive strategy should have a long-term vision, but 
should also be implemented at a program rath-
er than a project level. This national program 
strategy should integrate, within the umbrella 
of a single organization, the goals of achieving 
adequate use of land, water, and other natural 
resources, as well as continued improvement 
and adaptation of agricultural techniques.
6. The drivers of drought and desertification 
are both natural, and anthropogenic. Hence, 
the legal and political provisions that contribute 
to the further degradation and marginalization 
of the country’s agricultural lands should be as-
sessed and revised to eliminate perverse incen-
tives that lead to further soil degradation. 
7. A final cross-cutting issue that affects the 
Mexican government’s ability to plan and im-
prove the efficacy of its programs is its lack of 
data-collection capacity and the dearth of com-
prehensive program evaluations. The design of 
the government’s drought and desertification 
social safety net programs should include the 
development of measurable indicators, as well 
as credible short-, middle-, and long-term objec-
tives, and include mechanisms that involve local 
beneficiaries in the decision-making process. 
6. CONCLUSION
The case of droughts and Mexico-US migration 
demonstrates the complex relationship between 
the environment, humans, and the social and polit-
ical frameworks that organize their interactions. 
As has been presented in this chapter, Mexico’s 
experience with droughts dates back centuries, 
yet Mexico’s preparedness in facing the cyclical 
crises that arise from extreme drought episodes 
has been aggressively developed only in the past 
decade. The lack of an effective safety net against 
droughts and desertification affects Mexico’s most 
vulnerable, those who depend on their land for 
subsistence consumption. Often, this segment 
of the population has no other viable option but 
to migrate to the United States. While Mexican 
migrants have not been recognized as environ-
mental migrants on either side of the border, 
the results from this case study have illuminated 
various areas of promise in the management of 
extreme poverty in arid and semi-arid areas, as 
well as coping with the increases in Mexico-US 
migration in the past decades. ❚
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INTRODUCTION
Within the European Union, Spain is the country 
most affected by desertification and by migra-
tion. Within Spain, Almeria is the only province 
with a desert in Europe. The transition from a 
traditional rural agricultural system to a techno-
logical agricultural system has permitted this poor 
region who expulsed its population to turn into a 
developed region that receives population (Garcia 
Lorca, 2006). Known as the “vegetable patch of 
Europe”, the territory of Almeria has been trans-
formed into thousands of hectares of plastic green-
houses, becoming a land of great agricultural 
expansion and large-scale immigration (Camacho 
Ferre, 2002). 
From the 1970s onward, the agriculture of 
Almeria has known a radical revolution constitut-
ing one of the most interesting recent economic 
phenomenons of Spain. The semi-arid province 
of Almeria has been transformed into the wid-
est greenhouse area in the world, with an area of 
26,000 ha in 2007 (Campra, Garcia, Canton, Pala-
cios, 2008). With this conversion, Almeria has be-
come one of the world’s areas that has experienced 
the most dramatic environmental changes in the 
last decades (UNEP, 2005). The incredible socio-
economic change provided by this agro economic 
transformation has been of such extent that it is 
often referred to as “miraculous” (Sánchez, Aznar, 
Garcia, 2011). 
The introduction of greenhouse agriculture 
came hand in hand with important flows of immi-
gration since this type of agriculture is extremely 
dependent on manpower. The “model of Almeria” 
could be an exemplary model for adaptation to 
climate change in dry regions. In this chapter, 
we will analyse the negative and positive conse-
quences of the implementation of intensive agri-
culture on both migration and the environment in 
this region in order to evaluate the pertinence of 
the model of Almeria as a model of adaptation to 
climate change in dry regions. On the other hand, 
migration caused by desertification is very often 
thought of as labour migration and mono-causal 
relationships are extremely difficult to establish. 
Nevertheless, we will see through this case study 
that the degradation of lands has contributed di-
rectly to migration through its impact on poverty.
1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
1.1. Geographic and 
climatic contexts
Situated in the south east of the Iberian Peninsula, 
Almeria, province of the autonomous community 
of Andalusia, is one of the most arid regions in the 
THE MODEL OF ALMERIA: TEMPORARY 
MIGRATION PROGRAMS AS A SOLUTION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTALLY-INDUCED MIGRATION?
SARA VIGIL*
Map 1. Almeria’s geographical location 
Source: Universidad de Almeria
*. The author wishes to acknowledge the advice, help and 
data facilitated by the Subdelegate of the Government in 
Almeria, Professor Andrés Miguel Garcia Lorca.
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Mediterranean basin, with a sub desert environ-
ment. Aridity, linked to high insolation, is the most 
characteristic climatic factor of the territory and 
has brought limitations, but also opportunities, 
for the economic growth of the region (Sánchez 
Picón, 2005). 
Climatically, the area suffers from a very se-
vere pluviometric deficit with periods of extreme 
drought. In most of the region precipitations are 
lower than 350mm per year and many areas have 
less than 250mm per year. Precipitation is scarce 
and irregular, coming, when it does, in torrential 
downpours (Sanchez, Aznar, Garcia, 2011)1. The 
average temperature is mild with variations from 
17°C to 21°C and winds are reasonably constant 
throughout the year. Solar radiation is very high 
with approximately 3,200 sun hours per year (Gar-
cia Lorca, 2010). 
1.2. Perspectives of climate 
change and desertification 
An important amount of the surface of Almeria 
is at risk of desertification. Projections that have 
been made on climate change in the Mediter-
ranean region suggest that climate change will 
aggravate the existing problems of salinization 
and erosion. Desertification is still perceived in the 
developed world as a far away problem but we will 
see in this case study that it has been an integral 
constituting factor in the history of a region of a 
European country, Spain. 
According to climate change indicators, average 
temperatures in Andalusia have incremented in 
1,2°C since 1915 and rainfall has decreased in 18% 
since the 1960s (Informe sobre el cambio climático 
en España, 2007). Furthermore, extreme weather 
events will become more frequent with drought 
as the most distressing phenomenon. These stud-
ies conclude that drought crises in the region could 
become structural and permanent problems if the 
projections of the climate change models are met 
(Informe sobre el cambio climático en España, 2007).
The last estimations of the Delegation of Envi-
ronment in Spain indicate that inherited deserti-
fication covers more than 17% of the regional area 
and that most of the areas suffering from deser-
tification are concentrated in Almeria (Montero, 
2007). These estimations also indicate that “man-
made” desertification is already affecting 28% of 
the territory (Montero, 2007). Water shortage 
and drought have always been a recurring prob-
lem in the region. This problem is now intensified 
as a result of global climate change. In the 1990s 
1.  The translations in this chapter (french-english, spanish-
english) were done by the author.
the five-year drought became one of the main ca-
tastrophes in Spain and affected 6 million people 
(Terra Actualidad, 2007). The current drought of 
2012, accompanied by frosts, is being described as 
the worst drought in 50 years (COAG, 2012).
As we will see, the model of intensive agricul-
ture in Almeria has been an important model for 
economic development in an area suffering from 
such climate change and desertification problems. 
1.3. Desertification in the 
history of the region
The formation of the semi-deserted landscape 
took place mainly during the 19th century as result 
of the mining activities that were accompanied by 
large wood consumption, agricultural expansion, 
and demographic growth. The mining activities 
linked to population growth led to an exhaustion 
of natural resources in Almeria causing deserti-
fication (Fermin, 2009). Between 1822 and 1857 
the growth of the population in Almeria acceler-
ated in an unprecedented manner. This major 
anthropogenic pressure over a fragile environ-
ment, like the one that characterizes this region, 
was the main cause of the desertification process 
(Sánchez Picón, 1996). The expansion of irri-
gated agricultural land, in order to nourish the 
incoming workers, caused the depletion of surface 
water. From 1880 onwards, the fall in the prices 
of mineral and traditional agricultural products 
and the crisis this generated, forced populations to 
migrate (Sánchez Picón, 1996). 
We can see that in the history of the region, land 
degradation was not only caused by climatic condi-
tions but in a very important way, by human activi-
ties. In the Mediterranean region, climatic drying 
took place at the same time as agricultural devel-
opment and rapid population growth. Desertifica-
tion has been acting as a push factor for centuries 
in this region. In the past, agricultural produc-
tion was scarce and difficult in this underdevel-
oped land and poverty situations were tradition-
ally combated through emigration (Garcia Lorca, 
2010). The region of Almeria has shown numerous 
examples of important changes in the rhythm of 
human occupation and the intensity of the exploi-
tation of natural resources depending on the dif-
ferent economic models of each period (Sánchez 
Picón, Aznar Sanchez, Garcia Latorre, 2011).
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2. A CHRONOLOGY OF 
MIGRATION IN THE REGION
2.1. Historical land of migration
Migration implies complex models of multi vari-
ability and economic development. Institutional 
and political factors have had a very important role 
in migratory patterns but environmental factors 
have also played a significant role. 
Almeria was one of the case studies chosen by 
the EACH-FOR Project (Environmental Change 
and Forced Migration Scenarios) which was the 
first large-scale empirical research project on en-
vironmentally induced migration, financed by the 
European Commission from 2007 to 2009. Spain 
was selected as a case study because it is severe-
ly affected by two environmental issues that are 
expected to become of increasing importance in 
the Mediterranean region: water shortage and 
drought. Within Spain, Almeria was selected due 
to the relevance of the relationship between en-
vironment and migration (2009: 15). This study 
underlines the fact that the semi-arid climate of 
this province has played an important role as a 
push factor exerting considerable influence on 
migration (Fermin, 2009: 16). Despite the lack of 
relevant research and data on the link between en-
vironment and migration it is possible to acknowl-
edge the way in which the environmental factors 
have impacted migration flows. 
The isolated position of Almeria relative to the 
most developed regions in Spain and its lack of 
infrastructures increased the dependence of the 
population on natural resources, causing defor-
estation and erosion. This situation linked with 
the underdevelopment of the region was one of 
the push factors for internal and cross border emi-
gration (Sánchez Picón, 1996). In fact, the mining 
activities during the late 18th century and the be-
ginning of the 19th century that provoked soil deg-
radation and that eroded agricultural production, 
pushed thousands of farmers to migrate to areas 
with better job opportunities (Bknerr, 2004). Peo-
ple abandoned arable lands and marginal areas, 
leading also to further erosion. The loss of forests 
caused an alteration in the hydrologic balance ac-
celerating erosion. 
The economists Aznar and Sánchez Picón, 
agree that the keys to understand the great mi-
gratory vague of the beginning of the 20th Cen-
tury are the decline of the mining and agricul-
tural sectors (Aznar, Sánchez Picón, 2000). The 
development of traditional agriculture in this 
arid region was very difficult due to the lack of 
precipitation and the bad quality of the ground. 
Gomez Diaz, who analysed migratory movements 
in Almeria until the beginning of the 20th century, 
also mentions the fact that meteorological catas-
trophes like floods and droughts had an impor-
tant impact on production acting as an important 
push factor for migration (Cruz Moya, 2005). 
According to Garcia Latorre and Aznar Sanchez, 
exceeding disturbances in a short period led not 
only to extreme environmental changes, but also 
to the economic and demographic stagnation of 
Almeria until the 1960s. “By 1910, Almeria had be-
come largely desert and one of the poorest prov-
inces in Spain. People began emigrating” (Garcia, 
Sanchez, 2001).
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to re-
late the high emigration of the late 19th Century 
and most of the 20th Century only to environmen-
tal factors that restricted agricultural production 
(Fermin, 2009). This is because institutional and 
social factors also played a significant role. Howev-
er, there are good reasons to believe that environ-
mental change did have an important influence 
on the other traditional socio-economic drivers of 
migration. 
Table 1. Migratory balance in the 20th century in Almeria
Period Natural 
Growth of the 
Population
Actual 
Population 
Changes
Net Migratory 
Balance
1900-10 36,460 32,000 -4,460
1910-20 39,000 -24,300 -63,300
1920-30 59,500 -14,000 -73,500
1930-40 44,500 8,400 -36,100
1940-50 44,000 -10,200 -54,200
1950-60 60,600 6,000 -54,600
1960-70 56,800 12,000 -44,800
1970-80 46,500 27,500 -23,000
1980-90 34,500 45,000 10,500
1990-2000 21,300 49,500 28,200
Source: IEA in Rodríguez Vaquero, 2008.
As we can observe in Table 1, the most important 
emigration wave took place just before the Span-
ish Civil War (1936-39). Economic problems in the 
province linked to the industrialisation and urban-
isation of other Spanish regions such as Catalonia, 
and the facilities to migrate to some American 
countries that were in need of work force (Argen-
tina, Brasil, Cuba or the United States), explain the 
great migratory wave. The decrease in the migra-
tory wave in the 1930s is linked to the economic 
crisis of the host regions after the crash of 1929. 
After the Civil War, emigration continued to Cata-
lonia, Switzerland, Germany, France and Belgium 
(Sánchez Picón, 2005). The migratory balance in 
the region stayed negative until the implementa-
tion of intensive agriculture in the 1970s (Sánchez 
Picón, 2005). 
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2.2. The miracle of Almeria
The situation in South-Eastern Spain has changed 
radically over the last five decades. This Spanish 
province, suffering from desertification and 
erosion and with a lack of infrastructure, has had 
a dramatic change in status in the last 50 years. 
Almeria has passed from being one of the poorest 
provinces in Spain to becoming one of the richest. 
Until the late 1960s, Almeria was the penultimate 
Spanish province in terms of GDP and has now 
passed to being the first province in Andalusia 
occupying an intermediate position at a national 
level (INE, in Aznar, Galdeano, Pérez, 2011).
This agro-economic transformation was imple-
mented after the Spanish Civil War with the crea-
tion of the National Institute for Colonisation and 
Agricultural Reform (INCRA). The aim of this in-
stitution was to transform traditional agriculture 
into irrigated agriculture (Garcia Lorca, 2010). 
With the perforation of wells, to exploit salty wa-
ter, the introduction of the sand plot technique 
and the development of vegetable production us-
ing plastic greenhouses, the region became suit-
able for intensive agricultural activity (Sanchez, 
Aznar, Garcia, p.1364, 2011). 
The most developed areas in intensive agricul-
ture today are the Campo Dalias and the Campo 
de Nijar. Before the 1960s, these areas were barren 
shrublands used for grazing (Garcia Lorca, 2010). 
Although water is essential for irrigated agriculture, 
the low level of rainfall, the high average sun hours 
and the mild winters are favourable for greenhouse 
agriculture production (Fermin, 2009). These suit-
able conditions that allow the production of veg-
etables out of season give farmers in this region an 
important competitive advantage over the rest of 
Spain and Europe (Sanchez, Galdeano, 2011).
Other factors like the increase in demand of 
agricultural products, the economic integration 
of Spain into the European Union in 1986 and 
important technological development in produc-
tion, transport and commercialisation also played 
a decisive role (Garcia Lorca, 2010). Furthermore, 
European regulations have had a positive effect, 
guaranteeing free access to the European market 
as well as limiting imports of non-European prod-
ucts. Subsidies have also been granted to farmers 
to help offset the costs of structural reform related 
to traceability in agricultural products2, certifica-
tion and waste tracking (Galdeano-Gómez, Aznar-
Sánchez, Pérez-Mesa, 2011). In several years, this 
land was transformed from a desert into the “veg-
etable patch of Europe” (Sanchez, Aznar, Garcia, 
2011). 
The model from the point of view of landowner 
structure has reduced poverty and contributed 
to the creation of successful economic and social 
communities. The researcher Giognocavo points 
out that what is rare about the model of Almeria 
is the fact that it has grown into a highly special-
ized agricultural sector, heavily empowered by 
2.  “Each stage in the supply chain from farm to consumer 
can be traced so that the quality of the food can be 
guaranteed” (Agriculture Dictionary).
Map 2. The territorial transformation of Almeria (1974-2000)
Source: UNEP, 2005.
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technological improvements but always maintain-
ing its cooperative business form. The role of the 
cooperatives has been very significant since a high 
proportion of the farms are small and family man-
aged (Giognocavo, 2012). The 27, 000 hectares 
of green house agriculture are distributed within 
more than 13,500 small owners. The fact that the 
exploitations are small and family managed has al-
lowed a pretty equitable distribution of wealth be-
tween the locals (Aznar, 2011). Almeria is not only 
the main fruit and vegetable-growing province in 
Spain, but also the largest cooperative vegetable 
growing area in Europe. In the current economic 
crisis, the agricultural cooperative sector is the 
only sector generating employment with a large 
distribution of the benefits (Giagnocavo, 2012).
Furthermore, there has been a large extension 
and diversification of activities around the agricul-
tural sector creating an important agro industrial 
cluster. The emergence of this agro industrial clus-
ter has played an essential role in the development 
of the model and is considered as an outstanding 
exponent of endogenous development. From the 
1990s there has been a substantial growth of local 
businesses dedicated to activities such as: biologi-
cal production, crop substratum, environmental 
control, watering and fertilization, seeds, financial 
services, transport machinery, cartons and pack-
aging, etc. (Galdeano, Aznar, Pérez, 2011). This 
productive system around the horticultural sector 
has created significant interrelations and coop-
eration within the businesses, which give strength 
and integration to the cluster (Aznar, 2011).
2.3. The “boom” of 
recent immigration
The development of intensive agriculture has 
been closely linked to demographic growth. The 
increase in agrarian production would not have 
been possible without immediate and sizable 
migration flows since this type of agriculture is 
extremely dependent on manpower (Sanchez, 
Aznar, Garcia, 2011). We can distinguish three 
periods of immigration in Almeria. The first period 
(1954-1970) was characterized by the establish-
ment of new farms in new population centers that 
were accompanied by inter-municipal movements. 
During the second period (1971-1989) migratory 
movements came from other regions of Spain 
that were attracted by the “Almerian miracle”. 
However, it was not until the third migratory 
period that began in the 1990s that international 
migration occurred. (Garcia Lorca, 2010). The full 
integration of Spain in the European Union in 1993 
brought a spectacular growth in the horticultural 
sector that attracted foreign populations (Garcia 
Torrente, 2002). 
In the last 30 years, Almeria has become a well-
developed province with prosperous agricultural, 
touristic and construction sectors. The arid climate 
conditions no longer act as a push factor but as a 
pull factor attracting migrants from all over the 
world (Fermin, 2009). The appropriate manipula-
tion of climatic factors was one of the keys of the 
development process (Garcia Lorca, p. 923, 2010).
Information from the Ministry of Interior re-
flected on Figure 2 shows that from the mid 1990s 
the increase of international residents in Almeria 
became much greater than in the rest of Andalusia 
and the rest of Spain (going from approximately 
1000 in 1991 to over 16,000 in 2005). These num-
bers provide evidence of a net population gain due 
to migration. The significant increase of popula-
tion in recent years has made Almeria the second 
highest province in Spain in terms of population 
growth and the first in terms of immigration 
(Aznar, Galdeano, Perez, 2011).
More than 150 nationalities are represented in 
Almeria. The most represented nations are those 
shown in Figure 3. The geographical proximity 
with Northern Africa has been determinant to ex-
plain the important migratory flows coming from 
the Maghreb. These migrants find in Almeria a 
space of transit, regularization and posterior dif-
fusion to other territories. Cultural and linguistic 
proximity has also facilitated the settlement of 
Latin American migrants and the fall of the Iron 
Curtain enabled the entrance of migrants from 
Eastern Europe (Garcia Lorca, 2009). 
In 2011, the total population of Almeria was 
190,349. Of this population 20,160 were foreign-
ers. According to recent data from the Subdelega-
tion of Government in Almeria, the most signifi-
cant nationalities represented in Almeria in 2011 
were: Morocco (46,340), Rumania (35,884), Unit-
ed Kingdom (11,052), Ecuador (7,500), Bulgaria 
(4,295), Lithuania (3,632), Colombia (2,979), Rus-
sia (2,868), Senegal (2,542) and Argentina (2,470). 
The largest numbers of immigrants are in working 
age and 60% of them are between 15 and 39 years 
old. The development of agriculture has been the 
main pull factor for immigrant populations to this 
region.
Keeping in mind the significance of irregular mi-
gration, foreign immigrants in Almeria represent 
15% of the members of the Social Security System 
and are occupied as follows: 60% in agriculture, 
10% in construction, 9% in the hotel industry, 7% 
in commercial activities and the rest do not have 
a fixed occupation (Rodriguez Vaquero, 2008). 
The most important occupation of immigrant men 
continues to be agriculture, whilst women are 
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Figure 1. Increase of international residents 
Figure 2. Foreigners by country of origin with residence and work permit in Almeria (1996-2011)
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occupied in domestic services, taking care of the 
elderly, catering and, sadly, prostitution. Within 
the group of the over 60 year olds, European citi-
zens represent more than 80% showing that Alme-
ria is a place chosen for retirement due to the mild 
climate of the region (Garcia Lorca, 2009). 
2.4. The environment-
migration nexus 
According to the Subdelegate of the Govern-
ment in Almeria, the discussion on environmen-
tally induced migration as such is not present in 
the political discourse. Migrations are addressed 
from a socio-economic point of view in the 
context of a broader global change, but not of 
an environmental change in particular. (Inter-
view Garcia Lorca, 2012). The only type of envi-
ronmental migration that has been suggested is 
that of migrants arriving to Almeria in search of 
milder weather conditions. The fact of referring 
to immigrants from developed northern European 
countries as environmental migrants is very inter-
esting and not often addressed in literature. These 
migrants normally look to settle in the country-
side in houses offering luxurious living conditions. 
These populations cause further environmental 
tensions for the repartition of land and water 
resources. Most of these migrants come from the 
UK and represent 10% of foreign immigrants in 
Almeria (Garcia Lorca, 2010: 931).
The links between desertification and migra-
tion are only addressed from a technical point of 
view by specialized organisms like the United Na-
tions Convention to Combat Desertification. This 
convention was established in 1994 and signed by 
194 parties. The UNCCD is the only legally binding 
international agreement on desertification issues 
and addresses the link between desertification 
and migration in its article 17.1 (e) as follows: the 
parties have agreed to “take into account, where 
relevant, the relationship between poverty, migra-
tion caused by environmental factors, and deserti-
fication” (UNCCD). According to the UNCCD, the 
root causes of migrations in dry lands have often 
been mistaken. Migrants tend to explain the rea-
sons for mobility in terms of poverty, often over-
looking the fact that the real cause of this poverty 
is due to the deterioration of their lands of origin 
and the loss in productivity. Migration does have 
an environmental dimension (UNCCD, 2009). 
There is still a lack of information concerning the 
impact of desertification in the regions of origin of 
the immigrants that come to Almeria. Recent data 
shows that most African migrants come to Almeria 
from urban centers (Garcia Lorca, 2012). However, 
studies have not been undertaken to show the 
impact of drought and desertification on their re-
gions of origin and the way in which desertifica-
tion could have led them to migrate to the city in 
the first place. Since most of the migrants come 
from Africa, which is the continent that is most 
deeply affected by desertification, studies to show 
the relationship between desertification in Africa 
and migration towards Almeria may provide re-
sourceful information. 
This relationship between desertification and 
migration was nevertheless referred to in both 
of the international symposiums that took place 
in Almeria in 1996 and 2004 concerning forced 
migration in arid and semi-arid regions. The de-
parture point for these meetings was that large 
demographic movements do not only occur as a 
consequence of political conflict and economic 
crisis but also as a cause of environmental change 
in general, and desertification in particular. These 
symposiums concluded that desertification is the 
consequence of bad policies and non-sustainable 
activities. One of the conclusions of these sympo-
siums was that the example of greenhouse agri-
culture in Almeria is showing to be a productive 
alternative for depressed areas (II International 
Symposium, 2006). We will analyse these assump-
tions in the following sections. 
3. VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
OF THE MODEL OF ALMERIA 
3.1. Environmental aspects
3.1.1. Main Problems
Despite great economic performance, the future 
prospects of this model seem uncertain due to the 
social and environmental consequences, which are 
often negative. The expansion of intensive agricul-
ture can be both a source of wealth and a general 
problem regarding sustainable development 
and desertification. This industrial agriculture 
implies a strong environmental impact provoking 
the pollution of the scarce water resources, land 
erosion, loss of ecological diversity, deforesta-
tion and the consumption of fossil fuels and the 
release of greenhouse gases. Desertification in this 
region has not only been accelerated by intensive 
agriculture but also by a growing touristic sector. 
Poor agricultural practices (pesticides, irrigation, 
and invasive plant species) together with modern 
economic development have damaged the land. 
In the beginning, this new agricultural model 
was entirely dependent on subterranean water 
sources. The continued growth of greenhouses 
STUDY 06/20111 1 4 IDDRI
The State of Environmental Migration 2011 
between the 1980s and 1990s placed an enormous 
demand on water supplies and its impact became 
noticeable when the quality of the underground 
water began to deteriorate and salinize (Sanchez, 
Aznar, Garcia, 2011). The process of exhaustion of 
aquifers and unsustainable water management is 
the process that is most closely linked to deserti-
fication in Spain. There is an important risk of 
desertification in this region due to this overex-
ploitation of surface and groundwater resources 
(Puigedefábregas, Mendizábal, 2006). 
3.1.2. Policy Responses
Nevertheless, action has been taken since the mid 
1990s to fight the negative externalities of the 
model and authorities seem to have an increased 
awareness of the environmental issues involved. 
The irrigation system of southeastern Spain is 
now the most efficient in the country. The AGUA 
program in 2004 replaced the Hydrological Plan 
of 2001 that was based on large inter-basin water 
transfers. The new program is now committed to 
desalinization as a way to address water deficits 
(Downward, Taylor, 2007). Desalinization plants 
and reservoirs have been constructed to increase 
the water supply and regulatory frameworks have 
been implemented to control aquifer overexploi-
tation. Measures have also been taken to improve 
the collection and use of rainwater (Gómez-Orea, 
2003). All of these measures have significantly 
decreased water needs and the pressure exerted 
on aquifers (Picón, Aznar, Latorre, p.6, 2011). 
The scarce water resources are now being used 
in a much more efficient manner. In the 1970s 
for the production of 60,000 kg/ha/year more 
than 8000 cubic metres of water/ha/year were 
used. With the implementation of the measures 
mentioned above, in 2008 the average produc-
tion was between 120,000 and 160,000 kg/ha/
year, with a consumption of between 3,500 and 
6,000 cubic metres/ha/year (Garcia Lorca, 
2010). The productive efficiency of the model 
has been therefore significantly improved with 
constant technological innovation. (Interview 
Garcia Lorca, 2012). However, Almeria will have 
to balance the projections of agricultural devel-
opment and the environmental consequences of 
a future supported on desalinated water (Down-
ward, Taylor, 2007). 
Measures that will permit adaptation to cli-
mate change include an adequate management of 
cultivation techniques, better irrigation systems 
and reforestation. The European Strategy for the 
Conservation of Plants, the Common Agricultural 
Policy with its agro-environmental measures and 
the Spanish Forest Plan and the regulation of 
land use are instruments that should allow the 
conservation of edaphic resources of the ecosys-
tems (Informe sobre el cambio climático en España, 
2007).
Regarding desertification, the ratification of the 
Spanish government of the United Nations Con-
vention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 
1994 came along with the creation of a National 
Program to Combat Desertification (PAND). The 
objective of the PAND is to determinate the con-
tributing factors to desertification and the mea-
sures needed to combat and mitigate the conse-
quences of droughts. The LUCDEME Project (Fight 
Against Desertification in the Mediterranean) 
was established by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
1995 in the context of the PAND. This project is a 
reference in the research and creation of mitiga-
tion policies to combat desertification. For many 
years, it was the only program that funded de-
sertification research in Spain (Ministerio de Ag-
ricultura, Alimentación y Medioambiente). How-
ever, although important scientific knowledge on 
the causes and effects of desertification has been 
obtained, little efforts have been made to imple-
ment an efficient way for the agro industrial sec-
tor to fight desertification. Certain researchers 
such as Martinez Fernandez, are surprised by the 
fact that intensive green house agriculture is not 
considered or referred to in the National Plan to 
Combat Desertification. The measures to protect 
the soil in Spain should rapidly take into account 
the spread of greenhouses in Almeria (Martinez, 
2005). The confederation of ecological oriented 
groups of Ecologists in Action is also worried that 
measures against erosion created by the great 
proliferation of greenhouses in Almeria have not 
been undertaken by the PAND (Ecologistas en Ac-
cion, 2008). 
3.2. Immigration 
3.2.1. Main Problems
The impacts of growing immigration on the 
environment in this region should also be taken 
seriously into account. The significant growth in 
population density exerts a growing pressure over 
land uses and natural resources. Environmental 
disruption can in fact be both a cause and a 
consequence of population movements. Growing 
human demand on the land causes, in many 
cases, the depletion of natural resources (Scherr, 
Satya, 1996). The spectacular growth of immi-
gration, together with the already existing water 
demanding sectors, agriculture and tourism, has 
added pressure on natural resources. According to 
a report on climate change prepared for the presi-
dency of Spain in 2007, current migratory flows 
are attracted to vulnerable areas that are already 
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the most exposed to environmental hazards and 
climate change such as Almeria (Informe sobre el 
cambio climático en España, 2007). If high popula-
tion growth persists, great social and institutional 
efforts will need to be made not only to assure a 
sustainable use of natural ressources but also to 
reduce social conflict. 
There is also an important problem regarding 
irregular migration. The Subdelegation of Gov-
ernment in Almeria indicates that there are ap-
proximatively 30,000 irregular migrants in the 
region. These immigrants do not always enter 
the territory in pateras (small boats used for il-
legal migration), but also by the airport entering 
as tourists. Andrés Garcia Lorca explains that it 
is has become increasingly difficult to control il-
legal migration, and that many of these illegal 
migrants do not have any kind of documentation 
with them, creating problems to determine their 
country of origin (Interview Garcia Lorca, 2012). 
One of the reasons that explains their will to lie 
about their nationality is the hope of obtaining 
the refugee status. This is why , many of them 
claim to be natives of countries such as Liberia, 
Syria or Mali (Barros, 2006). 
Furthermore, the social integration of im-
migrants has not come without problems and 
conflicts. An intense outbreak of racist violence 
against Moroccan immigrants took place in Feb-
ruary 2000, when a Moroccan with mental prob-
lems murdered a young woman from the town of 
El Ejido in Almeria. This isolated incident gener-
alized a racist wave of violence against the immi-
grant community. The mosque, butcheries, bars, 
restaurants and cars of immigrants were object of 
violence from the rest of the population in El Eji-
do. According to SOS Racism, for discrimination 
to be abolished there is a great need to combat la-
bour exploitation and to fight for the rights of the 
immigrant community. Spatial segregation and 
labour exploitation are the basic elements to un-
derstand what occurred in El Ejido in 2000 (SOS 
Racismo, 2001). Housing for the agricultural 
workers continues to be a social and environmen-
tal problem that requires attention. Shantytowns 
in Almeria are widespread and more than 4000 
migrants are currently living in them. Most of the 
shantytowns are situated in El Ejido and occu-
pied by Moroccans. Many of their inhabitants are 
undocumented migrants and live under extreme 
poverty conditions (Cabrera, 2010).
In 2011, an investigation from The Guardian 
claimed that the working conditions of illegal 
workers in Almeria met the UN’s definition of 
modern slavery (Lawrence, 2011). These condi-
tions seem to have deteriorated since the economic 
crisis that drove an increasing amount of migrants 
to search for work in the agricultural sector after 
the collapse of the construction sector. Accord-
ing to this report, African migrant workers live in 
shacks made of boxes and plastic and have no ac-
ces to sanitation or drinking water. Their salaries 
are half of the legal established minimum wage, 
and illegal workers are threatened to be reported 
to the police if they complain about their living 
conditions (IOMC, 2011). Competitiveness in the 
agro industrial sector is achieved by reducing la-
bour costs and by augmenting productivity. On 
the other hand, Moroccan and Spanish producers 
now compete for the same potential markets in 
agriculture and this increases considerably racist 
and anti Arab reactions within the agriculturalists 
of Almeria. The vulnerability, in the case of un-
documented migrants, is total since their situation 
does not allow them to denounce to the police. 
Their only mean of expression is rebellion and this 
rebellion is used against them to reinforce the ste-
reotypes of conflictive workers that are laid upon 
them (SOS Racismo, 2001). These outbreaks of 
violence in El Ejido in 2000 showed the unsustain-
ability of the model and trade unions and associa-
tions such as the Association for Human Rights of 
Andalusia, the Association of Moroccan Emigrants 
in Spain and the National Confederation of Work-
ers, pressured the sector to improve working con-
ditions for immigrant workers asking for broader 
regularization processes (Cabrera, 2000). 
3.2.2. Solutions
The importance of the migratory phenomenon in 
the region of Almeria and the necessity to control 
migration flows have required the implementa-
tion of migration policies. National policies on 
immigration establish specific legal regulations 
for foreigners to have access to the labor market. 
In general, the principal objective of these poli-
cies is to satisfy the needs of the national labor 
market. In 1985, the law on the rights and liber-
ties of foreign immigrants was published and new 
measures have been taken. Extraordinary regular-
ization processes have taken place in 1985, 1990, 
1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005 in order to decrease the 
number of irregular migrants. Those of 2000 and 
2001 were of particular importance. Firstly, foreign 
immigrants in legal situation doubled and regular 
contracts rose. Another consequence of this was 
the growth of family regroupation, which involves 
further challenges and leads to the congregation 
of new illegal immigrants. (Pumares Fernandez, 
2004). Social services like education, health care 
and administration have also been significantly 
modified as a consequence of this high population 
growth and need to adapt in order to answer to a 
growing demand (Rodriguez Vaquero, 2008).
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Even if at the beginning there was a poor man-
agement of the incorporation of large amounts 
of immigrant workers, measures have been taken 
to correct the situation by making greenhouse 
labor more attractive (fixation of salaries accord-
ing to production, mechanization of the most dif-
ficult tasks) and by the regularization processes. 
Additionally, the agriculturalists associations are 
encouraging contracts with the immigrant work-
ers’ countries of origin to manage the arrival and 
adaptation of immigrants in a more efficient man-
ner (Aznar, Galdeano, 2011). Furthermore, plans 
have been approved since 2001 to coordinate pub-
lic policies concerning immigration in Andalusia. 
Policies have also been implemented to foster the 
integration of immigrant populations. 3 The main 
objective of these measures has been to decrease 
social conflict, increase relationships between dif-
ferent cultures and to promote tolerance between 
the migrant and local populations (Junta de Anda-
lucia). Additionally, Almeria presented in July 2011 
the Second Municipal Plan for Immigration (2011-
2013) focused on favouring access to resources, 
employment and integration of immigrant popu-
lations. Another aim of this plan is to raise con-
sciousness of society as a whole of the positive 
values of immigration in order to avoid racism 
and xenophobia (Integra Local, 2011). An element 
that proves the growing integration of migrants is 
the fact that an increasing number of them are be-
coming shareholders in agricultural cooperatives 
within few years (Garcia Lorca, 2006). However, 
the social conflict between communities remains 
high in the context of the current economic crisis 
and many more efforts will be needed in order to 
combat racism. 
From the 1990s annual quotas for foreign work-
ers have been established with the hope that these 
quotas would be a mechanism to select workers in 
function of the labor needs and that clandestine 
migration would be discouraged. Nevertheless, 
a new problem has emerged since there is a ten-
dency from the part of the regularized migrants to 
change of destination and sector once they are in 
legal situation. There is an extended idea between 
the immigrant community that better salaries and 
conditions can be earned in other sectors and prov-
inces of Spain. The loss of these workers leaves a 
constant need for new immigrant labour and leads 
to question the sustainability and capability of the 
model to better the working conditions in order to 
increase the attractiveness of greenhouse labor to 
immigrants (Pumares, 2003). 
3.  Plan Piloto de Actuación Integral en Zonas Sensibles con 
presencia significativa de población inmigrante.
4. INTENSIVE GREENHOUSE 
FARMING: A MODEL OF ADAPATION 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE? 
According to a scientific study published in the 
Journal of Geophysical Research, the high concen-
tration of greenhouses in Almeria has a posi-
tive effect in the fight against climate change by 
offsetting global warming through the generation 
of local microclimates. Investigators recorded a 
significant air-cooling trend of -0,3°C/decade in 
the area covered by greenhouses during the years 
of greenhouse expansion, between 1983 and 2006. 
This cooling trend has no correlation with the 
regional warming trend of +0,4°C/decade that 
matches the warming in the rest of the Mediterra-
nean area in the same period. The explanation of 
this cooling trend would be the negative radiative 
force exerced by the greenhouses that reduces the 
net incoming shortwave energy diminishing the 
energy emitted as long wave radiation (Campra, 
Garcia, Canton, Palacios-Orueta, 2008). This 
study shows the important benefit of high albedo 
surfaces as adaptation measures to climate change 
at local scales and should be further developed 
and researched as a strategy for both mitigation 
and adaptation. This type of geo-engineering 
consisting in augmenting albedo surfaces is not yet 
considered as a mitigation or adaptation strategy 
in international protocols (Campra, 2011). Poli-
cies aimed at quantifying the human influence 
on climate are still largely focused on changes in 
atmospheric composition. Nonetheless, there is 
a vast variety of scientific work that has proved 
that land-cover changes also have a significant 
influence on climate by changing the physical 
properties of the land surface. According to the 
IPCC, the local radiative-forcing change caused 
by surface albedo in regions of intensive land use 
such as Europe may be greater than that due to all 
the anthropogenic greenhouses together (Pielke, 
Marlan, Betts, Chase, Eastman, Niles, Niyogi, 
Running, 2002). 
Another issue that the model of Almeria raises 
and that should be carefully analysed, is the de-
bate between land sharing and land spreading. 
In land sparing, concentrated areas of farming 
are managed to maximize yields, while separate 
reserves target biodiversity conservation. Agri-
cultural yields on farmland are maximised so that 
other areas can be “spared for nature”. In land 
sharing or wildlife-friendly farming, conservation 
and production are integrated in more heteroge-
neous landscapes (Fischer et al. 2008). Each of 
these techniques has positive and negative effects 
depending on the richness and concentration of 
biodiversity in each territory.
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In the case of Almeria, the shift from extensive 
dry crops to intensive greenhouse farming has 
decreased the pressure on an area that is 10 times 
larger than the one used for intensive farming 
enabling the recovery of natural vegetation and 
allowing forestry plans to develop in the aban-
doned lands. The 30,000 ha used for intensive 
greenhouse farming represent only 3% of the total 
area in the province. Some of the protected areas 
in Almeria include: the Natural Parks of Cabo de 
Gata-Nijar, Sierra Nevada and Sierra Maria, the 
Natural Sites of the Tabernas Desert, the river of 
Aguas, the Punta Entinas-Sabinal, the Mountain 
Range of Alhamilla and the Nature Reserve of the 
Albufera de Adra. These areas together with the 
other protected areas in the province sum up to 
more than 300,000 ha of protected land (Conse-
jeria de Medioambiente, 2012). The protection of 
these areas was made in order to establish limits 
and prohibitions to the extension of greenhouses 
and touristic urbanisation (Valcuerdo, Quintero, 
Cortés, 2011).
The researcher Pablo Campra, indicates that 
very important carbon sinks in soil and biomass 
have been recorded and that these sinks should 
be taken seriously into account when analysing 
the environmental consequences of greenhouse 
farming in the province of Almeria as they prove 
to be huge in terms of climate change mitigation 
(Campra, 2011). Moreover, historical erosion has 
been significantly reduced in the mountains and 
hinterlands that were traditionally exploited for 
esparto grass production (Interview Garcia Lorca, 
2012). This “high yield” conservation approach 
that enables to reconciliate human land use of the 
Earth with the conservation and recovery of natu-
ral habitats deserves much wider consideration 
by policy makers (Campra, 2011). This approach 
may become an increasingly important way of us-
ing the Earth in a more sustainable manner whilst 
enabling to feed the 9 billion people that are esti-
mated to inhabitate our planet by 2050.
5. AGRICULTURE IN THE 
CURRENT CONTEXT
The agricultural sector of Almeria is showing 
vigour despite the economic and financial 
crisis. The Delegate of Agriculture in Almeria 
(José Antonio Salibas) explains that exports are 
continuing to grow. The strength of the agricul-
tural sector is maintaining the economy of the 
province during the current economic crisis. 
The results of the horticultural campaign in 2011 
show the importance of the sector as a creator of 
employment. During 2011 an average of 216,500 
employments were created. This supposed only a 
small decrease in agricultural contracting of 6% 
in comparison to 2010. During the last three years 
the number of affiliations to the Social Security 
System has barely changed (Esteban Ruiz, 2011). 
In all the other sectors unemployment has grown 
dramatically since 2007, with the construction and 
industrial sectors being most affected (Ministerio 
de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 2012). Unemploy-
ment in Almeria at the end of 2011 was of 33.3% 
compared to 10.2% in 2007 (IEA, 2012). 
Agriculture is the only sector that has known a 
growth in contract labour. Nevertheless, with the 
importance of the agricultural sector as a refuge 
for employment, unemployment of the immigrant 
community has grown since the start of the eco-
nomic crisis with the incorporation of nationals 
to the agricultural sector. This has caused some 
Latin-American migrants to return to their coun-
try of origin helped by the voluntary return plans 
implemented by the Spanish government (Garcia 
Lorca, 2012). 
Population growth in Almeria still remains posi-
tive although it has decreased since 2007. Even 
if the increase in population in 2011 has barely 
passed 1%, it still remains greater than the nation-
al average of 0.36%. Migrant population has been 
preeminent with an annual variation of 2.75%, 
representing 22.1% of the total population whilst 
in Spain they represent 12.19% and in Andalusia 
8.67% (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 
2012). 
The year 2011 was a difficult year especially due 
to the E.Coli sanitarian crisis coming from Germa-
ny but whose speculation had significant econom-
ic and social consequences on the agriculture of 
the region. The latest free trade agreement (2012) 
between the European Union and Morocco could 
affect negatively Spanish agriculture and labour 
Figure 3. Unemployment in Almeria (1981-2011)
Source: The author. Data Source: IEA
 Andalusia  Almeria  Spain
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providing cheaper products due to the inexpensive 
manpower and fewer environmental regulations 
of Morocco (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad So-
cial, 2012). 
Agriculture will face important challenges in the 
coming years due to international competition, 
population decline and climate change. Accord-
ing to regulations the Regional Departement of 
Environment, the following measures in Almeria 
should be taken: irrigation design and planning, 
introduction of more resistant species to drought 
and high temperatures, control of plagues and ill-
nesses, establishment of systems to analyse the 
evolution of agriculture in the context of climate 
change, education of agriculturalists for the intro-
duction of adaptation techniques, further imple-
mentation of ecological agriculture and erosion 
control measures (Consejería del Medioambiente, 
Junta de Andalucía). Many farmers are trying to 
find a differentiation of their products, by advanc-
ing towards a more environmentally sustainable 
agriculture. Ecological greenhouse agriculture in 
Almeria started in the 1990s and by 2008 already 
700 hectares were being used for this type of agri-
culture (Salvador, 2008).
6. THE MODEL OF ALMERIA: A 
REFERENCE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES?
The supporters of this model argue that most of 
the negative externalities of the model have been 
corrected and that the model of Almeria, based 
on technology-based intensive farming represents 
an economic and social development alternative 
for depressed areas within dry regions (Garcia 
Lorca, 2010). In fact, if we compare the different 
scenarios from the 1960s to present, we can see 
the spectacular capacity of territorial transforma-
tion of this area. This is, in their opinion, a para-
digm that should be applied to other deserted 
areas suffering from the same problems to achieve 
a similar development and to regulate migratory 
movements from the regions of origin.
The model of Almeria has become a referent 
for many countries in the world. Many countries 
with different levels of development have an ac-
tive interest in the growth and development 
model of Almeria. Latin-American countries in-
cluding Chili, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and 
Colombia have started to show their interest and 
public and private institutions from all over the 
world are studying and trying to imitate the model 
(Garcia Lorca, 1999). Very important knowledge 
exchanges have also been established with Latin 
American and African countries (Interview Garcia 
Lorca, 2012). Projects like the Moproalh project 
between Alhucemas (Morocco) and the University 
of Almeria are being developed in order to transfer 
technology and knowledge to regions interested 
in copying the model (MOPROALH). Another ex-
ample is the “éburnée 1” project between the Uni-
versity of Almeria and the Ivory Coast (EBURNEE 
1). There is also a great interest from the Chinese 
government in the technical aspects of the model 
that they wish to implement in the area of Peking. 
Furthermore, the model of Almeria was recently 
presented in the United Nations during the discus-
sion on the role of cooperatives in poverty eradica-
tion in February 2012 in New York (UN, 2012). 
According to the credit cooperative Cajamar, the 
interest of these countries for this model comes 
from the fact that they have detected in it, an en-
dogenous development model (Instituto Cajamar, 
2004). This model has permitted a rapid develop-
ment mainly based on the labour factor by high 
performing agricultural cooperatives. The model 
of Almeria could constitute a paradigm and an 
economic development opportunity for countries 
with very specialised productive structures, with 
an important underdevelopment in the services 
industry, and with poor agricultural performance 
(Instituto Cajamar, 2004). 
Nevertheless, a direct transposition of the model 
to areas suffering from desertification seems dif-
ficult for various reasons. The first limitation is an 
economic one since many of the countries where 
a transposition could be an interesting and practi-
cal experience do not have the necessary economic 
resources or infrastructures needed to carry out a 
similar development. Furthermore, they do not al-
ways have access to a large solvent market like the 
European Union, with relevant purchasing power 
and enough public and private infrastructures to 
allow transportation and access of products in a 
profitable and easy manner. Other limitations to 
the transposition of the model include: produc-
tive limitations, of transport and communication, 
of technological transfer, of funding, etc. Even if 
the validation and transposition of the model of 
Almeria to countries that have not undertaken the 
industrial transition could eventually constitute an 
agrarian alternative, the particular circumstances 
of each of them should not be underestimated (In-
stituto Cajamar, 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
The model of Almeria has permitted a radical 
socio-economic transformation of one of the 
most arid regions in Europe. This region that 
expulsed its population is now a major attraction 
pole for immigrants from all over the world. The 
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efficient manipulation of the climatic factors has 
been crucial for the economic development of the 
region. Nevertheless, the agro-industrial sector in 
Almeria is now facing and will continue to face 
further challenges in the future. 
Concerning immigration, the exponential 
growth of migrants in a short period of time has 
not allowed a convenient consolidation of institu-
tions and social networks. The integration of im-
migrants remains one of the fundamental chal-
lenges of the province since there is still a big 
gap between the economic growth, which has 
proved to be spectacular, and the development 
of an integrated civil society. A continued social 
disintegration will slow down the socioeconomic 
development of Almeria. As we have observed, 
populations from very diverse horizons and cul-
tural backgrounds arrive to Almeria. These popu-
lations do not always have the same ambitions 
or needs, and policy responses must therefore be 
adapted to each particular group. Almeria needs 
to become not only a land of opportunity but also 
a multicultural, cosmopolitan and tolerant region 
that can make the best out of its cultural richness 
and diversity.  Education must play a key role in 
the reinforcement of a culture of trust between the 
different communities without forgetting that im-
migrants have played an essential role in the eco-
nomic development of the region. 
More generally, this case study helps illustrate 
the complex relationship between desertificac-
tion, poverty and migration. There is a lack of data 
regarding the nexus between desertification, un-
derdevelopement in Africa and migration towards 
Almeria. Further research is needed on the links 
between desertification, migration and intensive 
agriculture in a region that is deeply affected by 
both environmental changes and migratory move-
ments. The model of Almeria has proved to be an 
efficient solution to fight againts the environmen-
tal emigrants that had once abandoned the poor, 
underdeveloped province and could obtain similar 
results in other desertified regions. 
On the other hand, even if great progresses 
have been made, the negative environmental ex-
ternalities that the agricultural model provokes 
should not bee overlooked. Water scarcity remains 
the fundamental environmental challenge for an 
economy that is based on irrigated agriculture. 
We have seen that water resources are now be-
ing used in a much more efficient manner but 
greenhouse surface is continuingly growing and 
water resources will be scarcer in the context of 
climate change. The AGUA programme that is 
currently being used, tries to solve the problem 
of water scarcity by the means of desalinization 
instead of by an augmented water price. Further-
more, the environmental impacts of desilinisation 
should not be underestimated (OECD, 2008). The 
objective of satisfying demand whilst ensuring a 
sustainable exploitation of the system could be 
achieved by the distribution of new water resourc-
es between users, prioritizing urban demand, and 
compensating the expenses for agriculture be-
tween all consumers of the products (Downward, 
Taylor, 2007). There is a need of policies to treat 
water as the scarce resource that it is. Further-
more, policy makers must urgently take intensive 
agriculture and its effects on desertification into 
account. A sector that does not prove to be respect-
ful of the environment will not only endommage 
the land in an irreversible manner that could stop 
development all in all, but will also have rising dif-
ficulties to sell products to consummers that are 
growingly environmentally conscient (Pérez, Ro-
driguez, 2010). A greater added value of products 
must also be achived in a context of growing in-
ternational competition. Further development of 
ecological agriculture would not only aliviate the 
environmental pressure of the sector over the land 
but would also considerably increase the added 
value of the products. 
Finally, the positive effects of greenhouse farm-
ing for mitigation and adaptation in the context 
of climate change should be further researched 
since this case study seems to provide innovative 
steps forward. Important scientific and economic 
efforts should be made in order to further combat 
the negative externalities of a model that could 
eventually solve many current environmental, so-
cial and economic problems in marginal and de-
pressed areas of the planet. ❚
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CLIMATE, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
AND MIGRATION TERMINOLOGY
A GLOSSARY
Adaptation: Preparing for and coping with the 
impacts of climate changes, to changes in process-
es, practices, and structures to moderate potential 
damages or to benefit from opportunities associat-
ed with climate change (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change).
Climate change: A change of climate which is 
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity 
that alters the composition of the global atmos-
phere and which is in addition to other natural 
climate variability that has been observed over 
comparable time periods (UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Article 1, p. 4. 1992). 
Displacement: A forced removal of a person 
from his or her home or country, often due to 
armed conflict or natural disasters.
Environmental migrants: While no interna-
tionally accepted definition for persons moving for 
environmental reasons exists to date, IOM put for-
ward a working definition of “environmental mi-
grant” in an attempt to capture the complexity of 
the issue. It was presented to IOM’s membership at 
94th Council Session, it appears in the IOM World 
Migration Report 2008 and various other publica-
tions but it does not provide any legal dimension. 
“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of 
persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive 
changes in the environment that adversely affect 
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have 
to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, 
either temporarily or permanently, and who move 
either within their territory or abroad.
Evacuee: A person who has been removed from 
a dangerous place; a person who has been evacu-
ated (Merriam-Webster).
Global Environmental Change (GEC): includes 
changes in the physical and biogeochemical envi-
ronment, either caused naturally or influenced by 
human activities such as deforestation, fossil fuel 
consumption, urbanisation, land reclamation, ag-
ricultural intensification, freshwater extraction, 
fisheries over-exploitation and waste production 
(Global Environmental Change and Food Systems 
(GECAFS) http://www.gecafs.org/about/index.
html).
Internally-Displaced People (IDP): Persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged 
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to 
avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized state bor-
der (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).
Migration: The movement of a person or a 
group of persons, either across an international 
border or within a State. It is a population move-
ment, encompassing any kind of movement of peo-
ple, whatever its length, composition and causes; it 
includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, 
economic migrants, and persons moving for other 
purposes, including family reunification.
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Refugee: A person who owing to a well-found-
ed fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, and is unable to or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country (The United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 
1951 Article 1A). Note: The concept of refugee was 
expanded by regional conventions in Africa and 
Latin America to include persons who had fled war 
or other violence in their home country.
Relocation: A process whereby a community’s 
housing, assets, and public infrastructure are re-
built in another location. Relocation is sometimes 
perceived to be the best option after a disaster for 
one or more of the following reasons: (1) people 
have already been displaced by the disaster; (2) 
their current location is judged to be uninhabit-
able; or (3) relocation is considered to be the best 
option to reduce vulnerability to the risk of future 
disasters. In fact, relocation may be appropri-
ate when the disaster is the result of site-specific 
vulnerabilities. Relocation can be planned in ar-
eas that are expected to become uninhabitable to 
avoid a crisis situation and to ensure sustainabil-
ity” (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Re-
covery 2011 http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/).
Resettlement: The relocation and integration 
of people (refugees, internally-displaced persons, 
etc.) into another geographical area and environ-
ment, usually in a third country. In the refugee 
context, the transfer of refugees from the country 
in which they have sought refuge to another State 
that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will 
usually be granted asylum or some other form of 
long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will 
have the opportunity to become naturalized.
Source: Unless otherwise cited, IOM Glossary on 
Migration, 2nd Ed., IOM 2011.
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